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ABSTRACT 
The original Rome Treaties, which established the European Economic 
Community, made no direct reference to the regulation of mergers. The 
establishment and evolvement of a Community framework of merger regulation, 
therefore, was piecemeal, incremental and sporadic in nature, the building blocks of 
the framework premised upon specific cases such as the 1973 Continental Can 
judgment which established the foundations of the quasi merger regulation 
framework.' 
The European Community Merger Regulation which was formulated in 1989 and 
entered into force on September 21' 1990, aimed to establish a pro-active, pre-
emptive, unitary system of merger control. This Regulation represented a critical 
juncture in the evolvement of the merger regulation policy framework establishing a 
system that regulated mergers which possessed a Community dimension. This 
system appeared to be working effectively until early 2001-2002, when the Court of 
the First Instance reversed several of the Commission's decisions and severely 
rebuked it for its errors and incorrect interpretation of evidence when investigating 
the transaction. 
The revised Merger Regulation entered into force on May l 2004, enhancing the 
role of the Commission, introducing a higher degree of flexibility into the 
notification procedure and implementing the Significant Impediment Test. The 
Merger Task Force was dismantled and sectoral teams introduced. A Chief 
Competition Economist and team were also established to oversee the application of 
economic models during more complex investigations. The Courts have also been 
drawn into the governance regime as the whole investigative process has become 
much more adversarial in nature as parties become more willing to challenge 
Commission decisions, if they are not in agreement. 
The thesis, therefore, will examine if and how the application of the revised Merger 
Regulation has changed the direction of merger regulation policy. The thesis will 
illustrate that the application of the Regulation by the Commission represents a step 
rather than a radical change in the evolving framework of merger regulation. 
Paradigmatically and procedurally, the entry into force of the New Merger 
Regulation represents a shift in the focus and application of the provisions of the 
merger regulation framework by the Commission. The revised referral system, 
more flexible notification system, introduction of triangular meetings and the 
revision of the substantive test, all require the Commission to modilS' and 
reinterpret the foundations of the merger regulation framework. Economics now 
plays a much larger role in merger investigations, and the spectre of Court 
intervention looms on the horizon of any investigation where any party or interested 
person does not agree with the Commission's decision. 
'Case No 6172, Ew-opemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company inc. v Commission 
of the Ew-opean Communities, (1973) ECR 215; McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and 
Politicization in EU Competition Policy The Case of Merger control. Governwwe: An 
International Journal of Policy and Administration (1999), 12, (2). 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION & LITERATURE REVIEW 
Ii Introduction 
The evolvement of a European dimension to merger control is a relatively new 
innovation. The European CommunJty Merger Regulation (ECMR) was formulated 
in 1989 and entered into force on September 21st 
 1990. The aim was to establish a 
pro-active, pre-emptive, unitary system of merger' control which prevented the 
possible distortion of the Common Market as a consequence of a merger. The 
ECMR applied to any proposed concentration with a Community dimension. Until 
2000 the merger system appeared to be working effectively: between 2l 
September 1990 to December 2003, there were 2399 cases notified to the 
Commission, of which 2125 were declared compatible and only 18 were 
prohibited.2 
 The ECMR, therefore, appeared to be successful, regulating rather than 
dissuading concentrations between corporate entities. Several Commission 
decisions, however, were reversed by the Court of the First Instance (CFI) during 
2001-2002. 
A New Merger Regulation (NMR) - Regulation 139/2004 - entered into force 
on the 1' May 2004. This Regulation enhanced the role of the Commission, 
introduced a higher degree of flexibility into the notification procedure, modified 
the system, both enhancing the investigative powers of the Commission and 
increasing potential financial penalties for the failure of companies involved in the 
The term merger will be used in a generic sense throughout the thesis to refer to all 
concentrations drawn under the scope of the Regulation. Article 3 of the Regulation states that a 
concentration arises "... where a change of control on a lasting basis results from": mergers, 
joint-ventures or acquisitions. (A full list can be found in Article 3 of the Merger Regulation). 
Commission of the European Communities, European Merger Control - Council Regulation 
13912004 Statistics. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comnfcompetitionJmergersJecJstatshnnl 
 (Accessed 17/10/06). 
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proposed concentration to respond to Article 11 letters. The NMR also introduced a 
"Significant Impediment Test". Now, the Commission may block any proposed 
concentration which "would significantly impede effective competition, in the 
Common Market or in a substantial part of it, particularly as a result of the creation 
or strengthening of a dominant position"? The pre- and post-notification 
procedures have been made more flexible. As part of the revision of the system of 
merger regulation, the Directorate General for Competition (DO Comp) was 
reformed with the Merger Task Force (MTF) being dismantled and replaced by 
sectoral specific merger units coordinated by an overall merger unit. A Chief 
Competition Economist was also introduced to oversee the correct application of 
econometric analysis in complex cases. 
Although the formal aspects of the revised Merger Control Regulation have 
been examined in great detail in existing literature, the application and 
interpretation of these provisions by the Commission have, due to lack of 
substantial empirical evidence and relevant case-law, remained unexamined by 
recent analyses. This thesis will fill the gap by focusing upon empirical evidence 
which will provide an insight into the application of the NMR and the interpretation 
of the accompanying Guidelines by the Commission as the merger regulation 
framework evolves and develops. 
Eur-lex, Council Regulation (EC) No 13912004 of the 20 January 2004 on the control of 
Concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation). OJ L024, 29/1 t2004. 
AnAppmisai of the European Commission's Application of the New Merger Regulation 
In 1990, Soames4 
 stated that "[T]he coming into force of the Merger Control 
Regulation on 21 September 1990 will constitute a fundamental change in the 
control of mergers at ... Community level." Thus the entry into force of the ECMR 
represents what Bulmer and Burch 5 refer to as a "critical juncture". 6 The entry into 
force, and the subsequent application of the Regulation by the Commission, 
highlighted the framework's strengths and weaknesses. The revised Regulation 
sought to retain the successful elements of the Regulation whilst at the same time 
ifiling the gaps and providing clarification. Weitbrecht 7 stated "[T]he year 2004 
will be remembered in EU merger control as a year of transition". Entry into force 
of the NMR signified the introduction of a "new substantive test as well as 
significant procedural changes". My hypothesis therefore centres around an 
analysis of the application of the revised Regulation by the Commission. The thesis 
will examine the hypothesis that the application of the NMR by the Commission 
will result in a step-change rather than a radical readjustment of the existing Merger 
Control Regulation framework. To assess the accuracy of this hypothesis, the thesis 
will, therefore, provide an analysis of the recent developments in EU Merger 
control and the subsequent application of these revised provisions by the 
Commission. 
4 Soames, T. EC and Competition Unit, Norton Rose, Merger Regulation: Member States and 
the Commission. Law Society's Gazette, 18 July 1990. 
'Bulmer, S. J. & M. Burch, Organising for Europe. Public Administration, 1998, 76, (4): 605. 
&CriticaI junctures create branching points at which institutional developments move on to a 
new trajectonj or pathway which is then followed incrementally until a new critical moment 
arises, a new critical juncture follows and a new direction is taken". (Bulmer, S. J. & M. Burch, 
Organising for Europe. Public Administration, 1998, 76, (4): 605. 605). 
7 Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004- An Overview. E.C.LR.. 2005, 26(2): 67-74. 
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11 Literature Review 
The purpose of this section of the thesis is to provide an overview of the 
existing literature and illustrate where this thesis can fill the gap and add a new 
dimension to what is already available in this field of research. 
The existing politico-jurisprudential-historical analysis of EU merger 
regulation policy considers the evolvement of EU merger control from the Treaty of 
Paris (1951) until the entry into force of the ECMR in 1990. Fountoukakos and 
Ryan note that "Merger control has been a feature of European competition law 
since its inception". 8 They provide a brief historical account of the evolvement of 
EU merger control, observing that Articles 65 and 66 of the Treaty of Paris 
prohibited restrictive practices and permitted parties to merge if this did not hinder 
competition, whilst the Spaak report (1955) anticipated the necessity for merger 
regulation, stating the need to prohibit the domination of a market by one party. 
The Treaty of Rome (1957), however, did not contain any explicit reference to 
merger control. Instead Articles 81 (ex. Article 85) and 82 (ex. Article 86) regulate 
the behaviour of undertakings, rather than mergers per se, and it is noted that these 
Articles did not and were not supposed to provide a sufficient legal base to regulate 
mergers. 9 
In 1966 the Commission, in its Memorandum on the Concentration of 
Enterprises in the Common Market, identified that some type of merger control 
Regulation was required as lack of competence to intervene in this area of 
competition policy prevented the Commission from establishing and regulating 
competition in the Common Market.' ° After the European Court of Justice of the 
European Communities' (ECJ) Continental Can judgment (1973)," the 
'Fountoukakos, K. & Ryan, S. A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. KC.LIt, 
26(5), 2005: 277-296. 
9 Fountoukakos, IC & Ryan, S. A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. E.C.LIt, 
26(5), 2005: 277-296; Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (2°c' Ed.), OUP, 2004. 
Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (2M 
 Ed.), OUP, 2004: 855. 
• Judgment of the Court of 21 February 1973, Case 6-72 Europemboiiage Corporation and 
Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission of the European Communities, ECR [1973]. In 
this case Continental Can appealed to the ECJ on the basis that the Commission had made 
several mistakes when prohibiting the transaction. The ECJ reversed the Commission's 
decision, stating that the Commission had hued to meet the burden of proof in order to show 
that Continental Can possessed a dominant position in the relevant market and would thus 
11 
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Commission first proposed a Merger Control Regulation in 1973, premised upon 
Articles 83 (cx. Article 87) and 235, (ex. Article 308) but the Council failed to 
make a decision due to divisions concerning the extent to which "non-competition 
considerations should be taken into account"! 2 Revised draft Merger Control 
Regulations were presented by the Commission to the Council in 1981, 1984 and 
1986. A revised Merger Control Regulation containing a Dominance Test (DD 
was adopted by the Commission in 1988. This was accepted by the Council in 
1989. 13 Analysis of the sporadic evolvement of merger regulation gives an 
interesting insight into the politico-jurisprudential history of merger control policy. 
The critical junctures which have shaped the direction of policy can be placed into 
context, and the main actors who, and institutions which, have shaped the pathway 
(or hindered it) can be identified. The analysis of the formative period of merger 
control can then be taken forward and expanded upon as the path dependent 
structures develop. 
The contents of both the old' 4 and new15 Merger Control Regulations 
have already been examined in great detail in existing literature, as has the 
gradual evolvement of merger regulation policy from the entry into force of the 
first EC Merger Control Regulation, the ECMR, onwards.' 6 A significant 
amount of literature examines the pros and cons of the DT, a central tenet of the 
ECMR. The two phase investigative process has been analysed in great detail. t7 
Literature also focuses upon the successful operation of the ECMR until the late 
impede or eliminate competition. The ECJ did, however, uphold the Commission's argument 
that a company can impede competition if a company, which already holds a dominant position 
then increases its dominance through the acquirement of a competitor. 
12 iones A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (2 d Ed.), OUP, 2004: 855: Fountoukakos, K. & 
Ryan, S. A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. E.C.LR., 26(5), 2005: 277-296. 
' 3 .Jones, A. & B. Suffrmn, FE Competition Law. (2S  Ed.), OUP, 2004:855: Fountoukakos, K. & 
Ryan, S. A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. E.C.LK, 26(5), 2005:277-2%. 
"Lyons B. It. Reform of European Merger Policy. Working Paper CCR 03-5, Centre for 
Competition & Regulation, UEA Norwich. 
"Lyons, B. R. Reform of European Merger Policy. Working Paper CCR 03-5, Centre for 
Competition & Regulation, UEA Norwich; Ratcliff, J. Major Events and Policy Issues in EC 
Competition Law. I.C.0 IL, 15(2), 2004: 19-24. 
' 6 Levy N. EU Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 
195-218. 
' 7 Cini, M. & L. McGowan, Competition Policy in the European Union St Martins Press, 1998: 
21; Fountoukakos, K. & Ryan, S. A New Substantive Test for EU Merger ControL KC.LR., 
26(5), 2005: 277-296. 
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20th Century and provides analysis of the cases which highlight the 
shortcomings of the original framework. The drivers for change: the increasing 
pressure that the DO Comp was placed under due to the escalating number of 
notifications which required the MTF to investigate; 18 publication of the Green 
Paper on the Review of Council Regulation No. 4064/89;' enhanced 
extraterritorial competence, endowed by the Courts 20 coupled with the reversal 
of Conmilssion decisions by the CFI, are all appraised in the existing 
literature. 2 ' The irffluences of national actors in shaping the policy making 
process and content of the recast Merger Control Regulation are also analysed? 2 
More recent analysis examines the finite detail, substance and potential of the 
NMR which entered into force on l May 2004, comparing the new substantive 
test, the Substantial Impediment of Competition Test (SIEC), with the old DT, 
as outlined in the ECMR and the Substantive Lessening of Competition (SLC) 
Test used, for example, by the US and UK? 3 
Lev?4  provides an interesting, concise introduction to the analysis of the 
formative period of merger control. His article outlines the principles which 
provide the rationale for the initiation of EU merger regulation policy. Continued 
removal of the internal barriers to thcilitate the successflul operation of the Common 
Market will enable "corporate reorganisation in the Community, particularly in the 
forms of concentration". 25 "[M}ergers and other forms of concentrations" are 
1t Morgan, E. J. & S. McGuire, Transatlantic divergence: GE-Honeywell and the EU's merger 
'ic
Journal of European Public Policy, 11(1), 2004: 42. 
9 Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004 - An Overview. E.C.L.k, 26(2), 2005:67-74; 
Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (2" Ed.), OUP, 2004:860-2, 876; Levy, N. EU 
Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 195-218. 
20 Levy, N. EU Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 
195-2 18. 
2tLyons, B. R. Reform of European Merger Policy. Working Paper CCR 03-5, Centre for 
Competition & Regulation, UEA Norwick Cmi, M. & L. McGowan, Competition Policy in the 
European Union. St Martins Press, 1998; Morgan, E. J. & S. McGuire, Transatlantic 
divergence: GE-Honeywell and the EU's merger policy. Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, II 
(I), 2004:42; Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (20d Ed.), OUP, 2004; Jones, A. & 
B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (2nd Ed.), OUP, 2004; Levy, N. EU Merger Control: From 
Birth to Adolescence. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 195-218:211. 
Jones, A. & B. Suffrmn, EC Competition Law. (20d 
 Ed.), OUP, 2004:913. 
e.g. Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004 - An Overview. E.C.LR.. 2005,26(2): 67-74. 
2 Levy N. EU Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 
195-218. 
"Levy, N. EU Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 
195-2 18. 
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capable of enhancing the competitiveness of the European economy and the 
standards of living within the Union and ensure that the evolvement of these new 
concentrations do not damage the principle of effective competition. 26 A more 
recently announced principle of EU merger policy was the need to protect 
consumers from the effects of monopolistic activities, price fixing, poorer quality 
products and bundling of particular goods. 27 
Levy provides a brief résumé of the main details of the ECMR and identifies 
four epochs in the evolvement of EU merger regulation policy. 1990 to 1994, were, 
according to Levy, "the early years of discovery". During that period, the 
Commission began to use economic methodology to meet the procedural deadlines 
for each case and work with the Member State antitrust authorities, utilising the 
ECMR as a tool to encourage a unified approach to merger control. "A significant 
and disproportionate amount of time" was spent addressing issues which emerged 
as a consequence of the implementation of the Regulation. The first "milestone", 
1995 to 1998, represented "the years of consolidation", as the limitations of the 
ECMR were addressed by the Commission, introducing a "short form" for 
straightforward proposed concentrations, starting to assess the spill-over effects 
from the creation of "full-function joint ventures" and in order to reduce the need 
for multi-jurisdictional filings, establishing a second lower threshold, to trigger the 
Commission's involvement and competence over transactions which covered three 
or more Member States. The Commission also adopted the Market Definition 
Notice, institutionalising the principle of market definition. The "increasing 
maturity, confidence and sophistication in the Commission's substantive review" 
meant that appraisals of transactions became increasingly detailed? 8 
Tillotson, J. & N. Foster, Text, Cases and Materials on European Union. Cavendish 
Publishing, (4th  ed), 2004. 
Tillotson, J. & N. Foster, Tas Case., and Materiais on European Union. Cavendish 
Publishing, (0 ed), 2004: 195. 
2t lillotson, I. & N. Foster, Text, Cases and Materials on European Union. Cavendish 
Publishing, (4th 
 ed), 2004: 197. 
' Tillotson, J. & N. Foster, Text, Cases and Materials on European Union Cavendish 
Publishing, (4" ed), 2004: 205. 
14 
An Appniisai of the European Commission's Application of the New Mergo Regulation 
During this period, the Commission started to initiate a number of economic 
antitrust theories, prohibiting: eight proposed transactions, due to concerns about 
vertical effects; a merger of two platinum suppliers on the basis that they could 
establish oligopolistic dominance in the platinum market and also considered the 
possibility of conglomerate effects in several cases including coca-cola 
Enterprises/Amalgamated Beverages GB. 29 The first transatlantic differences 
concerning merger control policy became apparent in Boeing/McDonnell 
Douglas.3° 
 The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) felt that the proposed 
transaction did not require remedial action as the merger would not threaten the 
dynamics of the market, whereas the European Commission expressed concern over 
the reduction of global aircraft suppliers and the consequential strengthening of 
Boeing's position within the market. The Commission, therefore, only agreed to 
completion of the transaction on the condition that a series of remedies were 
implemented. 
The years of controversy, 1994 to 2001, represented a "... forceful, confident, 
and creative approach to its application" of merger regulation. 3 ' The Commission 
became more assertive, prohibiting several transactions, utilising a wide range of 
economic theories when assessing transactions and developing the principle of 
collective dominance. The Commission also began to evaluate transactions where 
the merging parties possessed less than 40% of the market share post merger as a 
possible situation of single-firm dominance. Proposed packages of remedial action, 
put forward by the merging firms after deadlines had passed, were ignored by the 
Commission. The transatlantic furore over the General Electric/Honeywell (GEl 
Honeywel0 32 decision, highlighted the differing approaches to merger regulation, 
Tillotson, J. & N. Foster, Text, Cases and Materials on European Union. Cavendish 
Publishing, (4th 
 ed), 2004:206. Case No. IVIM.794 Coca-Cola Enterprises/A maigamated 
Beverages GB, OJ L218 (1997). Commission authorized Coca-Cola's acquisition of 
Amalgamated Beverages GB. Transfer would go to The Coca Cola Company (parent company), 
thus becoming verticaJly integrated into their soft drinks portfolio. Conclusion: would not 
increase dominant position or impede competition. 
3° Merger between two US aerospace giants. Approved by FTC. Only approved by EU after 
remedies promised by Boeing - cancel the contracts with US airlines. 
tT,ilotson J. & N. Foster, Text, Cases and Materials on European Union. Cavendish 
Publishing, (4th 
 ed), 2004: 207. 
32 Case No. M.2220 - General Electric/Honeywell. Proposed acquisition by General Electric of 
Honeywell Inc. Passed by FTC. Commission expressed concern that transaction would reduce 
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with US antitrust commentators and officials very vocal in their differing opinions. 
Reservations were expressed over the Commission's role as "investigator, 
prosecutor and judge in EU merger control". 33 As the ECMR had evolved, checks 
and baJances had not developed at the same pave, making them less effective at 
monitoring the Commission's actions when appraising mergers. Lack of a swift 
judicial review, despite the introduction of the fast track procedure, was also seen as 
a negative feature of the existing framework. 
The "years of reckoning and reform", 2002-2003 saw the adoption of the 
Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Control Regulation, which identified the 
need to reform merger regulation in order to meet the challenges of: global markets; 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); the completion of the Single Market and 
the increased interaction of national and supranational antitrust authorities. Levy's 
analysis outlined the relatively "modest" proposals of the Green Paper, which were 
revised as a consequence of the CFI reversing three of the Commission's decisions 
which prohibited concentrations from taking place. He also analysed the proposed 
revised Regulation and the accompanying Guidelines and Notices, illustrating how 
the proposed NMR differed from the ECMR and how the new substantive test 
bridged the "enforcement gap" between the US and UK SLC test. The NMR, rather 
than a judicial-led system, adopted a more flexible timetable, with Courts providing 
a speedier process of appeal. 
Levy made several points and observations which remain pertinent despite 
the recent revisions to the merger regulation framework. As the EU merger 
regulation framework has evolved, it has become "an integral part of the antitrust 
practice",34 with a substantial amount of accompanying jurisprudence providing 
clarification on a variety of issues relating to the ECMR The approach of the 
Conmiission towards the appraisal of mergers is transparent: all Commission 
competition and ultimately raise prices for consumers, prohibited the transaction. (Prohibition 
y
T
held by the ECJ). 
illotson, J. & N. Foster, Text, Cares and Materials on European Union. Cavendish 
Publishing, (4113 
 ed), 2004. 
Tillotson, J. & N. Foster, Text, Cases and Materials on European Union. Cavendish 
Publishing, (4 ed), 2004: 200. 
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decisions are published on the DO Comp website, 35 as are consultation documents. 
Finally, the focus upon the use of economic methodology by the MTF has 
encouraged the other Directorates within DO Comp to also utilise economic 
methodology. Although Levy's analysis of the evolvement of EU merger policy 
has been rendered outdated by the entiy into force of the NMR., and the Guidelines 
in 2004, this article remains an excellent source of information, outlining the main 
points of the ECMR, pinpointing the main issues and drivers which precipitated the 
revision of the original Merger Control Regulation. Levy's examination represents 
a step up from a narrative account to an in-depth analysis. Through utilisation of a 
comparative methodology in order to outline: the differing merger regimes; the 
identification of the principles which underpin EU merger regulation; the key 
developments and also the drivers which have shaped reform, he therefore provided 
analysis which can be built upon as the EU merger regime evolves. 
The substantive test in EU merger control has proved to be the most 
contentious issue, both in practice36 and when examined in the existing literature 
appraising merger control policy. Despite the fact that in 2000, the Us prohibited a 
takeover of BOC by Air Liquide/Air Liquid 37 which had already been sanctioned by 
the EU, transatlantic divergence of attitudes towards the substantive test only 
became more apparent and vocal after the GE/Honeywell case,38 "which came as a 
shock to the system", considering the extent of EU/US collaboration in competition 
policy.39 This case is significant both because it illustrates the extent to which EU 
competition policy can affect "US-based multinational firms" and because it 
illustrates how two antitrust authorities, presented with the same infonnation, came 
to diametrically opposed conclusions about the effects of the proposed merger upon 
Tillotson, J. & N. Foster, Tat, Cases and Materials on European Union. Cavendish 
Publishing, (4th ed), 2004: 201. 
36 Selvam, V. S. V. The EC Merger Control Impasse: Is There A Solution To This Predicament. 
£C.L.R, 25(1), 2004: 52-67; Morgan, E. J. & S. McGuire, Transatlantic divergence: GE-
Honeywell and the EU's merger policy. Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, 11(1), 2004:42. 
37 Case No COMP/M. 1630 Air Liquide/BOC. This transaction involved the acquisition of SOC 
(UK) by Air Liquide (France) and Air Products(USA). These are all large gas producers. The 
Commission held jurisdiction over Air Liquide but not Air Products. This transaction was 
cleared (with substantial comnlitinents) by the Commission but blocked by the FTC. 
33 Veljanovski, C. EC Merger Development after GEl Honeywell and Airtours. Antitrust 
Bulletin, March 2004; Morgan, E. J. & S. McGuire, Transatlantic divergence: GE-Honeywell 
and the EU's merger policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(1), 2004: 42. 
39 Burnside, A. GE, Honey, I Sunk the Merger. KCMR., 23(2), 2002: 107-110. 
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world markets. 40 Academic argument focused upon the need for the introduction of 
a uniform substantive test, 4 ' because as Patterson and Shapiro 42 noted, conflicting 
substantive tests increase transaction costs for the proposed merging parties and can 
damage the political consensus and agreement that underpin the evolving 
international competition framework. 
Levy also contrasted the main provisions of the ECMR with the US merger 
control framework, illustrating the differing standards of dominance, comparing the 
SLC to the DT, highlighting the fact that there were ways that Member States could 
become involved during the appraisal process, whereas in the US, there is no formal 
avenue for the states' involvement in the process. The ECMR was premised upon a 
strict timetable, requiring the submission of a detailed set of information at the 
outset of the appraisal and an administrative system, based around the MTF and 
Commission approval. The Courts could only be brought in to rule on a point of 
law whereas in the US, the timetable is more flexible, the information required at 
the outset of the merger investigation is only minimal and the system is not 
administrative but judicial: parties must persuade the Courts to permit the 
concentration to go ahead. Although the NMR has rendered some of the points 
outdated, it remains an interesting comparative account of the main points of the 
ECMR, presenting a comparative framework which can be built upon, examining 
how the new NMR differs from the ECMR, identif'ing the points on which the 
NMR converges with the US system of merger regulation. 
The capabilities of, and gaps in, the DT have also been discussed in great 
detail.44 There is a general consensus that the DT is capable of assessing vertical 
40 Morgan, E. J. & S. McGuire, Transatlantic divergence: GE-Honeywell and the EU's merger 
Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, 11(l), 2004: 42.. 
TMorgan, E. J. & S. McGuire, Transatlantic divergence: GE-Honeywell and the EU's merger 
Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, 11(1), 2004:42. 
2 Patterson, D.E. & C. Shapiro, Trans-Atlantic Divergence in GE/Honeywell: Causes and 
Lessons. Ansitrust Magazines November 12, 2001. 
43 Patterson, D.E. & C. Shapiro, Trans-Atlantic Divergence in GE/Honeywell: Causes and 
Lessons. AmltrustMagrineNovember 12,2001:200. 
44 Selvam, V. S. V. The EC Merger Control Impasse: Is There A Solution To This Predicament. 
£C.L14 25(1), 2004: 52-67; ' Veljanovski, C. EC Merger Development after GE/ Honeywell 
and Airtours. Antitrust Bulletin, March 2004; Fingleton, J. & D. Nolan, Mind the gap: 
Reforming the EU Merger Regulation, (in translation as: Mind the Gap. La riforma del 
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mergers as well as conglomerate mergers between two companies which make 
products that belong to the same family, which could be bundled together, thus 
enhancing the merged company's market power as its portfolio of products 
increased as a result of the merger. The DI is also capable of assessing collective 
dominant situations and preventing one merged company from dominating a 
market. 
The literature, which examines the gaps or flaws of the DT, highlights its 
limitations when a major player possesses less than 40% of the market and thus 
cannot be considered "dominant" in the eyes of the EU. A "three to two merger" in 
this type of market will not necessarily allow one of the remaining firms to become 
dominant or control the market, but may allow one player to manipulate the market 
in the Iliture." Weitbrech& agrees that the DT does possess limitations when it is 
used to appraise mergers which are based in markets which have a "high level of 
concentration even before the merger". The test for single firm dominance was 
appropriate when the proposed merger would create a "new market leader", but if 
the number of competing finns is reduced without establishing a new leader, the 
only way potential dominance could be assessed is to consider if all the finns, 
which include the merging parties, could create a situation of collective dominance 
within that particular market, which would result in a situation of "co-ordinated 
effects". 41 If the collusion between finns is tacit, then the conditions are laid down 
by the Airtours48 judgment. Non-coordinated cooperation or collusion, however, 
was not covered by the original Merger Control Regulation. Thus a "gap in the 
regoiamento comunitario suite concentrazioni), Mercato Concorcnze Regole, No. 2: 297-308, 
2003. 
Selvam, V. S. V. The EC Merger Control Impasse: is There A Solution To This Predicament. 
&C.LR, 25(1), 2004: 52-67. 
46 Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004—An Overview. £C.LIt, 26(2), 2005:67-74. 
' Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004 — An Overview. KCLR., 26(2), 2005: 67-74. 
"Case T-342/99, Ainourspic. v. Commission, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 6 June 
2002. In this case the CFI overturned the Commission's decision to prohibit the acquisition of 
First Choice by Airtours on the basis that it would create a dominant oligopoly. The CFI found 
that the Commission had fuiled to find evidence of tacit collusion. The CFI provided a checklist 
fbi future cases. To identify cases of collective dominance the market must be transparent; the 
tacit collusion must be sustainable over time and the cooperation between competitors must not 
be threatened by new entrants into the market (Lexecon, Competition Memo: Ainours Cay; 
1999:1). 
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enforcement reginie"49 evolved as an unanticipated consequence of the ECMR. it 
was also debatable whether or not the: 
"... EC may have lacked a legal basis to intervene below the level of 
single dominance. Indeed, there was uncertainty about the EC's power 
to prohibit mergers under a theory of unilateral effects at 
This strand of literature often compares the DT with the SLC Test, to illustrate 
where the US Test can fill the gaps. This analysis has become more useful as a tool 
of comparison in order to consider if the new substantive test has filled the gaps left 
by the original DT. 
Literature examining the evolvement of EU merger control evaluated the 
drivers for reform: the controversial decision in GFJHoneywellSl - where the 
Commission prohibited the merger which the US antitrust authorities had already 
agreed to - highlighted the transatlantic differences in merger control. The failures 
on the part of the Commission concerning the use of inadequate economic analysis, 
procedural problems 52 and the impact these issues have had upon the subsequent 
reform of the merger framework, were also analysed in great detail. 53 Both these 
ffictors shaped and influenced the content of the Green Paper on Merger Reform 
published in December 200154 
 and can be identified as a series of critical junctures 
which shaped the future pathway of EU merger policy. 
Examination of these pressures facing the DG Comp creates the majority of 
the politico-jurisprudential literature. This literature also speculates upon the 
possible detail of the reformed Merger Control Regulation in tenns of the content of 
a revised substantive test, drawing comparisons with the US version. 55 
49 Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004 - An Overview. &C.LIL. 2005, 26(2): 67-74. 
5° Baxter, S. & F. Dethmers, Unilateral Effects under the European Merger Regulatiorn How Big 
is the Gap. KC.LR ., 26(7), 2005: 380-389. 
5t Lyons, B. R. Reform of European Merger Policy. Working Paper CCR 03-5, Centre for 
Competition & Regulation, UEA Norwich.; Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004 - An 
Overview. KC.LK . 2005,26(2): 67-74. 
52 Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004 - An Overview. E.C.LR.. 2005, 26(2): 67-74. 
"Editor, Commission loses Tetra Laval/Sidel Appeal. EU Focus, 2005: 2-4. 
M Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004 - An Overview. E.CLIL. 2005, 26(2): 67-74. 
"Lyons, B. R. Reform of European Merger Policy. Working Paper CCR 03-5, Centre for 
Competition & Regulation, UEA Norwich. 
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Although the Green Paper had been published before the CFI reversed three 
merger prohibition decisions, the points raised by the CFI, which criticised the 
procedures of the DO Comp, influenced the subsequent reform of EU merger 
policy. The most recent body of literature focuses upon assessment of the reform of 
EU merger policy, examining the recast Merger Control Regulation. Jones and 
Sufrmn, 56 
 for example, provide an in-depth analysis of the evolvement of EU merger 
policy, the purpose, pros and cons of a merger and the different types of merger. 
Details of the revised Merger Control Regulation are examined in detail in most EU 
competition policy monographs, as are the accompanying Guidelines, Notices and 
instances when the NMR cannot be applied - when the concentration lacks a 
Community dimension. The expanded referral system, flexible timetable, internal 
reform of the Commission, the introduction of a Chief Competition Economist and 
the abolition of the MTF, which was subsequently reorganised along sectoral lines, 
have all been examined. 57 Interestingly, the potential for a residual role for Articles 
81 and 82 EC Treaty, are discussed, as is the potential for the expansion of private 
antitrust litigation as there is now potential for private individuals to challenge the 
compatibility of a concentration with Articles 81 and 82 in national courts, 58 and 
claim damages. 
Examination of the STEC Test, however, is the focal point for the majority of 
recent literature examining the evolvement of EU merger regulation policy? 9 Most 
of the literature contrasts the "old" Article 2(2) with the new version. Roller and de 
Ia Mano,60 for example, examine the impact of the new substantive test for the 
European Commission, contrasting the old version, outlined in the ECMR (Article 
2(2)) which bars mergers which: "create or strengthen a dominant position as a 
"s, A. & B. Suffhn, EC Competition Law. (2h11  Ed.), OUP, 2004. 
"Jones, A. & B. Sufihin, EC Competition Law. (2S  Ed.), OUP, 2004; Lyons, B. R. Reform of 
European Merger Policy. Working Paper CCR 03-5, Centre for Competition & Regulation, 
UEA Norwich. 
so Jones, A. & B. Suffrmn, EC Competition Law. (2S  Ed.), OUP, 2004: 897. 
Baxter, S. & F. Dethmers, Unilateral Effects under the European Merger Regulation: How Big 
is the (lap. KCLR., 26(7), 2005: 380-389. 
60 Roller, L. H. & M. de In Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL European Commission, January 2006. Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. 1 04/search?qtcache:39_M6OUYXl wJ:europa.eu.int/commldgs/competition/ne 
w_substantiveJest.pdf+SIEC+test&hJ=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd= 10 [Accessed 22/02/06]. 
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result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded", with the 
new Article 2(2). This modifies the original Article, stating that: 
"A concentration which would significantly impede effective 
competition, in particular by the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position, in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it 
shall be declared incompatible with the Common Market." 6 ' 
The original Article 2(2) is open to two interpretations: 62 firstly mergers, 
which strengthen or create a dominant position, automatically hamper effective 
competition; secondly that the DT is a two-step test. "A concentration is 
prohibited" if it reinforces or creates a situation of dominance and there is evidence 
that this would significantly impede competition. 63 The original Article 2(2), 
therefore, is restricted by the emphasis placed upon the principle of dominance as a 
necessary prerequisite before a proposed concentration can be prohibited. As noted 
by Roller and de La Mano," the Courts have reinforced the principle that the two 
tier interpretation of Article 2(2) is dependent upon the principle of dominance. 
The Commission restated this view, focusing upon the competitive effects of the 
proposed concentration: the effect it will have upon that particular market, rather 
than examining the effect the merger will have upon market share. The revised 
Article 2(2) does not rely on the principle of dominance as the only reason to 
prohibit a merger. 65 Fountoukakos and Ryan66 
 argue that the SLEC fills the gaps 
left by the dominance test. The new substantive test "now contains not only a pure 
competition test but also one which is drafted in terms that reflect accurately the 
underlying objectives of competition policy". The two-tier or limb test has been 
combined: the assessment now considers if the proposed transaction will impede 
61 Roller, L. H. & M. de Ia Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL European Commission, January 2006. 
Roller, L. H. & M. de Ia Mano, The Impact oft/ic New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL European Commission, January 2006. 
CCamesasca, P. D. The Explicit Efficiency Defence in Merger Control: Does it Make the 
Difference. KC.LR , 20(1), 1999: 14-28; Fountoukakos, K. & Ryan, S. A New Substantive Test 
for EU Merger Control. E.C.LR., 26(5), 2005:277-2%. 
'Roller L. H. & M. de Ia Mano, The Impact oft/ic New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL European Commission, January 2006. 
'Fountoukakos, K. & Ryan, S. A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. KC.LRL, 
26(5), 2005: 277-296. 
Fountoukakos, K. & Ryan, S. A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. E.C.LR., 
26(5), 2005: 277-296. 
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competition but does not need to find dominance as required by the original test 
They argue that the new test will enhance the efficacy of merger control, filling the 
gaps left by the dominance test. Weitbrecht, 6' citing Recital 25 of the NMR, notes 
that the purpose of the SIEC is to close the gap concerning unilateral effects, which 
came to light in the Airtours judgment, whilst maintaining the acquis 
communautaire established by existing case-law and Commission decisions. 
The analysis of Baxter and Dethmers 68 of the new substantive test considers 
the application of unilaterai effects analysis, as the SIEC gives the Commission a 
legal base from which to appraise transactions on the basis of: anticipated unilateral 
effects; how the SIEC compares to the DT; how the two coexist under the NMR 
and, finally, whether or not the threshold for intervention has been lowered as a 
consequence of the recast Merger Control Regulation. "Unilateral effects analysis 
is premised upon the oligopoly model" whereby dominance is not identified as a 
consequence of market share but as the potential of companies in the same market 
post-merger to manipulate prices and distort competition through "strategic 
interaction", whereby competing firms consider or anticipate the action of their 
competitors before taking a course of actionP 9 Single firm dominance is premised 
upon the monopoly model whereby one company can dominate the market by itself. 
Since it holds a monopolistic position it therefore does not need to consider its 
competitors' actions. 70 
 Both these theories have a legal basis under the NMR, with 
Baxter and Dethmers 7 ' citing several cases where either unilateral effect or the 
single finn dominance model are used to assess proposed transactions. They 
comment that: 
"The co-existence of unilateral effects and single dominance under the 
EC's case law is undesirable, as it increases legal uncertainty and 
67 Weitbrecht A. EU Merger Control in 2004 - An Overview. KC.LIt . 2005,26(2): 67-74, 
a Baxter, S. & F. Dethmers, Unilateral Effects under the European Merger Regulation: How Big 
is the Gap. E.C.LR., 26(7), 2005: 380-389. 
' Baxter, S. & F. Dethmers, Unilateral Effects under the European Merger Regulation: How Big 
is the Gap. EC.LR ., 26(7), 2005: 380-389. 
7° Baxter, S. & F. Dethmers, Unilateral Effects wider the European Merger Regulation: How Big 
is the Gap. KC.LR ., 26(7), 2005: 380-389. 
71 Baxter, S. & F. Dethmers, Unilateral Effects under the European Merger Regulation: How Big 
is the Gap. &C.LR., 26(7), 2005:380-389. 
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undermines the potential positive impact that a rigorous unilateral effects 
approach could have on the analysis of horizontal mergers." 72 
The Commission may apply either one of these theories to the appraisal of 
horizontal mergers, which may result in the outcome of the appraisal being very 
different than if the other theory had been used to assess the transaction. They also 
consider that the Commission will apply these theories opportunistically, for 
example, not utilising unilateral effects theory because a high proportion of market 
share is seen as indicative of single firm dominance. The incorporation of unilateral 
effect theory into the equation may actually negate the findings of single firm 
dominance, as has been the case in several appraisals.' 3 
The threshold for intervention was not supposed to change as a consequence 
of the entry into force of the NMRY Baxter and Dethmers' 5 argue that, both in 
theory and reality, the threshold for intervention has changed as a consequence of 
the revised Merger Control Regulation. Transactions which would not have been 
covered by the single or collective dominance analysis may now be subject to 
unilateral effects. The threshold for identif'ing unilateral effects is lower than 
single-firm dominance. Even if the merged entity does not hold a clearly dominant 
position within its respective market, the transaction may be prohibited on the basis 
that it is anticompetitive: a reduction of the number of competing firms will 
increase prices whereas single market dominance is measured in increased market 
share. 
The literature which examines the new substantive test compares the DT with 
the SIEC, illustrating where the new substantive test fills the gaps left as an 
unanticipated consequence of the DT. This strand of literature, by focusing upon a 
central tenet of the old and new Merger Control Regulation, provides an in-depth 
Baxter, S. & F. Dethmers, Unilateral Effects under the European Merger Regulation: How Big 
is the Gap. E.C.L.R., 26(7), 2005: 380-389. 
73 Baxter, S. & F. Dethmers, Unilateral Effects under the European Merger Regulation: How Big 
is the Gap. EC.LR ., 26(7), 2005: 380-389.. 
74 Baxter, S. & F. Dethiners, Unilateral Eflècts under the European Merger Regulation: How Big 
is the Gap. E.C.LR., 26(7), 2005: 380-389. 
" Baxter, S. & F. Dethmeis, Unilateral Effects under the European Merger Regulation: How Big 
is the Gap. E.C.LR., 26(7), 2005:380-389. 
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analysis of the potential of the new test, analyses the potential gaps and uses several 
antitrust theories to test the efficacy and the potential for gaps in the new test. 
As noted by Lyons, 16 the "globalization of industry" requires the filing of 
proposed mergers to be appraised by antitrust agencies in more than one country, 
thus precipitating the comparison of the agencies' procedures, frameworks and 
ideologies. The potential for cooperation between differing agencies is also 
considered in terms of existing cross-national agreements concerning the appraisal 
of mergers and exchange of information. 
There is a strand of literature which examines and contrasts EU/US Merger 
Control Regulations but this relates more to the original ECMR - The European 
Commission Directorate General for Competition International Bar Association, for 
example, held a conference in 2000 examining international merger control which 
included a panel on the comparison of EU and US Merger Control Regulations. 
This body of literature draws comparisons with Section 7 of the US Clayton Act 
which forms the basis of the US merger framework, the ideological differences 
between the EU and US merger regulation frameworks and the comparative 
longevity of the US system in comparison with the EU. The Sherman Act of 1890 
marked the start of the evolvement of the US competition law framework. 17 The 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was established and the Clayton Act entered into 
force in 1914, with the 1950 amendments and the 1992 Guidelines78 adding to the 
evolving framework - compared to the EU system which only entered into force in 
1990. The majority of the literature examines the difference between the ECMR 
and the US tests for the appraisal of mergers. 79 The original ECMR possessed a 
DT: Article 2(3) stated that: 
76 ns B. it Reform of European Merger Policy. Working Paper CCR 03-5. Centre for 
Competition & Regulation, UEA Norwich. 
'Fountoukakos, K. & Ryan, S. A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. E.CL.R., 
26(5), 2005: 277-296. 
Camesasca, P. D. The Explicit Efficiency Defence in Merger Control: Does it Make the 
Difference. E.CLR,20(I), 1999: 14-28. 
" Cainesasca, P. D. The Explicit Efficiency Defence in Merger Control: Does it Make the 
Difference. RC.LR , 20(l), 1999: 14-28: Lyons, B. R. Reform of European Merger Policy. 
Working Paper CCR 03-5. Centre for Competition & Regulation, IJEA Norwich; Levy, N. EU 
Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 195-218: 202. 
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"A concentration [i.e. merger or acquisition] which creates or 
strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective 
competition would be significantly impeded in the Common Market or 
in a substantiaj part of it shall be declared incompatible with the 
Common Market." 
The Clayton Act, Section 7, possesses a SLC test which prevented the 
purchase of the: 
"stock or other share capital of another corporation ... where the effect 
of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between 
the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making 
the acquisition... 
As noted by Camesasca, 80 the appraisal criteria for the ECMR are much wider 
than both the Clayton Act and the U.S. Merger Guidelines. They aimed to achieve 
the goal of the EU: market integration, whilst the aim of the US merger regime is to 
protect the consumer. 8 ' Although this argument has now been superseded by the 
insertion of the SIEC Test, it is useflul to outline this discussion as it embodies a 
crucial aspect of the evolvement of EU merger policy. 
Other differences between the anti-trust frameworks highlighted in the 
existing literature include the examination of the differing institutions which police 
each respective framework. The EU system, prior to the 2004 reform, possessed a 
MTF, which had the competence to investigate all proposed mergers. The merger 
review had two phases, with very specific deadlines for the completion of each 
phase and all the European Commissioners made the final decision, based upon the 
decision of the MTF whether or not a merger should be permitted to proceed? 
The CFI and ECJ could become involved in the proceedings if parties involved in 
the proposed merger appealed, but this referral was limited to judicial review, the 
Courts considering, for example, if the Commission had used the correct economic 
model to draw its conclusions, rather than assessing the information per se. In 
so Levy, N. EU Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 
195-2 18: 202. 
81t1 Veljanovski C. EC Merger Development after GEl Honeywell and Airtours. Antitrust 
Bulletin, March 2004. 
Lyons, B. R. Reform of European Merger Policy. Working Paper CCR 03-5. Centre for 
Competition & Regulation, UEA Norwich: 5. 
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contrast, the US system is more Court-centred, 83 an integral part of the merger 
regulation framework. The Court is not restricted to judicial review, but considers 
the facts in hand and is involved from the initial notification. The parties and either 
the DOJ or FTC may negotiate a settlement, ironing out any anti-competitive effects 
the proposed merger may have. The parties concerned then present their case to the 
judge and the Supreme Court makes the decision whether or not the parties can 
merge. TM 
The principle or notion of "efficiencies" is the final aspect of EU merger 
control to be examined in detail by existing literature. As noted by McGowan and 
Cmi, there already exists an ever increasing body of literature, dominated by 
economic analyses, examining the efficiency tests. 85 The first wave of literature 
examined and highlighted how the ECMR could not take into account the efficiency 
defence when assessing mergers because "the wording ... does not leave scope for 
taking dynamic efficiencies into account once dominance is concluded upon"? 
Now the DO Comp may consider the effect the proposed merger may have upon 
prices, for example, and consider the impact increased efficiencies - lowered costs 
for operation,, pooling of transport facilities, economies of scale - may have as a 
trade off for the increased market share/possible dominant position. The Guidelines 
on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
Control of Undertakings between Concentrations permit the impact of efficiencies 
to be considered by the DO Comp when considering if a concentration is 
permissible, whereas under the original ECMR, the Commission had restated that 
there was no means to justi& taking into consideration the efficiency defence when 
conducting a merger investigation. The NMR and accompanying Guidelines 
explicitly permit the efficiency defence in the appraisal of mergers, which has 
Lyons, B. R. Reform of European Merger Policy. Working Paper CCR 03-5, Centre for 
Competition & Regulation, UEA Norwich. 
Vusi W. P. & Vernon, J. M. & J. E. Barrington, Economics ofReguloi ion andAnlilnat, 
Third Edition Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000: 209. 
" McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case 
of Merger control. Governance: An International Journal ofPolicy and Athninistration 12,(2), 
1999: 175-200. 
Camesasca, P. D. The Explicit Efficiency Defence in Merger Control: Does it Make the 
Difference. E.C.LR, 20(1), 1999: 14-28. 
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triggered the evolvement of a strand of literature which is both standalone 87 and 
linked to a wider debate concerning the content of the NMR.0 
Of course there is a vast amount of literature which focuses upon case 
comments. This strand of literature assesses the Courts' conclusions, the evidence 
put forward by both the Commission and the merging parties and also reviews the 
Courts' decisions to determine whether or not the author of the case comment feels 
the conclusion was correct. This strand of literature also considers the impact that 
particular case will have upon the evolvement of the merger regulation policy 
framework. The case comment, for example, examining the CFI's annulment of the 
Commission's decisions concerning Terra Laval/Sidefi9 which had prohibited the 
merger and the Commission's subsequent appeal to the ECJ, outlines the 
background information to the case: which markets - carton packaging - are 
involved and the reasons why the CFI annulled the Commission's decision. The 
case comment also outlines and reviews the ECJ's decision to uphold the previous 
decision made by the CM. Naturally all case comment related literature is different, 
focusing upon the specifics of that particular case. What is useful about the case 
focused literature relating to EU merger decisions is that this provides an excellent 
insight into policy in action and the critical junctures which shape the evolvement 
of EU merger control policy. 
The academic community which examines the evolvement of EU merger 
regulation focuses upon the evolvement of the framework of merger control at 
European level rather than examining the implementation of policy by the 
Commission. This analysis can be taken one step further through the examination 
of the application of recent Commission decisions and Court judgments. This new 
87 Luescher, C. Efficiency Considerations in European Merger Control - Just Another 
Battleground for the European Commission, Economists and Competition Lawyers. European 
Competition Law Review, 2, (25), 2004: 72-86. 
"Ratcliff, J. Major Events and Policy Issues in EC Competition Law. I.C.C.R., 15(2), 2004: 
19-24. 
89 Commission prohibited the acquisition of Sidel by Tetra Lava] on the basis that the 
combination of Tetra's dominant position in the carton packaging industry and Sidel's leading 
position in the plastic packaging equipment market would create a dominant position in the PET 
packaging market. (Rapid Press Release: Commission prohibits acquisition of Sidel by Tetra 
Lava]. IP/01I15I6. Available from: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=LP/0  1/1516) 
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policy implementation-focused analysis will determine if the original conclusions 
are correct or need re-evaluating in the light of new empirical evidence. My thesis, 
therefore, adds a new dimension to the existing literature by firstly analysing how 
the application of the merger regulation framework by the Commission has altered 
as a consequence of the entry into force of the NMR and secondly by considering 
how the merger regulation policy landscape and governance regime have altered as 
the NMR has been interpreted and applied by the Commission. 
1.3 Frameworks for Analysis & Methodology 
This section will outline the frameworks used for the jurisprudential 
research, summarize the research methodology and present the arguments that 
the thesis does fulfil the originality requirements for the MPhil degree. The 
thesis will utilise both the black letter law approach and historical institutionalist 
analysis to examine the evolvement of EU merger policy and the application of 
the NMR by the Commission. 
1.4 Black Letter Law 
The black letter approach to legal analysis does provide some of the tools 
needed to analyse the content of Merger Control Regulation legislation. 
Emerging during the period of Enlightenment of the late 18th 
 Century, black 
letter law is influenced by the scientific, positivist and utilitarian discourse of 
authors, such as BenthainY°  which was sweeping the social science movement 
throughout Europe during this time. Black letter analysis, premised upon legal 
formalism9 ' and objectivism, 92  applies the same analytical techniques used in 
the natural sciences. Classification, methods of induction and deduction and 
rationalisation in order to elucidate the correct answer, all underpin the methods 
of black letter law theory. The black letter approach examines legal rules and 
principles scientifically, separating law from social and political imperatives, 
influences and factors, analysing the meaning and visible, formal, rather than 
° S. Adelman, & K. Foster, Critical Legal Theoiy: The Power of Law, in Grigg-Spall, 1. & P. 
Ireland, (Eds.) The Critical Lawyers Handbook. Pluto Press, 1992, 39-44. 
91 S. Adelman, & K. Foster, Critical Legal Theosy: The Power of Law, in Grigg-Spall, I. & P.  
Ireland, (Eds.) The Critical Lawyers Handbook. Pluto Press, 1992, 39-44. 
Unger, R. M. The Critical Legal Studies Movement. Harvard University Press, 1986,2. 
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substantive, element of the rules and procedures as laid down in treaties, 
constitutions, laws or jurisprudence. Black letterism focuses upon the intention 
rather than the impact of the system, legal process or legislation. Black letter 
methodology is past of the legal science discourse: conclusions can be drawn by 
the categorisation of legal rules and concepts. 
The black letter approach is used to categorise the details of the Merger 
Control Regulations in order to determine to which category the legislative 
provisions belong. The subsequent results can then be placed within a wider 
context to determine how the NMR differs from the original Merger Control 
Regulation. 
1.5 historical Institutionalism 
Although this thesis is primarily focused upon the legal aspects of the EU 
merger regulation framework, the thesis takes a multi-disciplinary approach to 
the analysis of EU merger regulation. The historical institutional methodology 
evolved as a reaction to the epistemological, theoretical and ideological debates 
and differences which cluttered the analysis of EU politics 93 and legal 
framework in the 1980s and 1990s. The historical instit tional framework of 
analysis is used to pinpoint changes in normative dimension, institutional 
change, evolvement of policy and systemic change? The term evolvement is 
used as a tool to describe how the policy under evaluation has become 
institutionalized through a "logic of institutionalization". 95 As Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz point outY as actors and institutions interpret, apply and "... 
encounter the limits of ..." rules, a loop of institutionalisation emerges. New 
actors are drawn into the policy process in order to adjudicate. As unanticipated 
gaps in policy develop, new legislation is constructed to fill these gaps, thus 
Almond, G.A. Discipline Divided Schools and Sects in Political Science. Sage, 1990. 
94 BuImer, S. J. History and Institutions of the European Union, in Artis, M. and N. Lee, (Eds.) 
The Economics of the European Unioa Oxford University Press, 1997,1-32; Bulmer, S. J. 
Setting and Influencing the Ru1es in D. Mayes, (Et) The Evolution ofthe Single European 
Market Edward Elgar, 1997,30-48,32. 
Stone Sweet; A. & W. Sandholtz, Integration and Supraiiationai Governance, in Sandholtz, W. 
& A. Stone Sweet, European Integration and Supranational Governance OIJP, 1998: 17. 
Stone Sweet, A. & W. Sandhottz, Integration and Supranational Governance, in Sandholtz, W. 
& A. Stone Sweet, European Integration and Supranational Governance. OUP, 1998: 17. 
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policy evolves. 97 
 It is not static but gradually develops and changes as the rules 
are (re)interpreted and applied by the relevant actors and new sign-post 
legislation is subsequently established in order to fill the gaps and improve the 
existing policy, to ensure it is compatible with existing ideological discourse. 
Analysis of systemic change98 gives the researcher an insight into which 
actors and institutions have shaped the evolvement of a specific policy, as 
looking backwards to the roots of a policy can assist understanding of its future 
direction. In this case, analysis of the evolvement of merger regulation policy 
illustrates how a cohesive framework is relatively new in comparison to other 
strands of competition policy. Examination of systemic change also enables the 
researcher to pinpoint critical junctures and analyse how and why policy has 
changed. Within the analysis of case-law, decisions and examination of the 
shifting power relations between the different institutions, the thesis has 
identified the changing institutional configurations, paradigmatic shifts in the 
normative dimension and pinpointed the critical junctures which provide 
signposts for the trajectory of policy. 
Analysis of the evolvement of policy allows for identification of the toolkit 
used by the Commission to investigate transactions and pinpoint how this toolkit 
has changed as a consequence of the entry into force of the NMR. The 
researcher can also examine the "iterative" process of policy-making through 
the development of governance regimes? 9 By tracing the involvement of policy 
and political actors who have participated in this process, it is possible to 
determine how a governance regime has been constructed around the merger 
regulation policy arena and how the dynamics have changed as the system has 
become more adversarial in nature. Examination of the normative dimension 
provides an insight into the direction policy may take in the future and permits 
Stone Sweet; A. & W. Sandholtz Integration and Supranational Governance, in Sandholtz, W. 
& A. Stone Sweet, European Integration and Supranational Governance. OUP, 1998: 17. 
Bulmer, S. J. New Institutionalism, The Single Market and EU Governance. Arena Working 
Papers, WP 97125. 
Bu1mer, S. J. New Institutionalism, The Single Market and EU Governance. Arena Working 
Papers, WP 97125. 
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the researcher to consider what factors may have precipitated this paradigmatic 
shift in the norms and values of a policy community. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
The research for the thesis has been qualitative rather than quantitative. 
There has been no need for field work as the information needed for the thesis 
can be accessed via e-joumals, the World Wide Web or inter-library loan. 
Research, therefore, has been desk based. Primary sources, for the two 
substantive chapters, were accessed via the EU competition policy website, and 
include the texts of the Merger Control Regulations, Commission decisions on 
merger cases, speeches given by Competition Commission officials and Green 
papers. The secondary sources used include European Voice, to gain an insight 
into the forces and influences which shape the formulation of EU merger policy 
and reaction to CFI judgments. The EU legal journals, accessed via Lexis Nexis 
and Westlaw provided analysis and details about recent merger case law. 
Existing academic monographs were also used to gain background information 
concerning EU merger policy as were conference papers accessed from the 
Universities' websites, such as the Centre for Competition and Regulation, 
which is held at the University of East Anglia. 
1.7 Originality 
The principle of originality provides the distinction between the MPhil and 
MA degree by research. The MPhil must add a new dimension to the existing 
literature which analyses that particular subject. Although there is already a 
body of literature which examines the finite details and evolvement of EU 
merger control, this thesis takes the analysis one step further by analysing how 
the Commission has operationalised the recast Merger Control Regulation. 
The thesis examines the evolvement of the EU merger regulation regime 
and analyses recent examples of the application of the NMR by the Commission 
in order to evaluate if the entry into force of the NMR represents a change in 
direction for the EU merger regulation framework. 
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The thesis analyses jurisdictional, substantive and procedural issues, in 
order to consider if the evolving procedural and ideological dynamics have 
altered direction as a consequence of the entry into force of the NMR or, if the 
application of the New Regulation by the Commission represents a natural 
continuation of the path dependent policy established by the original Regulation 
as amended by the 1997 Regulation. The changing role of the Commission in 
both the EU and international Merger Regulation framework was also evaluated, 
as was the environment within which Commission decisions are taken. 
By bringing together and updating existing literature, utilising a 
comparative framework of analysis, the thesis adds a new dimension to the 
existing literature examining EU merger regulation policy. Analysis of recent 
application of the recast NMR by the Commission provides an avenue through 
which the thesis can lay claim to academic purchase and adds a new dimension 
to the existing literature. 
The two substantive chapters of the MPhil are linked together by the 
systematic analysis of the EU merger regulation framework, its application by 
the Commission and the direction taken by the merger regulation framework. 
The first substantive chapter will provide a synthesis and analysis of the gradual 
evolvement of the EU merger regulation framework as a response to the 
emergence of a global market and the consequential need to reduce both the 
demand for multiple notifications and the transaction costs for merging parties. 
This chapter will highlight the evolving governance regime, the changing 
dynamics within this regime and illustrate the unanticipated gaps that emerged 
as a consequence of the application of the original Merger Control Regulation 
by the Commission. This chapter will also illustrate how the revised merger 
framework and the accompanying non-legislative reforms fill the unanticipated 
gaps and provide clarification of some aspects of the original Regulation. 
The second substantive chapter will provide an appraisal of the application 
of the revised, recast Merger Control Regulation by the Commission, examining 
if and how the entry into force of the NMR. and its subsequent application have 
altered the dynamics of the EU merger regulation regime. This chapter will 
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consider if the revised Regulation has increased the flexibility of the framework 
in relation to: the referral system; the stop-the-clock procedure and revised 
notification proceedings. Analysis of the application of the substantive test will 
examine whether or not the introduction of this new test will result in continued 
use of dominance by the Commission, as the reason to prohibit a merger. This 
chapter will consider if the introduction of the new test will result in the use of 
effect-based analysis during merger investigations. The chapter will also 
examine ancillary restrictions in order to analyse the possibility that the 
Commission's application of these principles has altered as a consequence of 
the entry into force of the NMR. The thesis will place the Commission's 
actions/influence within an international context in order to examine the 
functions and position of the Commission both within the EU merger regulation 
regime and within the international merger regulation/competition regime. 
Factors over which the Commission has little or no control can also 
influence or hinder the application of the NMR. The impact ofjudicial review, 
the counter effect of protectionist Member States and the influence of the media 
and Public Relation agencies upon the merger review/regulation process will all 
be examined in order to consider to what extent, and how, these factors have 
become institutionalised in the merger regulation policy governance regime and 
how they shape or influence the application of the NMR by the Commission. 
The conclusion will re-state the main points of each chapter to consider whether 
or not the application of the NMR by the Commission will result in a radical 
reshaping of the existing merger regulation framework. 
As many of the changes to the system of Merger Control Regulation have 
yet to crystaffise or be translated into concrete decisions, the impact of the 
changes, therefore, cannot be fully assessed. Initial assessment of the direction 
of merger policy, however, can be conjectured through analysis of the 
Commission's recent decisions. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EVOLVEMENT OF A EUROPEAN DIMENSION TO 
MERGER CONTROL 
2,1 Introduction 
The aims of this chapter are to provide an overview, an update and synthesis 
of the evolvement of EU merger control in order to illustrate to what extent the 
original ECMR differs from the recast Merger Control Regulation and to outline the 
main provisions of both. This chapter will provide an evaluation of the evolvement 
and the incremental establishment of a European merger regulation framework. 
2.2 Evolvement of a Framework of Merger Control 
The evolvement of a framework of Community-wide merger control has been 
slow and incremental in nature. The evolving merger policy community contains 
actors who differ in their visions for the future and for the potential framework of 
merger regulation. As a consequence, these divisions have hindered (or shaped) the 
development of the merger control policy regime. This regime highlights, reflects 
and represents a microcosm of the tensions between the supranational and national 
actors within the EU as a whole, as, on the one hand, the national actors seek to 
hold on to key policy areas whilst on the other hand, the Commission aims to 
acquire more competence. The European Coal and Steel Community Treaty 
(ECSC) contained provisions (Articles 65 and 66) which explicitly regulated 
mergers. Article 66 ECSC required the Commission when authorizing any merger 
concerning coal and steel companies, to ensure that the: 
"... proposed transaction will not give ... [those] ... concerned the power ... to 
determine prices, ... to hinder effective competition in a substantial part of the 
market, or to evade the niles of competition instituted under this Treaty ... by 
establishing an artificially privileged position involving a substantial advantage 
in access to supplies or markets ...... ..." 
The Spaak Report anticipated the need for merger control: "it will be 
necessary to prevent ... the absorption or domination of a market for a production 
by a single enterprise ...,,.2 
 Although the subsequent Treaty, the Treaty of Rome 
(the European Economic Community Treaty (EEC, now EC Treaty)), did retain an 
'Cited by Fountoukakos, K. & S. Ryan, A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. KC.L.R 
26(5), 2005: 277-296. 
2 Fountoukakos, K. & S. Ryan, A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. KC.LP, 26(5), 2005: 
2 77-296. 
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obligation set out in Article 3(0) to institute "... a system ensuring that competition 
in the Common Market is not distorted", it did not, however, contain an explicit 
provision for merger control similar to Article 66 ECSC. 3 
As McGowan and Cini4 pointed out, the two Treaties were "radically 
different". The ECSC "is ... traite-loi' aimed at establishing a regulatory 
framework for identifiable industries: coal and steel. The intention of the ECSC was 
to repair Franco-German relations after World War Two and to tie Germany into a 
set of supranational institutions which would prevent a repeat conflict. Merger 
control was an integral and essential part of the Treaty. The EC Treaty, however, is 
"Ira lie-cadre ", establishing a framework which requires secondary action to 
achieve its aims? The lack of merger control provisions in the EC Treaty became 
apparent immediately, but the Council of Ministers did not want to endow the 
Commission with any more competence in this area. 6 Articles 81 (cx. Art. 85) and 
82 (cx. Art. 86) are the pillars of EU competition policy which are in essence "an 
economic constitution". 7 Articles relating to competition policy - 81 to 86 EC 
Treaty (cx. Arts. 85 to 90) - focused upon the regulation of cartels and the abuse of 
dominance. Jones and Sufrmn argue that lack of a legal basis to regulate mergers 
was due to the fact that the "concentration of economic power rather than the 
prohibition of mergers was thought to be the best way of achieving the objectives of 
economic expansion set out in Article 2"? The Commission acknowledged, 
straight after the entry into force of the EC Treaty, that it lacked the provisions to 
regulate mergers or joint ventures which may create or possess anti-competitive 
Fountoukakos, K. & S. Ryan, A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. KC.LP, 26(5), 2005: 
277-2%. 
4 McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An inlernational Journal of Policy and Administration, 12 (2), April 1999: 175-
200,178. 
Bulmer, S. J. 1994, 423-4, quoted by McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU 
Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control. Governance: An international Journal of Policy and 
Administration, 12(2), April 1999: 175-200, 178; Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (2°" 
Ed.), OUP, 2004. 
6 McGowan, L. & M. Cliii, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An international Journal of Policy and Administration, 12(2), April 1999: 17$-
200,178. 
7McCiowan, L. & M. Cliii, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An !nternationalfournai of Policy andAdminLctration, 12(2). April 1999: 175-
200, 177. 
'Jones, A. & B. Sufitin, EC Competition Law. (2°" Ed.), OUP, 2004: 707, quoted by S. V. Selvam, 
The EC Merger Control Impasse: Is there a solution to the predicament? E.CLR,25(l), 2004: 52-67. 
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effects which would damage that particular market by establishing a monopolistic 
or oligopolistic situation. 9 Council Regulation 17, which entered into force in 1962, 
endowed the Commission with competence "to police Arts. 81 and 82" but does not 
appear to be applicable to the policing of concentrations.' ° In the 1966 
Memorandum on the Problems of Concentration in the Common Market" the 
Commission stated that Article 82 may be operationalised to "regulate 
concentrations," 2 but made it clear that Article 81 remained inapplicable to 
merging parties. '3 
The Continental Can (1973) judgment established the foundations of the quasi 
merger regulation framework.' 4 This case involved Continental wanting to 
purchase its main competitor in the packaging market. Although the ECJ annulled 
the Commission's decision that Europemballage and Continental Can could not 
merge, on the basis that the Commission had utilised inadequate economic analysis 
when analysing the packaging market, the Court, however, did support the 
Commission's use of Article 82, due to the potential effect the merger may have 
upon the structures of the market. The ECJ stated that "any structural measure may 
influence market conditions, if it increases the size and the economic power of the 
undertaking".' 5 
 The Court agreed with the Commission, establishing that in certain 
circumstances a firm holding a dominant position could abuse its status as market 
leader when entering into a merger or taking over another company.' 6 Although 
this ruling did provide clarification for the Commission, it didn't compensate for the 
9 iones, A. & B. Suifrin, EC Competition Law. (2°' Ed.), OUP, 2004: 707, quoted by S. V. Selvam, 
The EC Merger Control Impasse: Is there a solution to the predicament? LC.LR ,25(I), 2004: 52-67. 
'° Fountoukakos, K. & S. Ryan, A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. E.C.LR. 26(5), 2005: 
27 7-2 96. 
COM, Memorandum on the problem of concentration in the Common ma,icet EEC Competition Series 
No.3 1966, Para 58. 
' 2McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An International Journal ofPolicy and Administration, 12(2), April 1999: 175-
200, 179: COM, EEC Competition Series Study, No.3, 1966. 
' 3 Fountoulcakos, K. & S. Ryan, A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. E.C.LR. 26(5), 2005: 
277-296. 
"Case No 6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission of the 
European Communities, (1973) ECR 215; McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU 
Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and 
Athninissration, 12 (2), April 1999: 175-200. 
"Case  No 6/72, EuropenthoJlage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission of the 
European Communities, (1973) ECR 215, at 243. 
' 6McGowan L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 12(2), April 1999: 175-
200, 179. 
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lack of any substantial merger regulation framework upon which the Commission 
could rely. Article 82 had only limited potential for the regulation of mergers, as it 
could only be used if the finn already held a dominant position within the market. 
The framework was not pre-emptive but re-active and so could not be used to assess 
the merits or disadvantages of a proposed merger.' 7 Only cases of possible abuse of 
dominant position could be investigated.' 8 This: 
"... ruling [therefore] left a serious anomaly in EEC law for a merger 
involving at least one firm in a dominant position might be prohibited under 
Article 86 [now Ai-ticle 82] whereas a merger between a small number of 
equal size firms would contravene no law even if it created a 100% 
monopoly".' 9 
Due to the limitations of Article 82, the Commission did not apply this Article 
to many investigations after the Continental Can case.2o After this judgment, the 
Commission presented its first proposal for a Merger Control Regulation in 1973 
premised upon Articles 83 and 235, but the Council failed to make a decision due to 
divisions concerning the extent to which "non-competition considerations should be 
taken into account."2 ' National political imperatives and influences coupled with 
the world wide oil crisis and subsequent recession precipitated opposition from 
France, UK and Germany at Council level due to theft determination to ensure 
national competence was retained over merger regulation. Three thrther revised 
Merger Control Regulation proposals were presented by the Commission to the 
Council in 1981, 1984 and 198672 
The issue of the need to regulate the market became apparent with the 
incremental establishment of the single market. Although the 1985 White Paper 
Completing the Internal Market 23 
 did not mention the need for the establishment of 
' 7 Arnull, A. et al. Wyatt & DasMvooa European Union Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002: 651. 
IS McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Adminisfration 12 (2), April 1999: l75-
200, 179; Arnull, A. et at. Wyatt & Dathwooa' European Union Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002: 651. 
' 9 Fishwick, F. Making Sense of Competition Policy. Kogan Page, 1993: 115. 
Arnull, A. et al. Hatt & Daslrwoo4 European Union Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002:651. 
2! Fountoulcakos, K. & S. Ryan, A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. E.C.LP, 26(5), 2005: 
277-296; Jones, A. & B. Sufilin, EC Competition Law. (20d Ed.), OUP, 2004: 855. 
Fountoukakos, K. & S. Ryan, A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control. E.C.LK 26(5), 2005: 
277-296; Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (2M  Ed.), OUP, 2004: 855. 
" McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Adinintctration, 12(2), April 1999: 179. 
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a fornialised, coherent framework, due to the proliferation and exponential growth 
of crossnational mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures, it became apparent to all 
concerned that some framework of regulation in this area was necessary. 
In the period running up to the establishment of the 1989 Regulation, the ECJ 
was brought back into the equation with the Philip Morris case.24 BAT and RJ 
Reynolds had brought a complaint to the Commission concerning the agreement 
between Philip Morris and Rembrandt. This agreement gave Philip Morris control 
over one of Rembrandt's subsidiaries and also gave them first refusal over Rothman 
International's shares. Following an investigation by the Commission, the 
Commission insisted that the agreement should be altered. Philip Morris appealed, 
but the ECJ not only upheld the Commission's decision but also pointed out that 
concentrations which were established as a consequence of agreed share 
transactions could be classified as restrictive agreements. In the BAT 25 case the 
Court concluded: 
"Although the acquisition by one company of an equity interest in a 
competitor does not itself constitute conduct restricting competition, such an 
acquisition may nonetheless serve as an instrument for influencing the 
commercial conduct of the companies in question so as to restrict or distort 
competition on the market in which they carry on business". 
Restrictive agreements would, therefore, be brought under Article 81 (which is 
concerned with the prohibition of restrictive practices), giving the Commission the 
competence to "intercede in so-called 'friendly mergers". 26 The Commission 
utilised this interpretation of Article 81 to force British Airways to give up some of 
its flight paths to its competitors after it had taken over British Caledonian. 27 
Fountoulcakos, K. & S. Ryan, A New Substantive Test for Eli Merger Control. E.C.LI( 26(5), 2005: 
277-296. 
" Cases 142 and 1586/34 BAT Ltd and Ri Reynolds Inc v. Commission and Philip Morris, E.C.R. 
4487[1987] 2 CMLR 551. Mon-is was going to purchase 501Y* share of Rothmans. Due to competitors' 
complaints, the share was reduced to 30.8% with only 24.90/6 voting rights and no representation on 
Rothmans' Board (which the Commission was agreeable with). The complainants (BAT and Ri 
Reynolds) challenged the Commission before the ECJ. The EQ stated that friendly agreements could be 
seen as restrictive and impede competition. (Rodger, B. J.& A. MacCulloch, Competition Law and 
Politics. Routledge/Cavendish, 2004: 205). 
McCiowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 12 (2), April 1999: 180. 
McGowan, L. & M. Cliii, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 12 (2), April 1999. 
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The incremental accruement of powers by the Commission to regulate 
mergers, joint ventures and acquisitions did not offset the lack of a formal 
framework to regulate these transactions. The de-facto framework which emerged 
as a consequence of sporadic jurisprudence did not engender support or confidence 
from European industry. The business community was concerned at the possible 
abuse of dominant position by market leaders which would result in the market 
being monopolised and distorted. The decision "did not clearly delineate the scope 
of Article 85(now Art. 81) of the EEC Treaty and therefore left open the possibility 
that it was applicable to all mergers". 28 National industry organisations, therefore, 
increased pressure on national governments to work together to establish a 
comprehensive transnational framework of merger regulation. 29 
Just two weeks after the Philip Moths case, on 17th  November 1987, the 
Council permitted the Commission to construct a new draft Merger Control 
Regulation. The fifth draft Merger Control Regulation was finally presented to the 
Council of Ministers in March 1988. The main bones of contention related to: the 
transference of competence from national to supranational institutions; the lack of 
clarity between the powers held by national and supranational competition 
authorities; how much competence the supranational authorities would hold and 
how the concentrations should be assessed. 3o 
23 Details of the ECMR 
The final draft of the Regulation was agreed upon by the Council on 21" 
December 1989 and entered into force on 21" September 1990. After a "long 
history of failed proposals",3 ' a formalised framework of merger control was finally 
established. This Regulation - the first European-wide Regulation - established the 
foundations and path dependent structures of merger policy. The legal basis for this 
Coate, M. B. Economics, the Guidelines and the Evolution of Merger Policy. The Antitrust Bulletin, 
37, 1992, 1033, cited McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: 
The Case of Merger Control. Governance: An International Journal ofPolicy and Administration, 12 
(2), April 1999, i go. 
McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 12(2), April 1999. 
3° McQowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An INeniational Journal ofPolicy wzdAdministration, 12 (2), April 1999, 181. 
31 Maudhuiç S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, E.CLIL 26(l), 2005: 57-64. 
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Regulation is Articles 83 and 235 EC Treaty. Whilst this Regulation laid out the 
"jurisdictional, procedural and substantive rules, Regulation 447/98 established the 
rules of procedure". 32 This Regulation allowed the Commission competence over 
any "concentration" which possesses a "Community dimension", 33 established a 
pre-notification system, 34  the DT35 and a strict investigative timetable.36 The 
purpose of the Merger Control Regulation was "to permit effective control of all 
concentrations from the point of view of their effect on the structure of competition 
in the Community and to be the only instrument applicable to such concentrations". 
The ECMR, as with the recast, revised versions, does not only regulate mergers but 
also joint ventures and acquisitions. 37 The Competition Commissioner at that time, 
Leon Brittan, succinctly summarised the Merger Control Regulation: 
"All mergers with a Community dimension will benefit from the one-stop-
shop regime. A large European merger which had to be hawked around 
several European capitals for approval and consideration also had to be 
given to the precise scope of Articles in this field, on the basis of two 
judgments of the European Court. Now we have thelicy right and we 
have clarified the procedures and the substantive rules.' 
Intervention was only triggered if there was a European dimension to the 
merger. In the draft Regulation submitted by the Commission the thresholds were 
set at between ECU I and 10 million. States with no national legislation, such as 
Luxembourg, wanted lower thresholds whilst Member States, such as the UK, 
wanted higher thresholds so they could maintain intluence and regulate larger 
mergers, preserving some semblance of economic sovereignty in this area. The 
higher threshold requirement ensured that fewer mergers were brought under the 
jurisdiction of the Commission. 39 The thresholds for intervention were clearly 
defined in the ECMR. The firms involved have an aggregate world wide turnover 
Jones, A. & B. SulThn, EC Competition Law. (2' s" Ed.) OUP, 2004: 859. 
33 iones, A. & B. Suifrin, EC Competition Law. (2S  Ed.), OUP, 2004. 
34 Jons, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (2'd  Ed.), OUP, 2004. 
35 Jones, A. & B. Suff?in, EC Competition Law. (2nd  Ed.), OUP, 2004. 
Jones, A. & B. Suifrin, EC Competition Law. (20d Ed.), OUP, 2004. 
"Commission Notices on the Guidance on the Concept of Concentrations then provides most detailed 
explanation. 
3'Brittan, L. The Law and Policy of Merger Control in the EEC, K L Rev. 5,357, 1990. 
"McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 12(2), April 1999, 182. 
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of more than ECU 5 billion,40 each of at least two of the firms involved had to have 
an aggregate turnover of more than ECU 250 million and at least one of the 
undertakings involved had to have more than two-thirds of its aggregate EU-wide 
turnover within one Member State.4 ' 
Other issues of contention related to cases being brought back under the 
jurisdiction of national competition authorities. The German government was 
insistent that in cases where a proposed merger would have consequences for a 
national market there must be a provision for mergers to be referred back to the 
national authorities. Article 9 colloquially referred to as the "German clause" was 
inserted. The German Federal Cartel Office was the first authority to submit four 
submissions to the Commission requesting that these mergers be repatriated to be 
examined by their own authorities (these were refused by the Commission). Article 
22(3), the "Dutch clause" permitted Member States to ask the Commission to 
conduct investigations on their behalf; even if the merger did not contain a 
European dimension and so did not fall within the Commission's jurisdiction. This 
clause has been invoked most frequently by Member States who have weak or no 
merger regulation frameworks. 42 
The bedrock of the ECMR was Article 2(3) which established the DT. The 
article stated: "a concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as 
a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the 
Common Market shall be declared incompatible with the Common Market". 
The Council of Ministers and European Parliament remained marginal in the 
competition policy making process. "At the institutional heart of EU competition 
policy sits the European Comnussi. ... and European Courts". 43 Interaction 
between the Commission and Courts shaped the pathway of competition policy. 
40 McGowan, L. & M. Cliii, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 12(2), April 1999. 
"McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An Internationojfounwj of Policy andAdministrazion, 12(2), April 1999 
42 McGowan, L. & M. Cliii, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An International Journal ofPolicy and Administration, 12(2), April 1999, 182. 
43 McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 12(2), April 1999. 177. 
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Regulation 176/62 established the Commission as the pivotal actor in competition 
policy, the implementer and guardian of merger policy. The responsibility for 
merger investigations was placed with the MTF, four units, without any specific 
specialisation, placed within the then DGIV, now the Competition Commission. 
The investigation was conducted in two phases, premised upon a very strict 
timetable, ensuring that the final decision was taken in five months or less. Three 
specific questions: "whether the notified concentration falls within the scope of the 
regulation, its compatibility with the Common Market [and] whether or not it 
creates or strengthens a dominant position in the Common Market"" were 
considered by the Commission. 
After notification of the proposed merger, the Commission started its 
investigation. Phase I took four weeks, during which time the merging parties 
ceased negotiations, in case the Commission rejected the proposed merger, which 
would then require a divestiture. The Commission then presented their report to the 
Advisory Committee on Concentrations. The Committee considered its opinion 
then presented its findings to the Commission. The proposed merger could be: 
sanctioned, determined to be outside EU jurisdiction or subjected to more 
investigation - Phase II. Article S of the ECMR permitted a further four month 
investigation to be held, with the outcome resulting in: the concentration being 
permitted to proceed; continuation but with conditions attached or the proposed 
merger prohibited. 
During the early 1990s, the German Federal Office lobbied for the 
introduction of an independent European Cartel Office, due to increasing distrust 
and antipathy to the Commission holding all the main cards and control over the 
merger policy framework. As this proposal was quickly dismissed during the 1996 
"Commission of the European Communities, 22nd Report. on Competition Policy 1992, COM (93) 162 
Final, 130, Brussels, 5 May, 1993, quoted McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, 
Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control. Governance: An 
Intenialional Journal of Policy andAdministratio 12(2), April 1999, 183. 
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IGC, focus for reform was placed upon the threshold limits and the shift of 
competencies between national and supranational institutions. 45 
The Council had opposed the reduction of the threshold in the 1993 review, 
despite support from the business community. Regardless of this opposition, the 
Commission declared its intention to review the threshold limits, which it did in 
1996, after extensive consultation with representatives from the European business 
community, presenting its report in the 1996 (ireen Paper on the Review of the 
Merger Control Regulation. 46 This proposal would have drawn cmssnational 
transactions which had the potential to detrimentally affect European markets but 
just fell below the threshold limit within the jurisdiction of the Commission. This 
proposal would have enhanced the competence of the MTF and reduced the 
thresholds of ECU 5 billion and 250 million to ECU 2 billion and 100 million 
respectively, 47 Several Member States, however, opposed the reduction of the 
thresholds.48 The final proposal presented to the Council by the Commission was 
much more restrained. Under this proposal the two-thirds rule remained the same 
and the thresholds were slightly reduced, whilst focus was placed upon the need to 
reduce multiple filings. 49 The Commission suggested that if a proposed transaction 
fell below the threshold but at least three Member States needed to be informed, the 
Commission should investigate the merger. The final Resolution agreed upon by 
the Council in 1997 0 did not revise the threshold limits which remained the same 
as outlined in the 1989 Regulation. It did, however, pennit the Commission to 
intervene if the combined turnover of all companies involved was over ECU 100 
million in three or more Member States. This Regulation did introduce the "two-
third rule" whereby if an "undertaking" achieves two-thirds of its "Community 
turnover" in one Member State, then it did not fall within the jurisdiction of the 
45 McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition 
Policy: The Case of Merger Control. Governance: An international Journal of Policy and 
Adminiszration 12(2), April 1999, 183: 194. 
Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the Review of the Mesger Regulation3 
COM(96) Final 721, Bnissels, 3 1/01/1996. 
47 McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An international Journal of Policy andAdminisfratio,& 12 (2), April 1999, 195. 
u McGowaa L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An international Journal of Policy andAdministration, 12(2), April 1999, 195. 
McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An international Journal of Policy and Administration, 12(2), April 1999. 
5° EUR-Lex, Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. OJ L 180, 09/07/1997, 1-6. 
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Commission. 5 ' The Commission issued Guidance Notices clarifring the meaning 
of concentration and calculation of turnover. 52 
As noted by Soames,53 until 2002, despite the fact that the number of merger 
investigations increased dramatically, with investigations raising the profile of the 
Competition Commission, only one decision was annulled by the CFI: Kali and 
5 54 Between 21 September 1990 to December 2003, 2399 cases were notified 
to the Commission, 2125 were declared compatible and 18 were prohibited. The 
rest were either referred back to the Member States, did not come under the scope 
of the Regulation or were subject to remedies. 55 As pointed out by Levy, 56 the 
Commission adopted an informal approach to the application of the Merger Control 
Regulation, entering into informal pre-notification meetings to explain procedures, 
gather preliminary information related to markets and clari& existing jurisprudence. 
In 2002, however, the CFI annulled three Commission merger decisions: 
Airtours,57 Schneider58 and Tetra LavaL 59 The CFI overturned the Aiflours 
decision on the basis that the Commission had interpreted the facts of the case 
5! EUIR-Lex, Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. OJ L 180, 09/07/1997, 1-6. 
EUR-Lex, Commission Notice on the meaning of Concentration 01 C 66/5, 1998; Commission Notice 
on calculation of turnover OJC 66125, 1998. 
" Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, KC.LR. 26(1), 2005: 57-64. 
Cases C 68/94 & 30/95, France v The Commission; [1998] E.C.R. 1-1375. 
"Commission, Council Regulation 4064/89 Statistics. Available from: 
http://ec.europaeu/commlcompetitionlmergers/cases/stats.html  (Accessed 17/10106) 
Levy, N. EU Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence. World Competition; 26(2), 2003: 195-218, 
201. 
" Case T-342/99, A irtow-s plc. it. Commission, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 6 June 2002. 
Cases T-310/01 and T-77/02, Schneider Electric v. Commission, Judgments of the Court of First 
Instance of 22 October 2002. In 2001 the Commission had prohibited a merger between Schneider and 
Legrand SA as it would impede competition in certain electricity markets. Schneider appealed to the CA. 
The CFI dismissed the Commission decision in two judgetnents: the first (Schneider I) the decision to 
prohibit the concentration and the second (Schneider II) requiring Schneider to divest LeGrand on the 
basis that the Commission had infringed Schneider's defence rights by not outlining its true objections to 
the transaction in the SO. (flowery, Ant itnist Update. July 2007, Available from: 
http://www.howrey.com/flles/News/650e6e2d-ffbf-4cde-875b- 
%Sbo8dl43eclPresentation/NewsAttachment/b8ebb36O-a3e3-49 I 1-th5-
c5bOd86fdaa7/clientalertschneider.pdt). 
Case T-5/02 and Case T-80/02 Tetra Lava! BV v Commission; Judgment of the Cowl of the First 
Instance, 25 October 2002. The Commission had prohibited the acquisition of Sidel by Tetra Laval BV 
and ordered the divestment of Sidet. The Commission found the transaction would increase Tetra 
Laval's already dominant position in the polyethylene terephthalate (PET) packaging market The CFI 
overturned the Commission's decision on the basis that the Commission had overestimated the possible 
distortion to the market as a consequence of the transaction. Howeiy Europe Antitrust Client Alert, 
August 2002. Available from: httpil/www.howrey.com/files/News/ac794c7d-786c-4fl)5-9933-
07348d4674da/Presentation/NewsAttachment/96  I 67459-99df-4c67-b5b6- 
29c2ec5e86b I /ClientAlert2002Os2O.pdf [Accessed 24/08/081. 
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incorrectly, Schneider on the basis that the Commission had committed "several 
obvious errors, omissions and contradictions", 60 when applying the Merger Control 
Regulation to this case which "infringed Schneider's defence rights" 6 ' and 
overturned the Tetra Laval decision on the basis that the Commission had 
overestimated the possible distortion of competition. The incorrect application of 
the ECM]t by the Commission resulted in three high profile court cases which in 
essence criticized the application of the ECMR by the Commission. 
The need for merger reform had been mooted as early as 1998 with the 
Commission stating that: 
"... competition policy must adapt to the economic realities of the 
contemporaiy world ... . Present legislation and practice are still rooted in the 
early years ... . Despite periodic alterations it seems clear that legislation is 
out of step with the requirements of an effective policy 
Article 1(4) of the ECMR required the Commission to present a review of the 
jurisdictional thresholds in 2000.63 
 In the Report to the Council on the application 
of the Merger Control Regulation Thresholds, TM the Commission asserted that a 
large number of crossnational transactions had still not been brought under the 
jurisdiction of the Commission. The Commission argued that a more in-depth 
review was required, not just to analyse the jurisdictional thresholds, but also to 
consider procedures and other substantive issues. 65 The subsequent Green Paper, 
published on the 11d' 
 December 2001, considered if there should be a: revised 
substantive test; a mechanism for permitting the investigation of mergers which do 
not possess a European dimension but require multiple filings; a more relaxed and 
flexible approach to the investigative timetable and a mechanism through which 
investigations can be passed from Member States to the Commission and vice 
'° apan P. Monti court defeat over merger veto gives boost to reform calls. European Voice, 8 (38), 
24 Oct 2002. 
"Chapman, P. Monti court defeat over merger veto gives boost to reThnn calls. European Voice, 8(38), 
24 Oct 2002. 
' Commission of the European Communities, Twenty- Seventh Report on Competition Policy, 1997. 
Luxembourg: CEC, 1998: 13. 
' Jones, A. & B. Suffrmn, EC Competition Law. (2" Ed.), OUP, 2004: 860. 
M Commission of the European Communities. Report to the Council on the Application of the Merger 
Regulation Thresholdc. COM 
 (2000) 399 Final. 
' Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (2"' Ed.), OUP, 2004: 860. 
"Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation; 
4064/1989 COM (2001) 745 Final. 
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versa The growing discord between US and EU competition authorities due to the 
Commission prohibiting the GE'Honeywell merger, in June 2001, on grounds of 
efficiency, whilst not precipitating the review of the Merger Control Regulation, 
did, however influence and shape the path dependent structures and policies which 
evolved as a consequence of the review of the Merger Control Regulation. 
During the first twelve years of application of the ECMR by the Commission, 
"The Merger Regulation evolved into an integral part of Community antitrust 
practice."67 
 Even prior to the revision of merger policy, this policy was "arguably 
the most potent weapon at DOW's disposal,"62 and certainly the most visible within 
the Competition Commission's portfolio. The dynamics of this policy community, 
however, fluctuate and are prone to instability and power struggles. Clearly all the 
actors and groups involved had different visions of the potential future pathway of 
merger policy. The business community wanted to reduce transaction costs and 
establish a framework which would iron out the problems of uncertainty and 
distrust in the evolving system, precipitated by the step-by-step approach initiated 
by cases brought before the European Courts. The Commission wanted to protect, 
expand and enhance its own position and increase its competence within the regime 
and act as a facilitator within the policy community, actively encouraging 
negotiation, discussion and preliminary meetings with merging parties prior to 
investigations, engaging in consultation with European and national business 
representation groups during the review process. The Commission's interaction 
with the business community ensured that the process was transparent, open and 
had established links, a source of information and possible support from the 
business community. Certain members of the Council (those with already robust 
merger regulation laws), however, did not want the Commission to accrue any more 
competence, and so lose any more sovereignty in this politically sensitive area. The 
European Courts are another dynamic which must be considered, as they hold the 
potential to shape the future of European merger policy. 
67 Levy N. EU Merger Control: From Birth to Adolescence. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 195-218, 
201. 
' McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Adminiuration, 12(2), A pill 1999, 176. 
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2.4 The Recast Merger Control Regulation 
In November 2002, the Commission presented to the Council the revised 
ECMR69 and draft Notice on the appraisal of horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings. 7° The package 
proposed by Monti included a revised Regulation, draft guidelines for horizontal 
mergers, proposed measures aimed at restructuring staffing and examples of best 
practices, which would, stated Monti, "... improve our merger control system 
making it ... a model to be emulated worldwide". 7 ' The aim of the reform was to 
preserve the elements of the ECMR that had proved their worth. The establishment 
of: the "one-stop shop"; a timetable for investigations; transparency during the 
decision-making process through the publication of decisions and the Commission 
as the completely independent decision-maker "must be retained and preserved" 
whilst at the same time the elements of the system which have come under 
increasing strain must be reformed! 2 The Competitiveness Council agreed upon a 
revised Merger Control Regulation on 27th 
 November 2003, which was 
subsequently adopted and published in the Official Journal on 20th  January 2004. 
The new Regulation entered into force on l May 2004, equipping "the European 
Union with a modern, more flexible and efficient legislation to cater for the 
interests of 450 million consumers ... ". 73 As specified by Article 26(2) of the 
NMR, the old ECMR remained applicable to those transactions which had 
concluded an agreement or a public bid announced prior to l' May 2004. 
The original ECMR applied to mergers, acquisitions and full function joint-
ventures. The revised Merger Control Regulation clarifies the type of transaction 
which falls within the scope of the Regulation. The Regulation still covers the 
original three types of concentrations but has been widened to include creeping 
mergers and "conditional or staggered transactions". 74 
69 EUR-Lex, Proposal 1kw a Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
("The EC Merger Regulation") COM (2002) 711 Final, [2003] OJ C 20106:.4. 
7° Luescher, C. Efficiency Considerations in European Merger Control, S.CLR 25(2) 72-86. 
Rapid, Commission Press Release, Commission adopts comprehensive reform ofEU merger control, 
LP/02/1856, Brussels, 11/12/2002. 
Monti, M, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Merger Policy Control in the European 
Union: a radical reform. European Commission/IBA Conference on EU Merger Control, Brussels, 
7/11/2002. Rapid Press Release, Speech/02/545. 
73 Rapid Press Release, EU gives itself new merger control rules for 21" centwy. IPIo4flO, 20/01/04. 
74 Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, KC.L.R. 26(l), 2005: 57-64. 
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The revised Merger Control Regulation is supplemented by several Notices 
which provide assistance and guidance, expanding upon the text and concepts 
established in the ECMR. 7' The ECMR, as with the two previous Regulations, is 
applicable to any "concentration" which possesses a "Community dimension". To 
possess this dimension, the turnover of parties to the transaction must exceed the 
thresholds established in Article 1(2) of the Regulation, or, if a smaller, multi-
jurisdictional merger, fulfil the alternative thresholds established in the 1998 
Regulation. 76 Article 22 permits the Commission to review proposed transactions 
which do not fall under theft jurisdiction by virtue of Articles 1(2) and 1(3), but 
would require multiple notification, if asked to do so by one or more Member 
States. The revised Merger Control Regulation also permits the notifying parties to 
ask the Commission to review the transaction, if the transaction would require 
notification in three or more Member States and no Member State objects. Mergers 
which do not possess a Community dimension fall under the scope of national 
merger regulations, whilst those which do, fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Commission and the EU framework of merger regulation? 7 
Prior to the reform of merger policy, the MTF, Directorate B within DO 
Comp, dealt with all concentrations which were covered by the ECMR. Despite 
having to comply with legally binding frameworks and an expanding workload, 
only one decision was annulled by the CFI between 1989 and 2002. During 2002, 
however, the CFI reversed several of the Commission's decisions, criticising theft 
methods and procedures. As part of the reform of EU merger control policy, the 
DO Comp was reorganised. Until the 2004 reform, the MTF examined all 
transactions which fell within the scope of the ECMIt The MTF was one of the 
sectoral directorates within DO Comp. During 2003/4 the MTF was dismantled and 
replaced by merger units, all part of the Merger Network. These units were placed 
within each of the sectoral Directorates of DO Comp relating to antitrust 
investigations connected to a specific sector of the economy. An overall co-
ordinating merger unit was established in Directorate A, which is in charge of 
" Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (2S  lEt), 0th', 2004: 862. 
76 EUR-Lex, Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OJ L 24, 29/01.2004: 1-22. 
E1.JR-Lex, Council Regulation 13912004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OJ L 24, 29/01.2004: 1-22. 
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"policy and strategic support". A Chief Competition Economist, the first to be 
appointed was/is Lars-Hendrik Roller with a supporting office, a team of 10 "PhD 
level economists," as the Chief Economist's Team (CET) , 78 will ensure the correct 
application of economic analysis in complex cases. The poor quality application 
and incorrect assessment of markets etc, it must be remembered, were criticisms 
levelled at the Commission by the CFI. The creation of these posts can be seen as a 
response to this criticism. As noted by Maudhuit and Soames, this team has already 
been used in the preparation of requests when the Commission has asked for Article 
11 infomiation.79 The appointment of this "in-house team" provides the 
Commission with expertise "since otherwise it would have had to continue to rely 
on the input of the parties' economists, as has generally happened with the 
assessment of past complex cases". 80 
The NMR did not change the threshold requirements, but, instead, focused 
upon reforming the referral system. 81 
 The NMR outlines the procedures and 
notification rules for proposed transactions, whilst the Implementing Regulation 82 
informs the notifying parties about what information needs to be provided, explains 
and clarifies the time limits and procedures for hearings and raising objections. 83 
The Regulation framework permits informal, pre-notification discussion between 
the Commission and the notifying parties. A transaction may not be finalised before 
notification and subsequent investigation by the Commission has been completed. 
If the parties to the transaction complete before the Commission has agreed that the 
concentration is compatible with the market, they may be fined up to 10% of their 
aggregate turnover. Notification is made by the completion of Form CO (the 
official form for standard merger notification) or the Form SO ( the Short Form CO 
for simplified merger notifications). Articles 11 and 13 permit the Commission to 
gather information from both parties to the transaction and third parties - customers, 
Lyons, B. it Reform of European Merger Policy. Working Paper CCR 03-5, Centre for Competition 
& Regulation, UEA Norwich. 
Maudhuit, S. & T. Soarnes, Changes in EU Merger Control, (Part 3) E.C.LK 26(3), 2005: 144-150. 
80 Maudhuit, S. & T. Soaznes, Changes in EU Merger Control, (Part 3) E.C.Llt 26(3), 2005: 144-150. 
t1 Maudhuit S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, (Part 3) E.CLK 26(3), 2005: 144-150. 
82 EUR-Lex, Commission Regulation (EC) No.802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 
139/2004 (The "Implementing Regulation") and its annexes (Form CO. Short Form CO and Form Its). 
OiL 133, 30/04/2004:1-39. 
83EUR-Lex, Commission Regulation (EC) No.802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 
139/2004 (The "Implementing Regulation") and its annexes (Form CO. Short Form CO and Form RS). 
OIL 133, 30/04/2004: 17. 
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suppliers, competitors - and permit it to conduct unannounced investigations. The 
Commission's powers of investigation were enhanced as a consequence of the new 
Regulation, and are now similar to those possessed by the Commission in relation 
to Regulation 1/2003 
To ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity outlined in Article 5 
EC Treaty, the NMR ensures that the best placed competition authority evaluates 
the proposed transaction. The Commission's Notice on Case Referral in Respect of 
Concentrations outlines the principles upon which the system is premised. 
Allocation of cases must not only be based upon legal and economic analysis but 
must also take into account "practical considerations" such as who has the authority 
and possesses the necessary expertise and finance if the investigation has to be 
fragmented by several competition authorities. Fragmentation of investigations 
must be avoided if at all possible to avoid the increased costs associated with 
multiple filing. The need for "legal certainty" means that cases must not be 
reallocated to authorities which were not perceived as competent to assess the 
transaction at the outset of the investigation. 
Part of the pre-notification framework, Article 4 of the recast Merger Control 
Regulation, permits the Commission to refer the transaction to a Member State (Art. 
4(4)) or, three or more Member States to refer to the Commission (Art.4(5)). "[T]he 
big novelty of Article 487 
 is that the referral may be prompted by the merging 
parties - but this type of referral must take place before filing in any EU Member 
State. 88 Parties submit a reasoned submission form which "... allows the parties to 
identi& at the pre-notification stage, their preferred review agency". 89 
In order to improve the efficacy of the referral system the majority of the 
reforms focused upon Articles 9 and 22. At the post-notification stage the 
Commission can initiate the referral process. The revised Article 9 permits the 
Commission to ask Member States to request a referral of a transaction to a 
84iones A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (2 0d Ed.), OUP, 2004: 907. 
' Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, &C.LIt 26(1), 2005:57.64. 
' Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, E.CLK 26(l), 2005: 57-64. 
"Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, E.C.L.R. 26(1), 2005: 57-64. 
"Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, (Part 3) KC.LR. 26(3), 2005: 144-I50. 
39 Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, (Pan 3) &CLR. 26(3), 2005: 144-150. 
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Member State. The recast Article 22 permits the Commission to invite Member 
States to refer a transaction to it even though the transaction does not fall within the 
Commission's jurisdiction but may have an impact upon the EU market. 90 
The new Best Practice Notice, aimed at enhancing transparency and the 
standard of the decision-making process, is supposed to improve the 
communication and interaction between all actors involved in the decision-making 
process. "State of play meetings" have been introduced "designed to provide 
noti1ing parties with a clear understanding of the Commission's internal thinking 
at key stages of proceedings". 9 ' "Triangular meetings" between the Commission, 
parties to the transaction and complainants have also been introduced which is 
helpful to the Commission, as the complainants provide an expert insight into the 
market under examination. These meetings provide the Commission with the 
opportunity to verify third party submissions? 2 
The timetable and procedures to which the Commission must adhere, remain 
but are now more flexible. The need to notify within a week of concluding a 
merger agreement has been abolished. The original Merger Control Regulation 
contained a post-notification mechanism, requiring that a transaction be filed before 
referral to the "best placed" merger authority could take place. 93 Now notification 
of concentrations can be premised upon either legally-binding agreements or the 
demonstration of a "good faith intention". The timetable for investigation is now 
measured in working days, thus there is now no need to make calculations to take 
into account public holidays, length of months etc? 4 
Phase I of the investigation starts the thy after the Commission receives 
notification of the transaction. If the notification material presented by the parties is 
incomplete, the timetable stops until the correct information is provided. The 
Commission has 25 working days (which can be extended to 35 if the Commission 
requests a referral) to consider the compatibility of the proposed transaction with 
go Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, (Pail 3) E.CLlt 26(3), 2005: 144-150, 
for details of the procedures and processes for these Articles. 
91 Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU MergerControl, E.C.L.R. 26(l), 2005: 57-64. 
Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, KC.LJ{ 26(1), 2005: 57-64. 
Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, KC.LIL 26(1), 2005: 57-64. 
Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, E.C.LR. 26(l), 2005: 57-64. 
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the Common Market.95 Parties must offer remedies within 20 working days, 
although as Maudhuit and Soames96 point out in certain circumstances, outlined in 
the Commission Notice on Remedies, remedies will be accepted after the deadline 
has passed. The Commission must also inform the national competition authorities 
and publish all the information relevant to the merger in the Official Journal on 
Merger Control. The NMR endows the Commission with powers of inspection 9' 
and it can impose fines of up to 1% of aggregate turnover of parties of a proposed 
transaction if they refuse to supply information, or if the information supplied is 
incorrect or falsified.98 
The Commission has initially 90 days to make its decision relating to the 
Phase uP which can be extended to 125 days in certain circumstances! °° After the 
initiation of this phase and the adoption of the Statement of Objections by the 
Commission, the Hearing Officer holds an Oral Hearing where parties can discuss 
any relevant points or concerns.UU 
 At the end of the investigation the Commission 
may decide that the concentration is: compatible with the Common Market 
compatible after certain commitments are met or they can decide that the 
concentration is incompatible with the Common Market. 102 Article 10(3) 
introduced the "stop the clock" provision for up to 20 days during an investigation 
in order to provide clarification and verification of details in complex cases. The 
Commission cannot refuse such a request, which must be made within 15 working 
days after the start of the Phase II investigation. Comprised of experts from the 
Directorate and members from the Merger Network, "Devil's advocate panels" 
have also been introduced to ensure that a "fresh pair of eyes" is brought in to the 
" Jones, A. & B. Suffrmn, EC Competition Law. (2" Ed.), OUP, 2004: 863. 
96 Maudhuit,S.&T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, E.C.LJt 26(l), 2005: 57-64. 
EUR-Lex, Council Regulation I 39t2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OiL 24,29/01.2004: 1-22, Article 13. 
EUR-Lex, Council Regulation 13912004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OJ L 24,29/01.2004: 1-22, Article 14. 
99EUR-Ley, Council Regulation 13912004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OJ L 24,29/01.2004: 1-22, Article 10(3), e.g. where more information is 
needed by the Commission or commitments are offered by the parties to the transaction. 
'°° EUR-Lex, Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OIL 24, 29/01.2004: 1-22, Article 10(4). 
'°' Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, E.C.L.RL 26(1), 2005: 57-64. 
' 02 EUR-Lex, Council Regulation 13912004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OJ L 24,29/01.2004: 1-22, ArticleS. 
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investigation.' 03 
 "The Advisory Committee on Concentrations must be consulted 
before a final decision is made by the College of Commissioners, although Phase I 
decisions may be delegated to one Commissioner." °4 
Parties may appeal against Commission decisions to the CFL. Although the 
need for haste in assessing these cases is widely acknowledged, "there is, [only], an 
expedited appeals procedure in straightforward cases") 05 In all other cases, it may 
take up to three years until a decision is made by the CFI to prohibit or clear a 
merger. If the Commission's decision is annulled, the investigative process goes 
back to Phase I, and the parties have to provide up-to-date information about the 
condition of their market.' °6 
Articles 8(4) and 8(5) of the NMR clarifS' the Commission's decision-making 
powers.' °7 If a merger breaches the remedies (conditions rather than obligations) 
which are linked to Phase II decisions, or if the concentration has been implemented 
before the conclusion of the investigation, the Commission can order that the 
transaction be dissolved and so restore the market to its previous position. As noted 
by Maudhuit and Soames, divestiture of acquired shares etc is not always an option. 
Article 8(4), therefore, permits the Commission to take appropriate action to re-
establish the market conditions prior to the merger.' °8 
The most contentious issue during the formulation of both the original and the 
recast Merger Control Regulation' °9 related to how the concentration should be 
appraised." ° Whilst the Commission considered the arguments: for and against the 
adoption of the SLC test; the retention of the existing DT or the adoption of a test 
which combines the DT and SLC," the fmal test represented a compromise. "This 
' °3 iones, A. & B. Sufilin, EC Competition Law. (2S 
 Ed.), OUP, 2004 ; Maudhuit, S. & T. 
Changes in EU Merger Control, E.C.LRL 26(1), 2005: 57-64. 
' °4 iones, A. & B. Suffhin, EC Competition Law. (2 Ed.), OUP, 2004: 903. 
105iones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (2 Ed.), OUP, 2004: 863. 
'°'Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, E.CL I?. 26(l), 2005: 57-64. 
& Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, (Part 3) E.C.LIL 26(3), 2005: 144-150. 
' 07 Maudhuit, S. & T. Soarnes, Changes in EU Merger Control, &C.LIt 26(1), 2005: 57-64. 
tOt Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control, E.C.LK 26(l), 2005: 57-64. 
'09 The Irish and UK representatives pushed for the insertion of a Significant Lessening of Competition 
Test whilst the German delegation wanted to retain the DT (Jones, A. & B. Sufilin, EC Competition Law. (r Ed.), OUP, 2004: 913). 
110 Jones A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. (2M  Ed.), OUP, 2004: 909 
" France and Spain advocated a combination of the two tests, (Jones, A. & B. Suffrmn, EC Competition 
Law. (2 0d Ed.), OUP, 2004). 
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compromise, which is a remarkable and elegant exercise in semantics ..." does not 
represent a whole scale revision of the test merely a re-ordering of the existing 
words)' 2 As noted by Jones and Sufrmn," 3 the new test represents an attempt to 
combine the arguments and concerns of advocates of both the SLC and DT and as a 
consequence it is "broader" than the original test. Article 2(3) of the revised ECMR 
introduced the significant impediment of effective competition test, stating that: 
"A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition in 
the Common Market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of 
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared 
incompatible with the Common Market". 
The decision to retain the DT, whilst at the same time widening the test to 
include concentrations where there is not necessarily collective dominance and to 
deal with non-coordinated effects of a transaction, brings the test into line with 
countries which already use the SLC test." 4 Recital 25 of the Regulation aims to 
close the unanticipated gaps left by the DT: 
"... therefore in the interests of legal certainty, it should be made clear that 
this Regulation permits effective control of all such concentrations by 
providing that any concentration which would significantly impede 
competition ... should be declared incompatible with the Common 
Market." 
The Commission adopted the Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal 
Mergers at the same time as the NMR. "The purpose of this guidance is to provide 
guidance as to how the Commission assesses concentration,"6 when the merging 
parties are competitors within the same market, which could result in a distortion of 
competition. The incorporation of the Guidelines into the merger control regulation 
framework represents an attempt to increase the level of "legal certainty":" 7 
112 Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004- An Overview, £C.LR, 26(2), 2005: 67-73. 
"Jones, A. & B. Suifrmn, EC Competition Law. (2 0d Ed.), OUP, 2004. 
" Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004— An Overview, E.C.L.R, 26 (2), 2005: 67-73. 
"'EUR-Lex, EUR-Lex, Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration 
between undertakings. Article 1(3), 03 L 24, 29/01.2004: 1-22, Recital 25. 
"'EIJR-Lex, Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OJ L 24, 29/01.2004: 1-22, Recital 5. 
"7 Maudhuit S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control: Part 2. KC.LR. 2005,26(2): 74-81. 
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"The guidance set out in this notice draws and elaborates on the 
Commission's evolving experience with the appraisal of horizontal 
mergers under Regulation 4064/89 since its entry into force on 21" 
September 1990 as well as the case law of the Court of Justice and the 
Court of the First Instance 
The Guidelines are designed to assist the Commission when it assesses 
horizontal mergers" 9 and to provide guidance for parties to the proposed 
transaction.' 20 The Guidelines outline the Commission's approach to market share 
and concentration thresholds (section 111), the likely anticompetitive effect the 
merger would have upon the market if there are no countervailing factors (section 
IV), the effect "buyer power would have as countervailing facto?' to any anti-
competitive effects resulting from the merger (section V). The Guidelines outline 
the probability that the market would remain competitive in spite of the merger 
(section VI), the possibility that efficiencies may counterbalance the anti-
competitive effects of the merger (section VII) and the conditions for the failing 
company defence (section 
Assessment of market share is the first task of the Commission during the 
appraisal of mergers. The post-merger market share is premised upon the total pre-
market share of all the merging parties. 122 If the combined market share is 25% or 
less then the merger is not likely to distort the market. If it is more than 50%, there 
may be dominance.' 23  If this may be the case, the Commission will examine the 
strength and influence of competitors to prevent the merged entity from dominating 
the market. 124 To assess the concentration of the market, the Commission uses the 
Herflndahl-Hirschman Index (I-il-Il), to measure the absolute concentration of a 
" EUR-Lex, Council Regulation 139t2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OJ L 24, 29/01.2004: 1-22, Recital 26. 
The Commission has announced its intention to adopt similar Guidelines for Vertical and 
Conglomerate Mergers in the near future. (Maudhui S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control: 
Part 2. KC.LIt 2005,26(2): 74-81). 
120 4wflffift, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control : Part 2. E.C.LR. 2005,26(2): 74-81. 
121 ELJfle; Council Regulation 13912004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OJ L 24, 29/01.2004: 1-22, Recital 11; Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 
2004—An Overview, KC.LR, 26(2), 2005: 67-73; Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger 
Control: Part 2. E.C.LK 2005, 26(2): 74-81. 
EUR-Le; Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings, pam. 15. 
' 2 Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control: Part 2. E.C.L& 2005,26(2): 74-81. 
'' Maudhuit, S. & T. Soaines, Changes in EU Merger Control : Part 2. KC.L.R. 2005,26(2): 74-81; 
EUR-Lex, Council Regulation 13912004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OiL 24,29/01.2004: 1-22, Guidelines, para 17. 
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market, then the change in Hill (the delta) as a result of the merger. If the Hill is 
less than 1000, post-merger, the Commission is unlikely to investigate. If the Hit! 
is between 1000 - 2000 with a delta below 250 or the HILT post-merger is above 
2000 with a delta of 150 or less, the Commission is unlikely to investigate. 
However, if one of the merging companies possesses a post-market share of 50 9/6 or 
more, or if the rest of the competitors are linked through cross-shareholding, or, if 
one of the merging parties is unpredictable (a maverick) and likely to destabilize the 
market, the Commission will investigate the transaction.' 25 
As noted in the Guidelines, horizontal mergers may impede competition by 
strengthening or establishing a dominant position as the number of competitors are 
reduced by the merger.' 26 Horizontal mergers may impede competition in two 
ways: through both non-coordinated and coordinated effects. The Commission 
must assess whether or not the merger would precipitate changes to the market 
which would result in these effects.' 27 The reduction of "important competitive 
restraints on one or more firms" (the removal of one or more rivals) would permit 
company(ies) to increase market share and power without having to coordinate 
behaviour with other firms. Typically, the non-coordinated effects of a horizontal 
merger may result in either the merged party possessing an increased market share 
which is greater than its competitors' 28 or oligopolistic markets where there is a 
reduction in competition. These non-coordinated effects are incompatible with the 
Common Market.' 29 The Commission must, therefore, consider several factors 
such as: market share - the larger the share, the greater the chance a dominant 
position will be created; the closeness of merging parties' products - if there is a 
high degree of "substitutability", then there are likely to be price increases, if 
however, competing finns create similar products this will increase/protect rivalry. 
The potential for customers to switch suppliers - a reduction of suppliers may 
A lull list of the factors which would precipitate a detailed investigation by the Commission can be 
found at pan 20 of the Guidelines. 
126 EUR-Lex, Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OJ L 24, 29/01.2004: 1-22, pan. 22. 
EUR-Lex, Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OJ L 24,29/01.2004: 1-22, part 23. 
'EURLex, Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), Ui L 24, 29/01.2004: 1-22, part 25. 
'EUR-Le; Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), Ui L 24, 29/01.2004: 1-22, part 25. 
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reduce their opportunity to switch if costs are raised - and the possibility that there 
will be a reduction of supply to increase market prices post-merger, will all be 
considered by the Commission when assessing if the merger will precipitate non-
coordinated effects! 3° 
A merger may enable or facilitate closer coordination between the remaining 
firms, without any firms having to enter into a legally-binding agreement! 3 ' Tacit 
coordination between competitors permits firms to act independently but coordinate 
their behaviour when necessary. This coordination may take the form of: 
companies keeping market prices artificially high; the division of the market 
geographically or on the basis of social characteristics, or the restriction of the entry 
of new products on to the market! 32 
When assessing the possibility of coordinated effects, the Commission, 
therefore, must consider: evidence of past examples of coordination between 
competitors; the number of finns involved - it is easier to coordinate between a few 
firms; the stability of the market - it is easier to coordinate market prices when a 
market is stable; if coordinating firms are able to monitor competitors to ensure 
rules are being adhered to. If coordination is to be successful there must be checks, 
balances and relative transparency for the coordination to work. Finally the 
Commission must consider if competitors outside the coordinating group and 
consumers can counteract the effects of coordination. l 3) 
There has been much debate examining whether or not the old Article 2(1) (b) 
was a suitable mechanism to take into account the efficiency defence when 
appraising mergers! TM At first, Commission decisions dismissed the value of 
efficiencies as a possible defence, taking the view that efficiencies would strengthen 
a merged entity's dominant position. In AT & T/NCR the Commission decided that 
' 30 E0R-Le; Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), 0) 124, 29/01.2004: 24-38. This list, as noted by the Guidelines is not 
comprehensive. 
EUR-Lex, Council Regulation I 39t2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OJ 1 24, 29/01.2004: 1-22, 39. 
EUR-Lex, Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OiL 24,29/01.2004: 1-22, 40. 
133 MaUCIIUIi4 S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control : Part 2. KC.LR. 2005,26(2): 74-8I. 
134 See literature review. 
58 
An Appraisal of the Ewopean Commission's Application of the New Merga Regulation 
"It is not excluded that potential advantages flowing from synergies may create or 
strengthen a dominant position.' "35 Although the efficiency argument was used by 
the Commission in the Aerospatiale-AlenialdeHavillande' 36 decision, whereby any 
savings made by a merger should be passed to the consumer, this line of analysis 
petered out, with the Commission's approach to efficiencies gained by a transaction 
either vague, or irrelevant. In Mercedes-BenzlKassbo her, for example, the 
Commission concluded that although this merger would lead to increased 
efficiencies in terms of research and design (R&D), administration and production, 
the effect this would have upon the merger remained unclear. 137 In Dc 
Beers/LVMH, the Commission concluded that the synergies gained from this 
proposed joint venture in terms of "efficiencies and reduction in cost production" 
coupled with LVMH's expertise in international sales actually permitted them to 
become the dominant player in the luxury branded jewellery market. This joint 
venture was authorised, however, as these efficiencies would not significantly 
strengthen De Beers' already dominant position. 138 In GE/Honeywell, the 
Commission prohibited the transaction, taking the view that the efficiencies which 
could be gained from the merger would put less efficient companies at a 
disadvantage and as a consequence strengthen the merged entity's dominant 
position. 139 Prior to the entry in to force of the NMR, the Commission took the 
view that any efficiencies passed on to the consumer may harm competitors. As 
noted in the GE/Honeywell case, as the more efficient new entity can cut costs and 
increase competitiveness, competitors attempt to cut costs in order to compete but, 
as a consequence, due to the loss of revenue, may have to reduce investment in 
R&D 140 or may have to exit the market because they can't pay suppliers, wages 
etc) 4 ' 
' 33 Case No. COMP IV/M50, A T& T/NCR , [1991], at 31. This case involved American Telephone & 
Telegraph (AT&T) purchasing shares in NCR Corporation. The Commission cleared the transaction. 
''Case No. COMP IV/M.477, Mercedes-Benz/Kassbohrer, OJ L 211 , 06/09/1995: 0001 - 0029. A 
merger between two bus companies. The Commission permitted this transaction subject to certain 
conditions. 
'"Case No. COMP IV/M.477, Mercedes-BenzlKassbohrer, OJ L 211 ,06/09/1 995: 0001 - 0029. 66-67. 
138 Case No. COMP/M.2300, De BeersiL VMH [2001] at 102-5; Snelders, R. & S. Genevaz, Mergers 
Efficiencies and Remedies, in The international Comparative Legal Guide to: Merger Control. Global 
Legal Group: London. This case involved DeBeers (a large diamond group) and LVMH (a high end 
French luxury conglomerate) entering into ajoint venture in order for DeBeers to sell high end jewellery 
in LVM}{ stores. 
' 39 Case No. COMP JV/M2000, General Electrici Honeywell. at 350. 
' 40 Case No. COMP IV/M2000, General Fiectrici Honeywell at 403. 
"'Case No. COMP IV/M2000, General Electricl Honeywell at 402. 
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The efficiency defence, introduced by the combination of Article 2(1) (b) and 
Recital 29 clarifies that it is the consumer that must benefit from the efficiency 
trade off. Recital 29 of the NMR makes it clear that the efficiencies can offset and 
counterbalance the anti-competitive effects of the merger: 
"... it is appropriate to take into account any substantiated and likely 
efficiencies put forward by the undertakings concerned. It is possible that the 
efficiencies brought about by the concentration counteract the effects on 
competition ... 
The efficiency defence must be premised upon objective efficiencies, "cost savings 
arising from the exercise of market power will not be relevant. The efficiencies 
must result from the economic activity which forms the object of the agreement, 
and they must be substantiated". 142 The parties concerned must provide evidence 
which substantiates these claims and shows how these benefits can be passed on to 
the consumer.' 43 
The Guidelines allow for the clearance of mergers which impede competition, 
but only if one of the parties to the transaction is failing. The Commission 
"identifies three cumulative criteria of a 'failing firm' defence.tM  The first  
criterion is that the failing finn would collapse and hence be forced out of the 
market in the near future if the take-over was not cleared. The second is that there 
is no alternative merger that is less anticompetitive available and the third criterion 
is that the failing firm would collapse and the market conditions would be the same 
as if the merger had been permitted as there would still be one less competitor. 
Under the original Merger Control Regulation, the Commission had been 
required to assess the ancillary restraints, such as purchasing agreements, which are 
part and parcel of a merger agreement. The Commission had tried to avoid 
completing this assessment, but the CFI prevented it from doing so. The NMR 
requires companies to self-assess ancillary restraints, and the Commission has 
142 Ratcliff, J. Major Events and Policy Issues in EC Competition Law. J.C.C.It 15(2), 2004: 19-24. 
Ratcliff, J. Major Events and Policy Issues in EC Competition Law. LC.C.R 15(2), 2004: 19-24. 
t44M1tlui S. & t Soames, Changes in EU Mer Control : Part 2. E.C.LR. 2005,26(2): 74-8I. 
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provided a guidance notice advising parties how to do so: the Commission Notice 
on Restrictions Directly Related and Necessary to Concentrations.' 45 
"Subject to review by the Court of Justice, the Commission shall have sole 
jurisdiction to take the decisions provided for in this Regulation".' The 
Commission remains the pivotal, central actor within this policy framework. The 
framework of merger regulation has evolved. The revised NMR and the 
accompanying package of legislative and procedural reforms are certainly far-
reaching, aiming to solve the unanticipated consequences which have evolved as 
the original framework buckled under an ever-increasing workload and criticism 
from the European Courts. 
The analysis ofjoint ventures has proved a challenge for the Commission and 
"... posed the most difficult analytical issues for EEC competition lawyers") 47 
Joint ventures can take on different guises and involve different levels of 
integration, be structural or merely represent a partnership. Joint ventures may raise 
or defuse competition concerns, increase the efficiency of the parent companies or 
they may foreclose a particular market to competitors.' 48 The evolvement of the 
Commission's approach to the analysis ofjoint ventures illustrates the complexities 
involved when the Commission is analysing a transaction. 
Pathak noted that the Commission struggled for nearly 20 years to "develop a 
coherent approach for the assessment of joint The Commission first 
assessed joint ventures under Article 81. As noted by Zonnekeyn,' 5° for most of the 
formative period of the EC, the Commission reasoned that Article 81 EC Treaty 
remained inapplicable to mergers and other such "structural arrangements". The 
Ratcliff, J. Major Events and Policy Issues in EC Competition Law. I.C.C.R. 15(2), 2004: 19-24; 
Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control: Part 2. &C.LR. 2005,26(2): 74-81; 
Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004— An Overview, E.C.LR, 26(2), 2005:67-73. 
14' EUR-Lex, Council Regulation 13912004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentration between 
undertakings. Article 1(3), OiL 24,29/01.2004: 1-22, Art. 21(2). 
' tmt Pathak, A. S. The EC Commission's approach tojoint ventures: a policy of contradictions. E.CLR. 
171, 1991. 
'"Xiong, T. & J. Kirkbride, The European control of joint ventures: an historic opportunity or a mere 
continuation of existing practice. KLR. 1998. 
'Xiong, T. & J. Kirkbride, The European control ofjoint ventures: an historic opportunity or a mere 
continuation of existing practice. E.LR. 1998. 
' 50 Zonnekeyn, G. A, The Treatment ofjoint ventures under the amended E.C. Merger Regulation. 
E.C.LR, 414. 
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Commission identified two types of joint ventures: concentrative joint ventures 
which "... do not give rise to the possibility that parent companies will coordinate 
their competitive behaviour in the joint ventures' market", whilst cooperative joint 
ventures included those which may involve the parent companies remaining in the 
market post transaction and so may coordinate their actions.iSt  The Commission, 
therefore, developed the "partial merger test" for concentrative transactions. The 
"partial merger test" required the parties to "transfer all their business to the joint 
venture on a lasting basis" whilst the new joint venture remained an independent 
economic/business entity and the joint venture would not lead to co-operation 
between the "parent companies" in other areas. 152 Cooperative joint ventures 
continued to be examined under Article 81(1) & 81(3) EC Treaty. 
This test was applied by the Commission to several transactions. De 
Laval/Stor(ç' 53 for example, involved De Laval and Stork wanting to enter into a 
joint venture in order to develop compressors, turbines and pumps. The 
Commission, as observed by Zonnekeyn,' TM refbsed to accept that this transaction 
represented a joint venture as there was no proof that the parent companies would 
just become holding companies. The first (and only) Commission decision where a 
joint venture decision was deemed concentrative was SHy/Chevron.' 55 The 
Commission's Sixth Report on Competition Policy (1976) cited this transaction as a 
case where the parent companies "completely and ineversibly" left the joint 
venture's market without detrimentally effecting competition within that particular 
market. 156 Thus the market-exit criterion was an essential element if a transaction 
was to be categorized as concentrative. Zonnekeyn' 51 considered that the 
Commission's application of the assessment of joint ventures was "... not 
IS! Prescott, D. & S. Swartz, Joint Ventures in the internationalArena. American Bar Association, 2003. 
152 Prescott, D. & S. Swartz, Joint Ventures in the international Arena. American Bar Association, 2003. 
'53 CMLR, De Lava! / Stork decision [1977] 2 CMLR 069. De Lava! (US company) and Stork (Dutch 
company), both turbine companies fomied ajoint venture to make and sell turbines. 
154 CMLR, De Laval/Stork decision [1977] 2 CMLR 069. 
In this case Steenkolen-Handelsvereeniging (SHV) and Chevron Oil Europe Inc. (Chevron) 
established ajoint venture to sell products in a market, where previously the parent companies had 
competed. The parent companies transferred all their related assets and distribution networks to the joint 
venture. 
' 6 Pafliak, A. S. The EC Commission's approach tojoint ventures: a policy of contradictions. E.C.LJ{ 
171, 1991. 
157 Pathak, A. S. The EC Commission's approach tojoint ventures: a policy of contradictions. KCLR. 
171, 1991. 
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successful. The Commission was taking a too formalistic approach, finding 
potential competition to be present on the basis of rather unsatisfactory analysis". 
The Commission sought to provide further clarification in the ECMR 
between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures. Concentrative joint ventures 
fell under the jurisdiction of the ECMR whilst cooperative joint ventures were 
examined by Article 81. The Commission defined joint ventures as "undertakings 
which are jointly controlled by two or more undertakings which are economically 
independent".' 58 The ECMR attempted to solve this problem by replacing the 
partial merger test, with the new Regulation continuing the distinction drawn 
between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures. Brown' 59 pointed out that 
historically "[TJhe distinction between concentrative joint ventures and cooperative 
ones is critical .... It forms the basis of the jurisdiction test ...." The Commission, 
under the ECMR, only had jurisdiction over concentrative joint ventures: Article 3 
(2), second paragraph stated that: 
"[T]he creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the 
functions of an autonomous economic entity, which does not give rise to 
coordination of the competitive behaviour of the parties amongst themselves 
or between them and the joint venture, shall constitute a concentration 
within the meaning of paragraph 1 .(b)".' 6° 
Article 3(2) defined cooperative joint ventures as "an operation, including the 
creation of a joint venture, which has as its object or effect the coordination of the 
competitive behaviour of undertakings which remain independent, shall not 
constitute a concentration within the meaning of paragraph 1 (b)". Structural 
cooperative joint ventures would not fall under the ECMR and had to be assessed/ 
reviewed under Article 81, pursuant to Regulation 17/62.I61  Levy' 62 stated that 
" Xiong, T. & J. Kirkbride, The European control of joint ventures: an historic opportunity or a mere 
continuation of existing practice. E.L.R. 1998. 
"9 Brown, A. Distinguishing between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures: is it getting any 
easier. E.CL K 240. 
' 60 EUR-Lex, Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings 
' 61Zonnekeyn, G. A, The Treatment ofjoint ventures under the amended E.C. Merger Regulation. 
E.C.LR. 414. 
"2 Zo,meke G. A, The Treatment ofjoint ventures under the amended E.C. Merger Regulation. 
E.C.LR. 414. 
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"[A] significant and disproportionate amount of time ... was devoted to addressing 
issues that arose from the distinction made in the original version of the Merger 
Regulation" between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures. In a further 
attempt to clarit' the differences between the two types of joint ventures, the 
Commission published the "Interface Notice" in 1990.163  As parties which were 
proposing a transaction sought to get them classified as concentrative due to them 
then falling under the jurisdiction of the ECMR and its strict timetable - rather than 
cooperative- the Commission published a series of Notices in an attempt to ensure 
legal certainty. As noted by Cahill, 1 " however "... in practice ... Article 3.2 criteria 
were difficult to apply". Article 3.2 stipulated that joint ventures would be 
categorized as cooperative (and fall under the jurisdiction of Regulation 17 rather 
than the ECMR) if the venture would lead to coordination between the parent 
companies. As some coordination is inevitable between parent companies during 
the establishment and operation of many joint ventures, Cahill considered that "... 
this criterion seemed excessive." 65 Another problem with the distinction drawn 
between the two types of ventures, as noted by Cahill, was that in cases where there 
were both concentrative and cooperative elements the concentrative elements were 
drawn under the timetable of the ECMR whilst the cooperative elements were 
drawn under the (slower) jurisdiction of Article 81. To improve the framework for 
the assessment of joint ventures, the fast track procedure was introduced in 1993 
and the Commission Notice on the distinction between concentrative and 
cooperative joint ventures replaced Commission Notice C203/10 (The Interface 
Notice). 166 This Notice provided that to categorize a joint venture as concentrative 
the anaiysis should focus on economic autonomy of the venture and the continued 
competitiveness of the parent companies post transaction. Notably the 1994 Notice 
permitted interaction between the joint venture and parent company for the first 
' 63 European Commission, Commission notice regarding the concentrative and cooperative operations 
under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of2l December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings. O.J. [1990] C203110. 
'"Cahill, D. The BC MERGER REGULATION - AMENDMENT AND REFORM. Commercial Law 
Practitioner, Oct 1998: 229-235. 
tGSCII D. The BC MERGER REGULATION - AMENDMENT AND REFORM. Commercial Law 
Practitioner, Oct 1998: 229-235. 
'Zonnekeyn, G. A, The Treatment ofjoint ventures under the amended B.C. Merger Regulation. 
E.CLR. 414. 
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three years of its existence! 67 The revised Interface Notice "paved the way for the 
amendment of Article 3.2. by the 1998 amending Regu1ation".' 
The 1996 Green PaperW  which analysed the ECMR, highlighted concerns 
raised by both industry and Member States: that to treat the two types of joint 
ventures differently was unfair. Both types of joint ventures can have the same 
effect on the structures of the market, but fell under the jurisdiction of different 
frameworks, with different timetables for assessment and differing levels of legal 
certainty. '70  
Cahill noted that: "mhe  1994 Notice effectively went "halfway" but it took 
the amending Regulation and 1998 Notice to finish the job".' 7 ' The ECMR was 
revised in 1997 and the amending Regulation" 2 entered into force on March 1 
1998. In relation to mergers, the revised Regulation established a lower turnover 
threshold whilst fill function joint ventures, which have a Community dimension, 
would become a "concentration" within the definition laid out in the ECMR. The 
Merger Regulation no longer differentiated between concentrative and structural 
cooperative joint ventures. This Regulation removed all references to cooperative 
joint ventures (Article 3.2). The revised Article 3.2 determined the criteria for a 
concentrative joint venture: "... joint ventures that perform on a lasting basis all of 
the functions of an autonomous economic entity") 73 The 1998 Notice was 
premised upon the concept of full-function joint ventures, "(E)ffectively, this 
' 67 CahiIl, D. The EC MERGER REGULATION - AMENDMENT AND REFORM. Commercial Law 
Practitioner, Oct 1998: 229-23 5. 
'Caffill, D. The EC MERGER REGULATION - AMENDMENT AND REFORM. Commercial Law 
Practitioner, Oct 1998: 229-235. 
" Commission, Community Merger Control - Green Paper on the review of the merger regulation 
COM (96)19, January 1996. Available from: 
http://europa.euldocumentslcomm/greenj,apers/indexen,htm#  1996 [Accessed 17/07/08]. 
' 70 Zonnekeyn, G. A, The Treatment ofjoint ventures under the amended B.C. Merger Regulation. 
EC.LR . 414. 
' 71 Cahill, D. The EC MERGER REGULATION - AMENDMENT AND REFORM. Commercial Law 
Practitioner, Oct 1998: 229-235. 
1 EUR4; Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. OiL 180 of 9 July 1997. 
"3 Cahill, D. The EC MERGER REGULATION - AMENDMENT AND REFORM. Commercial Law 
Practitioner, Oct 1998: 229-235. 
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heralds the abandonment, both as a matter of law and a matter of Commission 
policy and practice, of the concentrative/cooperative distinction •.."* The 
distinction between full function and non-function joint ventures determined if the 
transaction fell under either the jurisdictional threshold of the ECMR or Regulation 
17/62. The revised Notice required the full function joint venture to fulfil both the 
DT and to satis& the criteria laid out in Article 8 1(3) which dealt with coordination 
between parent companies.' 75 
The possibility that the parent companies may interact and coordinate post 
joint venture did not now negate the application of the provisions of the ECMR. 
Article 2.4 allowed the coordination between parent companies to be assessed under 
Article 81 EC Treaty and the merger regulation framework. All full function joint 
ventures had to remain under the control of both parent companies and the 
principles to which joint ventures must adhere, if they were to be drawn under the 
jurisdiction of the ECMR, were outlined in the updated Commission Notice on the 
concept of concentration (1998)) 76 
At first glance the enactment of the NMR did little to change the position of 
joint ventures within the merger regulation framework. Sinan and Upho11477 
comment that: 
"Joint ventures remain the problem child of European competition laws. 
They do not fit neatly within legal frameworks which tend to view the 
world in terms of absolutes .... [t]his has led to a plethora of somewhat 
artificial distinction in attempting to fit joint ventures into the existing 
"Cahill, D. The EC MERGER REGULATION - AMENDMENT AND REFORM. Commercial Law 
Practitioner, Oct 1998: 229-235. 
175 Cahill, D. The EC MERGER REGULATION - AMENDMENT AND REFORM. Commercial Law 
Practitioner, Oct 1998: 229-235. 
"Cahill, D. The EC MERGER REGULATION - AMENDMENT AND REFORM. Commercial Law 
Practitioner, Oct 1998: 229-235. 
'Th Zonnekeyn, G. A, The Treatment ofjoint ventures under the amended E.C. Merger Regulation. 
KC.LR. 414. 
"Sinan, I. M, & N. T. Uphoff, Review of joint ventures wider the new EC Merger Regulation. The 
European Antitnat Review, 2005: 36-39. 
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framework the significance of which has changed with each adaptation 
oftheECMR...... 
Under the revised Merger Regulation a joint venture fills under the 
jurisdiction of the NN4R if the turnover thresholds are fulfilled (Article 1(2) and 
Article 1(3)) and, as stated in the Commission's Joint Venture Notice, if two or 
more separate companies acquire/share control over another company. The venture 
must be niH function. As stated in the Joint Venture Notice Article 12 fill 
functionality is achieved if 
"Essentially this means that a joint venture must operate on a market, 
performing the functions normally carried out by undertakings operating on 
the same market. In order to do so the joint venture must have a management 
dedicated to its day-to-day operations and access to resources including 
finance, staff and resources ... in order to conduct on a lasting basis its 
business activities within the area provided for in the joint venture 
agreement".' 78 
There does not need to be full functionality at the start of the venture. In 
Toray/Muratat'Te in,' 79 for example, the Commission accepted that initially the 
venture would only provide joint marketing services and would become full 
function after one year when it acquired manufacturing assets. Non full function 
joint ventures continue to be appraised under Article 81(1) and 81(3) EC Treaty to 
assess whether or not the concentration is compatible with the common market. 
The analysis must be conducted within the same timeframe as analysis conducted 
under the Merger Regulation. 
Most importantly of all, joint ventures do not only have to be subject to the 
SLEC but are also subject to a second test outlined in Article 2(4) ECMR. The 
Commission must assess whether or not there will be coordination between the 
' 78 EUR-Le; Commission Notice on the concept of fill-function joint ventures under Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. OJ C, 02/03/1998. 
' 79 COMP/M2763, Toray/Murata/Teijift Official Journal C 280, 16/11/2002 P. 0026 - 0026. The 
Commission concluded that the joint venture between these three textile machinery firms - gaining 
control over TMT Machinery Inc, would not impede competition as there was a clear timetable detailing 
when flull-flinctionality would be achieved. 
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parent companies (spill-over), if spill-over effects are identified they will be 
assessed under Article 81(1) EC Treaty. 
On Jul 10, 2007, the Commission adopted the Consolidated Jurisdictional 
Notice. This Notice updated and consolidated four existing Notices, one of which 
relates to full function joint ventures. If a pre-existing joint venture acquires part or 
all of a company from the parent company, if the joint venture acquires new assets 
or the joint venture becomes full-function, then EU notification may be required. 
The regulation of these transactions has evolved in a somewhat semantic 
fashion. Distinctions between the two types of ventures remain, but slowly the 
demarcation has become less distinct as the merger framework's jurisdiction has 
been widened to incorporate more types of ventures. Problems with analysing joint 
ventures, as highlighted by Tyson, 180 still remain where transactions may result in 
structural change but the venture does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Merger 
Regulation. Partial fill function joint ventures and strategic alliances may provide 
the base for a full function joint venture in the future, but these business 
arrangements are excluded from the merger regulation framework. As the 
Commission itself acknowledges "[Ejxclusion from the ECMR assessment 
produces difficulties because ... substantial sunk costs and far-reaching integration 
makes a post control and consequential potential unravelling generally 
incongruous".' 8 ' 
2.5 Conclusion 
"[O]f all the European Commission's current activities in the competition 
arena, it is merger contml that exemplifies this particular policy's potential for 
controversyY The increasing proliferation of mergers naturally precipitates 
concerns about the future direction of "European capitalism". The expansion of 
companies which cross national boundaries which are increasingly difficult to 
Tyson, N. .Joint Venture Regulation under European Competition Laws: An Update. European Law 
Review, 13, 3,2007: 408423. 
Tyson, N. Joint Venture Regulation under European Competition Laws: An Update. European Law 
Review, 13, 3, 2007: 408-423. 
182 McGowan, L. & M. Cmi, Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of 
Merger Control. Governance: An International Journal of Poticy andAthninistration, 12(2), April 
1999. 
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regulate, coupled with the need to ensure that the Single Market is not impeded due 
to mergers which establish or reinforce the dominant position of one company 
within a market, precipitated demands by all actors involved for the need for a 
transnational, European-wide, framework of merger regulation. A merger 
regulation framework was established in order to provide points of clarification for 
issues raised by the European Courts, to reduce transaction costs for businesses 
through the establishment of a "one-stop shop" for proposed mergers, joint ventures 
or agreements with a European dimension. The entry into force of the ECMR, the 
subsequent revisions in 1998 and amendments introduced by the 2004 Regulation 
established a complex and intricate framework of merger regulation. The 
Commission holds a pivotal position within the merger policy framework, a 
position which is unique to this policy regime, not replicated in any other policy 
area. The European Parliament and European Council only possess a residual role, 
constnxcting the legislative framework and Guidelines, the formal framework of 
merger regulation. The Commission, however, establishes and implements the 
substantive merger regulation framework. Particularly since the early 21 Century, 
the trajectory of policy has been shaped by the sometimes contentious relationship 
between the Community Courts and the Commission, the reversal of three key 
decisions by the CFI not precipitating, but shaping, the content of the recast Merger 
Control Regulation. 
Although the formal contents of the NMR have already been examined, the 
implementation and application of the Merger Control Regulation and the new 
Guidelines by the Commission have not. The rest of the thesis, therefore, will focus 
attention on this area of research, analysing the application of the NMR by the 
Commission. 
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CHAPTER 3: APPLICATION OF THE REVISED MERGER CONTROL 
REGULATION BY THE COMMISSION 
3.1 Introduction 
As the thesis is taking a centralised approach to the analysis of the recast 
Merger Control Regulation, this chapter will focus upon the application of the new 
Regulation by the Commission. This, the main substantive chapter of the thesis, 
will examine if, and to what extent, the pathway of policy is shifting as a result of 
this application and utilise empirical examples to illustrate the extent to which the 
two Regulations differ. 
Prior to the entry into force of the NMR, the Commission could only 
challenge transactions which would establish or strengthen the dominance of an 
entity post-merger. The most obvious examples of the Commission prohibiting a 
merger were cases of single firm dominance where the entity, as the dominant 
player, was able to raise prices. The Commission has also identified and prohibited 
cases of collective dominance where there could be tacit collusion in order to 
increase prices. As the Airtours judgment illustrated, however, the Commission 
lacked the competence necessary to challenge mergers which raised competition 
concerns because they did not establish or strengthen a dominant position! As part 
of the revision of the merger regulation framework, the DT was reworded, enabling 
the Commission to consider if a transaction may significantly impede competition 
even though it would not establish a collusive oligopoly or a position of dominance. 
The recast Merger Control Regulation also introduced or revised several Articles 
which required the reshaping of the merger regulation framework and the revision 
by the Commission of its approach and mind-set when applying the recast 
framework. In order to examine the hypothesis that the application of the NMR 
represents a step rather than a drastic change to the merger regulation framework, 
this chapter will consider how the European Commission has applied or adapted to 
these revisions and consider the impact the application of the NMR has had upon 
the trajectory of merger regulation policy and law and the (re)shaping of the merger 
regulation framework. 
'Conti, M. EU Merger Analysis. Comp. L.I. 2006, 5(5): 6-9. 
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The first part of the chapter will be separated into several subheadingsIissues: 
jurisdictional; substantive; procedura1 2 and Commission as a facilitator, in order to 
examine if and how the application of the merger regulation policy by the 
Commission has changed as a consequence of the entry into force of the NMR. The 
latter part of the chapter will examine the factors which remain outside the 
Commission's control but can (attempt to) shape the application of the merger 
regulation framework. This section will examine the role the media plays in 
hindering or shaping the appraisal process and the application of the NMR by the 
Commission and also analyse the role the CFI and ECJ play in shaping the merger 
regulation framework. 
3.2 Jurisdictional Issues 
3.2.1 Allocation of Mergers 
The original referral procedure, sometimes referred to as the "distinct market 
exception," was a product of compromise. 3 Prior to the entry into force of the 
NMR, case referral was premised upon Articles 9: a Member State may request a 
referral back to national authorities, and 22: whereby Member States can request a 
referral to the Commission if the transaction did not fall within the threshold 
requirements. The intention of the original ECMR was to establish a one-stop shop. 
Sir Leon Brittan, the then Competition Commissioner, observed that:" ... rather 
than adding an extra layer of bureaucracy, the Regulation would peel away several 
layers of bureaucratic control at one stroke reducing these to a single approval 
procedure in every case". 4 
Article 9 was only used infrequently in the formative period of the application 
of the ECMR. From 1996 onwards, however, this principle has been used more 
often by the Commission. The first time the reference back principle was 
2 This is following and building upon the framework laid out in Competition Law Monitor, Mergers 
in the EC - Reform of the Merger Regulation. Comp Law Mon 3.1(1), which examines the ECMR 
and charts developments, including reference to the proposed 14MW 
Hirsbrunner, S. Referral of Mergers in EC Merger Control. E.C.L1L 20(7), 1999: 372 - 378. 
Soames, T. The "Community Dimension" in the EEC Mergcr Regulation: the Calculation of the 
Turnover Criteria. £C.LR. 11(5) 1990:213-225. 
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operationalised was in Steetley plc/Tarmac5 in 1992. The Commission agreed that 
as the concentration would result in Tarmac and Steetley combining domestic 
building resources, this would lead to problems in the sale and manufacture of brick 
and clay files in certain parts of England. As the brick and tile market is regional 
and exportation of bricks and tiles to mainland Europe was low, due to 
transportation costs, the impact of the merger would affect UK markets. The 
economic implications of the merger were therefore referred back to the UK 
authorities whilst, at the same time, the Commission found that the remaining 
aspects of the merger were compatible with the Common Market. 6 Prior to the 
entry into force of the NMR, analysis of Article 9 Referrals, as noted by Jones and 
Sufflin,' reveals the potential "difficulties that can result" if one authority clears the 
merger whilst another prohibits the merger. 
Monti, in his last speech to the IBA Conference (2004) as Competition 
Commissioner, stated that one of the objectives of the revision of the merger 
regulation framework was to "... put in place a more rational corrective mechanism 
of case allocation ... based on subsidiarity, by ensuring that the authority best-
placed to carry out a particular merger investigation should deal with the case". 8 
The new two-way system of referral ensures that the principle of subsidiarity is 
applied - the best-placed authority appraises the transaction. Now referrals can be 
premised upon Article 4(4), whereby the notifying parties request a referral to the 
Commission. The Case Referral Notice outlines the Commission's policy towards 
case referral. Prior to the amendments, they could only request a referral after 
notification of a transaction. The new Merger Control Regulation introduced a 
degree of flexibility in the referral system, permitting the parties to the transaction 
Case COMP No IV/M.180 Steetley/Tarmac. The UK, under Article 9(2) requested a reference 
back in relation to certain markets, bricks and clay tiles. The Commission agreed as, due to 
transportation costs, the joint venture would not affect these markets on mainland Europe. 
6 
 Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. OUP, 2004: 886; Case No COMP WI M. 180, 
Steeleyplel Tarmac [1992],4, CMLR. 337. 
'Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, .EC Competition Law. OUP, 2004: 886; Case No CORP LW M. 180, 
Steeleyplcl Tarmac [19921, 4, C.M.L.R. 337. 
8 Monti. M Private litigation at a key complement to public enforcement of competition ndes and 
the first conclusions on the implementation of the new Merger Regulation.Speech by Mario Monti, 
IBA, 8 Annual Conference, Fiesole, 2004. EUROPA Rapid Press Release, 
SPEECH/04/403, Date: 17/09/2004. Available from: 
hup:lleuropa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAclion.do?reference=SPEECH/04/403&fbrmat='HTML&aged= 
0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, Accessed 17/10/06). 
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to request a referral from the Commission back to national competition authorities 
and vice versa, permitting referral at both the pre- and post-notification phase. 
Between May 2004 and September 2006 there were 821 notifications? There 
were 37 referrals to Member States' national competition authorities. Pm-
notification via Article 4(4) accounted for 21 of the referrals and post-notification 
via Article 9 for 16. There were 72 referrals to the Commission via Article 4(5) pm-
notification and 7 via Article 22 post-notification. 10 The Commission refused 6 
referral requests between 2004 and 2006. In BerteismanniSpringer IV" for 
example, the Commission refused to refer to the German Competition Authority on 
the basis that there was a European dimension to this case. Monti noted that "the 
key aspect of the reform is that referrals can occur before a formal filing". The 
majority of requests want filings to be based in Brussels, whilst: "so far, the new 
referral system is not being used by businesses as a means of simply forum-
shopping ... the great majority of the requests which have been submitted to the 
Commission under article 4(5) concerned genuinely cross-border cases 
As noted by Lowe,' 3 the revised case referral system both ensures that the 
most suitably placed authority reviews a transaction and that the need for multiple 
filings is reduced (400 filings with national competition authorities were avoided as 
a consequence of the introduction of the "one-stop shop"), whilst Jones and Suifrin 
observed that the Commission must exert caution and discretion when utilising 
Article 9, "... if it is not [to] rob the one-stop shop principle of substance".' 4 The 
European Commission, European Merger Control - Council Regulation 13912004 Statistics. 
Available from: htqyi/ec.europa.eomin/competition/mergers/cases/stats.html (Accessed 
17/10/06). 
'° See Appendix I for a fill break down of referral statistics. 
"COMIP/ M.3178 Bertelsmann/Springer JV. Bertelsmann, Gruner+, Jaher and Springer wanted to 
combine their rotogravure printing presses in Geimany and establish printing lhcilities in the UK. 
The German authorities requested a referral back but the Commission felt the joint venture had the 
capacity to affect the European market as a whole, not just the German high volume printing for 
magazine market The Venture was later cleared. 
' 2 Conti, M. EU Merger Analysis. Comp. Li. 2006, 5(5): 6-9. 
' 3 Lowe, P. EC Merger Regulation: is there Really a New Approach? EC Competition Day, Vienna, 
2006 EC Competition Day. Available from: 
http://www.competition06.comlNRirdonlyres/BE2DDIE3-5FA3-48CE-A333- 
D1365 15D1FE4t25532/PhilipLoweslidesl9iune2006Vienna.pdf (Accessed 14/01/08). 
14 Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. OUP, 2004: 889. 
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new case referral system, therefore, adheres to the principle of subsidiarity, which is 
a central tenet of the Community's acquis. 
The revision of the allocation of mergers mechanism illustrates a theme which 
runs concurrently through the Merger Control Regulation and competition policy - 
the need to increase the flexibility of the regime. The use of these new mechanisms 
by both the noti!'ing parties and the Commission has resulted in the need for fewer 
multiple-filings and represents a natural progression from the original mechanism 
rather than a radical change from the original provision. The new referral 
procedures are designed to find a balance between the need to establish a high 
degree of legal certainty - through the establishment of turnover thresholds which 
determine whether or not a concentration possesses a Community dimension - and 
the need to make provision for cases where a transaction may meet the threshold 
requirements but only has a limited impact upon a Member State or in cases where 
a transaction does not meet the threshold requirements but will impact upon a 
number of Member States.' 5 
33 Substantive Issues: Substantive Test 
33.1 SLEC Test 
Prior to the entry into force of the NMR, the Merger Control Regulation only 
permitted the Commission to prohibit mergers which would establish or reinforce a 
dominant position.' 6 The toolkit used by the Commission during the application of 
the original Merger Control Regulation enabled it to consider if competition would 
be impeded as a consequence of the transaction, focusing upon and utilising 
theories of hann:' 7 the effect monopolies or bundling of products would have upon 
competition in that particular market and the effect the transaction would have upon 
that entity's position within the market, namely will it establish or reinforce its 
Field, Fisher, Waterhouse LLP, Competition Monthly Update - 2004. Available from 
httpillwww.ffw.com/Publications/competition/alertersept2004.aspx  (Accessed I 5/10106). 
"Jones, A. & B. Suffrmn, EC Competition Law. OUP, 2004:931. 
Davidson, L. M. EU Merger Control and the Compatibility Test: A Review of Recent 
Developments. Liverpool Law Review, 25, 2004: 195-220 
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dominant position and increase market share to such an extent that competition is 
impeded.' 8 
As noted by Jones and Sufflin, however, although the original Merger Control 
Regulation "... provided no textual support for the view the regulation should also 
prohibit concentrations that would create or strengthen a collective dominant 
position on an oligopolistic market where a collusion-like outcome was likely," the 
Commission interpreted that the ECMR did permit the prohibition of concentrations 
which established or reinforced collective dominance.' 9 In a series of cases (some 
of which were upheld by the CFI 20 and ECJ), the Commission expanded the 
provisions of the Merger Control Regulation regime to also encompass transactions 
which had the potential to be duopolistic - in Nestle/Perrier,21 for example, the 
Commission required both companies to agree to commitments which would 
prevent the transaction creating a position of duopolistic dominance, whilst in Kali 
und SalzlMdKlTreuhand the Commission stated that the merger would create a 
duopoly in the potash market? 2 
"Dethmers, F. & N. Dodoo, The Abuse of Hoffman Roche: The Meaning of Dominance Under EC 
Competition Law. KC.LR . 27(10), 2006: 537-549. 
Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. OUP, 2004: 932. 
20!talian Flat Glass [1992] ECR 111403. In this non-merger case, The Commission found that three 
Italian flat glass manuthcturers (whose aggregate shares accounted for 95% of the Italian market), 
were in thct violating Article 81 EC Treaty and fixing prices and sharing the market. The 
Commission also found the flat glass companies to be violating Article 82 as they would not permit 
customers to negotiate prices or terms of sale. The CF] upheld the Commission's view that Article 
82 applied toany situation where more than two of the dominant companies were linked together by 
"economic links". (Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. OUP, 2004:932). 
21 Case No COMP/M.190 NestlelPen-ier[1992] OJ L336/1; Jones, A. & B. Sufilin, EC Competition 
Law. OUP, 2004: 932. Nestle wanted to acquire Perrier. This merger involved still and sparking 
bottled water markets. The Commission raised competition concerns relating to the French market 
where no drinks brand ie Coca Cola has managed to develop a presence in the bottled water market 
which rivals the three major suppliers: Nestle, Evian and Perrier (who also owned Volvic). The 
Commission identified high barriers to enter this market due to the high sunk costs involved in 
promoting a new brand of water and the Fact that three companies already dominate this market. The 
Commission only permitted the merger to proceed alter Nestle had sold off 20 0/a of its existing 
brands, and agreed not to repurchase these assets at a later date. 
Jones, A. & B. Sufflin, EC Competition Law. 01W, 2004. This case involved Kali und Salz AG 
(subsidiaiy of BASF), and Mitteldeutsche Kali AG wanting to enter into a concentration in the 
potash market. The Commission felt that this would impede competition as the concentration would 
hold a collective dominant position in the Community market (apart from Germany and Spain). The 
ECJ upheld the Commission's decision. (Press Release No. 19/98, Judgment of the Court of Justice 
in Joined Cases C-68/94 French Republic v Commission of the European Communities and C-30/95 
Societe Commerciale des Potasses et de l'Azote (SCPA) and Entreprise Minière et Chiinique (EMC) 
v Commission of the European Communities Available from: 
http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiquestcp98/Cp98]9en.htm 
 Accessed 23/08/08). 
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The first case to reveal the difference the NMR would make to the application 
of the merger regulation framework by the Commission, was Piaggio/ApriliaB 
This is one of the first cases to be referred as a pre-referral filing to the Commission 
for investigation on the basis of Article 4(5). In this instance the Commission 
cleared the acquisition of Aprilia S.p.A. by Piaggio & C. S.p.A. subject to 
conditions aimed at safeguarding the competitive environment for the sale of 50 cc 
motorcycles in Italy. Piaggio agreed to supply competitors/producers with 50cc 
engines in order to allay competition concerns expressed by the Commission. 
The Commission's analysis was based upon the traditional concepts of single 
dominance - the merger would allow the new entity to dominate the below 50cc 
market in Italy, despite the strong competition from other manufacturers - and 
market definition - the Commission identified two markets, scooters with an engine 
below 50cc and above 50cc. In its assessment of scooters with an engine below 
50cc, the Commission identified two sub-sections - high wheel and sports. In the 
high wheel market Piaggio was the market leader with 46% and Aprilia second in 
the market with 25%. Decline in Aprilia's sales in the first quarter of 2004 directly 
benefited Piaggio whose market sales went up 11%. The Commission identified 
competition concerns in this market as the combined entity would dominate the 
Italian below 50cc scooter market (the Commission identified no competition 
concerns outside Italy). The investigation, however, revealed a shift in emphasis to 
an analytical framework now influenced by the Horizontal Guidelines. The 
Commission's investigation focused primarily upon the closeness of substitution 
between Aprilia and Piaggio's products. The Commission identified a high degree 
of substitutability between the parties' products. As noted by Neven 24 "[T]he 
pattern of substitution and the competitive relationship between products has been 
considered in detail". 
23 Todino, M. First experiences with the new merger regulation: Piaggio/Aprilia. Competition Policy 
Newsletter, (I) Spring 2005: 79. Available from: 
http://ec.eumpa.eu/commlcompetitionipublications/cpn/cpn200S_l 
 .pdf [Accessed 29107/071. 
Piaggjo & C. S.pA, a small motorbike and scooter manufacturer acquired Aprilia, also a scooter 
manufacturer. The Commission cleared the transaction subject to conditions: Piaggio will supply (at 
commercial prices) 50cc 4 stroke engines to manufacturers in the same market. 
24 Neven, D. Competitive Economics and Antitrust in Europe. Economic Policy. 21 (48), October 
2006: 741-791. 
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The Fiagglo/Aprilia case, as observed by Todino,25 revealed "the novel 
features relating to the application of the procedural and analytical framework set 
out by the new merger regulation." The Commission appeared to combine the old 
and new analytical toolkits whilst familiarising itself with the facets of the new 
framework. As the rest of the chapter will demonstrate, the Commission has taken 
a cautious, incremental, step-by-step approach when applying the framework 
established by the NMR, combining the most successful and appropriate elements 
from both the original and revised frameworks. The seeds of the policy pathway 
and ideological framework which shape the direction of and influence the 
application of policy had been planted and were already slowly being incorporated 
into the merger regulation framework prior to the entry into force of the NMR. The 
continuation and direction of policy was cemented by the entry into force of the 
revised Regulation and the Commission has, through a case-by-case approach, 
provided empirical examples of how it intends to apply the procedural and 
substantive frameworks. 
Whilst the original Merger Control Regulation was premised upon a pure DT, 
the revised Regulation has been widened to focus upon an assessment of whether or 
not the merger significantly impedes competition. As Roller and de La Mano 
observe: "the dominance requirement zooms in on the market power of the merged 
entity, ignoring market wide equilibrium effects. Ignoring these equilibrium effects 
may lead to significant errors". The recast test, therefore, widens the Commission's 
remit for investigation of the impact of a transaction: 
"... the Commission is now able to assess how a given concentration affects 
what would happen to prices, outputs and other important features of an 
oligopolistic market including efficiencies - if firms responded in an 
individually rivairous way to market conditions, without any increased 
likelihood of engaging in tacit collusion." 
Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mario, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http:/172. 14.207. 1 04/searvh?q=cache:39_M6OUYXI wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgslcompetitionfnew_s 
ubstvetesLpdf+SIEC+M=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cdl 0 [Accessed 22/02/061, 79. 
26 RolIer, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
Control. Available from: 
http://72. 14207.1 
 04/search?q=cachc:39_M6OUYX I wJ:europa.euint/comm/dgs/competition/ncws 
ubstantivetestpdf+SLEC+test&hl=en&gl=nJc&ct=clnk&cd= 10 [Accessed 22/02/06]. 
WA 
M Appraisal of the Euiupean Commission's Application of the New Merger Regulation 
In their assessment of the new substantive test, Roller and de La Man0 21 
considered if the application of the SEC test has "... changed the way that the 
Commission evaluates mergers". 28 Analysing cases which were notified after the 
entry into force of the NMR (May 1 " 2004 to October 12th  2005) they focused upon 
"challenged mergers". 29 In their sample, Roller and de La Mano found that 
although "... dominance continues to play an important role in most cases 
especially Phase I cases, the Commission put less emphasis upon dominance in 
Phase 2 cases. This section of the thesis, therefore, will outline their findings and 
conclusions and take their sampling techniques, analysis and conclusions and apply 
them to more recent cases where competition concerns are raised by the 
Commission. 
To assess the impact of the NMR, Roller and de LaMano constructed two 
hypotheses, applying them to both horizontal and vertical mergers respectively. 
The first hypothesis examined the need for dominance as justification for 
challenging a merger: "The new test has reduced false negatives by focusing on the 
equilibrium effects of the merger. In particular dominance is not necessary". 3° If 
the Commission challenges a merger which does not establish or strengthen 
dominance, but threatens to challenge consumer welfare, it will be clear to the 
authors that there is "evidence of a gap case, in which case the new test clearly 
made a difference". 31 
' Roller, L. M. & M. de La Maim, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merge 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14.207 .! 04/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYX I wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgslcompetitionlnew_s 
ubstantivejest.pdf+SIEC+test&hlen&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd= 10 [Accessed 22102/061. 
Ro11er, 1. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
httpih72. 14207.1 04/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYX 1 wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantivetest.pdf-e-SIEC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=1 0 [Accessed 22/021061. 14. 
There were 425 notifications, 23 were challenged, 18 cleared after Phase! investigations with 
commitments, subject to Phase 2 investigations. No mergers were prohibited, (Roller, L. M. & M. 
de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merge Control. Available from: 
http://72. l4.207. 104/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYX  1 wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantivetest.pdf+SIEC+test&hI=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd= 10 [Accessed 22/02/06]). See Appendix 
2 fbr a list of evaluated cases. 
30Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merge 
ControL Available from: 
http:1172. 14.207. l04/searth?q=cache:39 M60LJYXIwJ:europacu.int/conim/dgs/compctition/new
—
s 
ubstantivetest.pdf+SIEC+test&hl=en&gl—uk&ct=clnk&cd=l 0 [Accessed 22/02/06], 14. 
"Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merge 
Control Available from: 
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The Commission's move to the application of an effects-based approach in 
merger regulation, as noted by Roller and de La Mano 32 has evolved gradually, with 
the Commission, in several earlier decisions, emphasising that although the 
transaction after the merger would only possess low market share, it would result in 
an increase in market power or influence. 33 Weitbrecht observed that after the entry 
into force of the NIMR the "injority of cases focus on the issue of whether the 
horizontal overlap brought about by the merger would trigger unilateral effects 
which may, but need not, include the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position".TM Instead of focusing upon whether or not the proposed merger 
strengthens or creates a dominant position, now the Commission focuses upon 
whether or not the horizontal effects of a merger may negatively effect/impede 
competition.35 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines "only uses the term dominance 
sparingly," emphasis is placed upon non-coordinated 36 and coordinated effects. 37 
As Weitbrecht38 points out, the appraisal of mergers does not focus upon the "static 
issues" relating to market structures such as market share but instead focuses upon 
the potential for the merging parties to increase prices after the conclusion of the 
merger. The Commission, according to Weitbrecht, 39 examines whether or not the 
horizontal effects of the merger will harm the competitiveness of the market, 
http://72. 14.207. 1 04/search?qcache:39_M60UYX1 wi:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantive test. pdf-'-SIEC+test&hI -en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=l 0 [ACCeSSed 22/02/061. 
32Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. 1 
 04/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYXIwJ:europaeu.tht/comnildgs/competiflon/new_s 
ubstantivejestpdf+SIEC+test&hfren&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=l0 [Accessed 22/02/06]. 
"Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14.207 ,1 04/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYX I wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantivetest.pdl+SIEC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd= 10 [Accessed 22/02/06]. 
Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005 - An Overview. KC.LR . 27(2). 2006:43-50,47. 
" Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005 - An Overview. E.C.L.R. 27(2), 2006: 43-50. 
36 
"non-coordinated (unilateral) effects comprise single firm dominance and the situation where the 
merger does not create a dominant firm, but where the merged entities' freedom to set prices may be 
substantially increased compared to the situation before the merger increasingly, the synonymous 
tenns noncoordinated effects and unilateral effects are used to refer to all effects that are not co-
ordinated effects and to include dominance". (Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005 - An 
Overview. KC.LR . 27(2), 2006). 
37 "co-onlinated effects refer to the situation of joint dominance as defined by the CFI judgment in 
Airtours, setting requirements that are not easy for the Commission to prove". (Weitbrecht, A. EU 
Merger Control in 2005—An Overview. KC.LR . 27(2), 2006). 
Weithrecht A. EU Merger Control in 2005—An Overview. EC.LR . 27(2), 2006,47. 
Weitbrecht A. EU Merger Control in 2005—An Overview. E.C.L.R. 27(2), 2006,47. 
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significantly impeding competition. 40 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, by 
focusing upon non-coordinated and coordinated effects of a merger, have moved 
analysis away from considering the potential establishment of a dominant position 
to take into account the overall effect and (possible) negative impact the merger 
may have upon competition. 
The potential of horizontal overlap to precipitate non-coordinated effects has 
been examined in BertelsmanWSpringer JY 4 ' Bertelsmann, an international media 
company, its subsidiary, Arvato AG, which controls several European printing 
firms, and Springer which operates two rotogravure printing presses in Germany, 
proposed to purchase shares in NewCo in order to establish a new joint venture in 
rotogravure printing. The proposed transaction represented a full function joint 
venture as the concentration would operate as a separate legal entity. 42 The 
Commission expressed concern that the concentration might impede competition, 
especially in the German market for high volume printing, where the joint venture 
would possess a market share of over 40%. 43 
 The Commission instigated the first 
Phase H investigation since the entry into force of the NMR, in order to investigate 
the possibility that competition in the high volume printing market would be 
impeded as a consequence of the approval of this joint venture. In the 
BerteismanniSpringer case there was no reference by the Commission to either 
dominance or the SIEC. Instead the Commission was concerned with the potential 
of the merging parties to increase prices post-merger. 
The Commission found that despite both companies possessing large market 
shares, this would not distort the market in Germany as: the three main competitors 
' Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Contml in 2005 - An Overview. E.C.L.R. 27(2). 2006 
4tCase No COMP/M.3 178, Beflelsmanni Springer JV. Brussels, 03/0512005. Notified under 
document number C(2005) 1368 FINAL. 
' Case No COMP/M.3 178, Berte!smwm/ Springer iv. Brussels, 03/0512005. Notified under 
document number C(2005) 1368 FINAL. 4. 
43 Rapid, Commission opens in-depth investigation into Berteismann/Springer rotogravure joint 
venturer EUROPA Rapid Press Release, [P104/1542, Available from: 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=1p104/l 
 542&format=HTML&aged=O& 
language=EN&guiLanguage=en, [ Accessed 27/08/061. 
"Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. 104/search?q=cache:39  M60IJYX 1 wJ:europaeuJnt/comm/dgs/competition/news 
ubstantive_test.pdf+STEC+test&bl=en&glr=uJc&ct=clnk&cd=] 0 [Accessed 22/02106], 15. 
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were planning long term expansion in terms of increasing net capacity; the presence 
of credible competitors: Rotosmeets, Quebecor and Ringier with printing presses 
close to the German borders, meant that they could offer their services to German 
publishers and prevent price increases in the German market for magazine printing. 
Despite the removal of Springer as an independent competitor, there remained three 
viable competitors who would prevent the market being distorted and the joint-
venture would encourage competitors to switch from advertisement and catalogue 
to magazine printing. 45 
 The joint venture, therefore, was approved without the need 
for remedies. 
In Siemens/VA Tech7 prior to the merger there were three main competitors: 
SMS, VA Tech and Dani eli (Siemens had a minority shareholding in SMS). This 
investigation resulted in a large Phase II investigation where the Commission 
explored the possibility that the concentration would establish a dominant position 
within the mechanical metallurgy and plant building market as the proposed venture 
would establish "numerous horizontal laps and horizontal overlaps in ... power 
generation ...; power transmission and distribution ...; frequency inverters ...; 
metallurgy ...; low voltage switchgears ...; building technology ... and other IT 
seMces.' Roller and de La Mano observed that in this case "... the Commission 
came closer to challenging a merger which could not be challenged under the old 
test."48 
 This merger was cleared with conditions attached. 
Roller and de La Mano noted that in the J&J/Guidant, Siemens,' VA Tech and 
Lufthansa/Swiss decisions, the Commission placed less emphasis upon dominance 
Commission of the European Communities, Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the 
Common Market and the Functioning of the LEA Agreement. OJ L6 1/17. 
Case No COMP/M.3653, Siemens/VA Tech. Brussels, 13/07/2005. Notified under document 
number C (2005) 2627 FENAL. Siemens proposed a takeover of VA Tech subject to commitments: 
Siemens would sell its share in SMS. The Commission accepted these commitments and cleared the 
tnnsactiozL 
' Case No COMP/M.3653, Siemens/VA Tech. Brussels, 13/07/2005. Notified under document 
number C (2005) 2627 FINAL. 
13 Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14207. l04/search?q=cache:39 
 M60IJYX I wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/news 
ubstantive_test.pdf+SIEC+test&hl=en&gl=ulc&ct=clnk&cd=1 0 [Accessed 22/02/06], 15. 
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and more upon the analysis of equilibrium effects. 49 In relation to horizontal 
mergers, Roller and de La Mano note that during the time span of their sample there 
were no gap cases, and hence little evidence that the Commission would challenge 
horizontal mergers where there was little or no evidence of dominance. The 
Commission would only challenge mergers where there is clear evidence of 
dominance. 
When Roller and de La Mano investigated vertical mergers, they found that 
the Commission was "... less reluctant to assess equilibrium effects". The 
Apollo/Bakelite 50 case, for example, involved the takeover of Bakelite by the Apollo 
Group. Bakelite produces formaldehyde resins, mouldings, compounds and epoxy 
resins whilst the Apollo Group is an investment corporation, owns two firms which 
are in direct competition with Bakelite: Borden in phenolic resins and Resolution 
Performance Products (RPP) in epoxy resins. In relation to amino resins, the 
Commission considered that Borden and Bakelite were not direct competitors in 
this market due to geographical constraints established in previous decisions. 5 ' In 
relation to epoxy resins, specifically Cardura, however, the Commission was 
concerned that Bakelite's strong market position in epoxy resins would affect 
verticai relations as it possessed a strong market position prior to the merger, (30-
40%)52 As RPP only possessed a small market share of the formulated systems, (0-
10%), the Commission was concerned that as RPP was not active in the formulated 
systems market after the merger was complete, it had not got any incentive to 
supply Bakelite's competitors: "... RPP may find it profitable to leverage its 
49 Rolfer, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
Control Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. 1 04/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYX I wJ:europa.eu.int/cotnm/dgslcompetition/new_s 
ubstantivetdf+SJEC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=l0 [Accessed 22/02/061, IS. 
30Case No COMP/M.3593 Apollo/Bakelite, Brussels, 1I/04/05, OJ C 048. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3593 
 20050411 202 12_en.pdf 
Eurlex website, document 32005M3593. The Commission cleared the acquisition of Bakelite AG 
(producer of formaldehyde resins) by Apollo (financial investment group which owns Borden and 
Resolution which also manufacture formaldehyde resins) subject to conditions. As the Commission 
identified competition concerns in the formaldehyde resins market, the parties offered to enter into 
long term supply agreements with any Cardura customer. 
Case No COMP/M.3593 ApolloiBakelite, Brussels, 11/04/05, OJ C 048. Available from: 
httpJ/ec.europaeu/comnilcompetition/mergescaseWdecisioSm3s93 2005041 L20212_en.pdf 
Eurlex website, document 32005M3593, 3. 
32 Case No COMP/M.3593 ApollolBakelite, Brussels, 11/04/05, OJ C 048. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comnilcompetitionlmergers/casesjdecisions/m3593 
 20050411202 l2en.pdf 
Eurlex website, document 32005M3593, 25. 
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dominant position in mono-functional ester Reactive Diluents by ceasing to supply 
those new competitors in fonnulated systems and therefore reinforce Bakelite's 
already strong position (30-40%) in this market", 53 As Cardura is an essential 
ingredient of epoxy formulated systems which are specifically formulated for a 
large range of composites and laminates, the merger would permit Bakelite to 
increase its control and dominance in the whole epoxy product value chain and 
"foreclose downstream competitors". TM The Commission concluded that the new 
entity "would use its dominant position upstream in mono-functional ester 
(Cardura) to increase market power in formulated systems downstream" 55 and 
increase "... its overall position over the whole epoxy product value chain and to 
foreclose Bakelite's downstream competitors". 56 It is also significant, as noted by 
Roller and de La Mano, "... that the merger would not allow Bakelite to acquire 
dominance downstream, as would be expected under the old test". 57 The 
Commission incorporated vertical effects 58 into its analysis, arguing that Bakelite's 
position was likely to be strengthened and to "increase market power", "an 
approach more in line with an equilibrium effects analysis". 59 
Case No COMP/M2593 Apollo/Bakelite, Brussels, 11/04/05, OJ C 048. Available from: 
http://ec.europaeu/comm/competitionJmergers/cases/decisions/m3593 
 20050411202 l2_en.pdf 
Eurlex website, document 32005M3593, 25. 
Rapid, Press Release: Mergers: Commission approves the acquisition of the German company 
Bake!ite AG by the Apollo Group, subject to conditions. EUROPA Rapid Press Release, Reference 
JP/05/4 15. Available from: http:lleuropa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do ?reference=IP/05/4 IS 
tAccessed 25/021071. 
'Roller L M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact ofthe New Substantive Test in European Merger 
Control. Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. I 
 04/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYX 1 wJ:europa.eu.int/commldgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantvetest.pdffSIEC+tes&hl=en&gl=ulc&ct='clnk&cd=I 0 [Accessed 22/02/06], 16. 
56 Case No COMP/M.3593 Apollo/Bake/lie, Brussels, 11/04/05, OJ C 048. Available from: 
httpil/ec.europa.eu/connn/competitionlmergersJcasesJdecisiosm3s93_200504 
 I 1_202 I 2_en.pdf 
Eurlex website, document 32005M3593, 45. 
"Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact ofthe New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
httpil/72. 14207.1 04/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYX I wJ:europaeu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantivetesqdf+SIEC+test&hI=en&gF=uk&ct=clnk&cd= 10 [Accessed 22/02/06], 16. 
' Vertical effect analysis: examination of the upwards or downstream markets in order to examine 
the potential for the merged entity to exert dominance, as a firm which produces the raw material 
(upstream market) over the final assembly or distribution of a product (Pass, C. et sI, Collins 
internet linked dictionaiy of ECONOAHCS: Economics defined and explained, Collins, 2005:536). 
Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. I 
 04/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYX I wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/news 
ubstantive_testpdf+SLEC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=1 0 [Accessed 22/02/061. 
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Roller and de La Mano found that the merger between E.ON and MOL 
represented a gap case in relation to their first hypothesis, where clearly the new test 
(and for the pedagogical and analytical requirements of this thesis) and its 
application by the Conunission had changed the final decision. In this case the 
Commission challenged the merger between E.ON and MOL. This merger 
involved the acquisition of MOL, a Hungarian owned wholesale gas company, 
which possessed a quasi-monopolistic status in the Hungarian marlS ° by E.ON 
Ruhrgas International AG (ERI), a subsidiary of a privately owned German firm, 
EON, which focused upon electricity and gas. 6' The Commission concluded that 
this transaction raised compatibility concerns because after the transaction the new 
"entity will have the ability and the incentive to discriminate against its competitors 
in the downstream gas market for their access to storage capacity". 62 Prior to the 
transaction, MOL Storage already possessed the capacity necessary to exploit its 
dominance in the storage of gas in the Hungarian market 63 The transaction would 
increase incentives to limit competitors' access to storage through the creation of a 
"fully vertically-integrated undertaking along the gas chain supply.M 
 As the 
60 Roller, L M. & M. de La Mano, Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New 
Substantive Test in European Merger Control. Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. 104/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYX  I wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantivetest.pdf+SIEC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&ct —clnk&cd=l 0 [Accessed 22/02/061, 16; 
Commission decision of 21/07/2005, Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common 
Market and the EEA,. COMP/M3696 - KON/MOL:3. Available front 
httjxJ/ec.europaeu/comnt/competition/mergen/cas&decisionWm3696 2005 122 1_20600_en.pdf 
[Accessed 27/02/071. The E.ON/MOL transaction involved the acquisition of two MOL subsidiaries 
MOL WMT and MOL Storage by EON. As this transaction involved two gas distributors, the 
Commission raised concerns that they would prevent new entrants from accessing the market as 
there would be no storage access. Remedies accepted by the Commission included the unbundling 
of MOL's gas transmission and production companies and the auctioning off of gas over a 10 year 
rriod in the Hungarian gas market, in order to re-establish a level playing field. 
Commission decision o121/0712005, Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common 
Market and the LEA,. C0MP1M3696 - E.ON/MOL: 3. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3696_2005  122 l_20600_en.pdf 
MLce 	 27/02/071. 
Commission decision of 21/07/2005, Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common 
Market and the ERA,. COMP/M3696 - E.ON/MOL: 3. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3696  2005122 l_2O6OQen.pdf 
27/02/07]. 
Commission decision of 21/07/2005, Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common 
Market and the LEA,. COMP/M3696 - E.ON/MOL:1 11. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competitionJmergersJcasesJdecisioSm3696  2005 122 l_20600_en.pdf 
27/02/07]. 
Commission decision of 21/07/2005, Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common 
Market and the LEA,. COMP/M3696 - & ON/MOL:1 11. Available from: 
http J/ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3  696 2005122 l_2060Qen.pdf 
[Accessed 27/021071. 
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Commission pointed out, the stnictural links between MOL and MOL Storage 
would prevent new entrants gaining access into the storage market. E.ON would 
control the expansion of storage capacity in Hungary 65 whilst the storage 
shareholders' agreement between E.ON and MOL would allow RON to have the 
"ability and incentive to make new entry into the storage market impossible at least 
in the short-medium term". The Commission concluded that this merger would: 
"... impede competition in a substantial part of the Common Market ... as 
the new entity is likely to discriminate against its competitors in the down- 
stream gas markets for theft access to storage capacity and is likely to make 
entry into the storage market impossible." 
Roller and de La Mano concluded that this transaction represented a gap case 
as although there was lithe evidence to suggest that E.ON would acquire a 
dominant position downstream as consequence of the transaction, 67 the newly 
merged company would have the resources and incentive to increase the cost of 
access to wholesale gas to rival firms in the downstream market. 
As a result of the examination of their hypothesis: that dominance by itself is 
not sufficient for the Commission to raise competition concerns, they concluded 
their evidence "was somewhat mixcd"P 5 Roller and de La Mano found that 
although dominance is still associated with the Commission raising competition 
concerns, in most cases once established, dominance appears a sufficient 
justification to prohibit a merger. In cases where the merging parties are only 
"Commission decision of 21/07/2005, Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common 
Market and the EEA,. COMP/M3696 - E. ON/MOL: 109. Available from: 
http://ec.europaeu/comni/componmergers/cases/decisions/m36962005  1221 20600 en.pdf 
27102/07]. 
Commission decision of 21/07/2005, Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common 
Market and the EEA,. COMP/M3696 - E.ON/MOL:l 11. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3696  2005122 1_20600_en.pdf 
[Accessed 27/02/07]. 
' 7Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. 104/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYX 
 I wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantive_testpdf+SIEC+test&hI=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=10 [Accessed 22/02/061, 16. 
a Roller, L. M. & l!vL de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
Control. Available from: 
http://72.14207.104/search?q=cache:39_M60UYXI 
 wJ:europaeuint/comm/dgs/competition/news 
ubstantive_test.pdf+SIEC+tes&hl=en&gl=uk&ctrclnk&cd=1 0 [Accessed 22/02/061, 18. 
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distant competitors, dominance is often dismissed as a possible competition 
concern, even if they possess a high market share. 
Continuing the analysis of the hypothesis established by Roller and de La 
Mano, in order to consider if the Commission's application of the merger regime 
has altered, as it has become more comfortable and acquainted with the new 
provisions of the NMR, the sample time frame has been extended. My sample is 
premised upon Commission decisions, taken between October 13th 
 2005 and June 
28th 2007, which have raised competition concerns and is based upon the same 
sampling technique as used by Roller and de La Mano, to ensure analysis is both 
valid and reliable. 
The examination of horizontal mergers indicates that, as noted by 
Weitbrecht, 7° they ".,. continue to be the principal focus of the Cormnission's 
revieW'. The principle of dominance as the rationale for intervention has been 
dropped by the Commission. Instead it uses language and econometric models 
associated with significant impediment. 7 ' An examination of the approach the 
Commission takes when examining non-coordinated effects in recent decisions, 
indicates that it, as Weitbrecht points out, is increasingly adopting a more "effects- 
based approach". The Commission is not only analysing the effect the transaction 
will have upon the market structure but also placing more emphasis upon the 
analysis and importance of the examination of the possibility that competitors, in 
order to raise prices, will restrict access to the market and may impede competition. 
The Adidas-SalomoWReebok 72 takeover already approved by US competition 
authorities, was subsequently cleared by the European Commission, despite the 
horizontal overlap between the activities of the two companies, as they had "slightly 
different brand and pricing positions". The relevant product markets were athletic 
footwear - sports, which could be subdivided into thirteen markets and leisure wear 
69 1 have only included analysis of the most relevant cases. 
Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005— An Overview. EC.LR . 27(2), 2006:43-50. 
71 Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005— An Overview. &C.LR. 27(2), 2006: 43-50 
72Case No. COMP/M3942, Adidas/Reebok, 24101106, 0200298. This merger between these global 
sports and leisurewear manuficturers was cleared unconditionally by the Commission. 
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- and athletic clothing. Examining the competitive effect the merger would have in 
terms of unilateral effects in the footwear market, the Commission could not fmd 
any evidence that the merged company would be able to raise the price of trainers 
for conswners as Adidas is aimed at the middle to high price-point and Reebok 
middle to low. The parties' price point overlap at the €50 to C80 73 
 mark is where 
there are enough existing competitors to counteract any attempt to raise prices. In 
the subsections of the sports shoe market, Nike and other footwear specialists, such 
as K-Swiss in the tenths market, are the leaders. At the lower end of the market, 
where there is some overlap, there are enough no-brand and "private brand" 
competitors to maintain competition. Although there is significant overlap between 
leisure and tenths, basketball and workout specialised sports footwear, the 
Commission concluded that even where the shoe is designed for tennis and 
basketball there is enough competition from competitors and consumers who want a 
shoe for leisure rather than specific purposes, whilst in the workout shoe market 
there is no "alarming overlap" as Nike is the market leader and the market is tiny 
and as yet undefined. 74 In the most competitive footwear market, football, Reebok 
holds only limited market share whilst there are already many strong competitors 
which compete with Adidas. 
The acquisition of Midas by Reebok represented a significant adjustment to 
the market as the number of competitors post-merger was reduced from three to 
two. As Nike is the market leader there was no possibility of dominance. The 
Commission concluded that the possibility of collusion was negated by the 
changeability of the market, the strength and number of competitors and the number 
of markets involved. 
Keen to encourage airline mergers in order to counteract competition from US 
counterparts, the Commission has cleared mergers which have affected many more 
passengers than the Ryanair transaction. The AirFrance/KLM and 
Lufthansa/Swissair mergers involved 70 million passengers whilst the Ryanair 
Case No. COMP/M.3942, AdidasfReebo& 24/01106, D200298, 10. 
74 Case No. COMP/M.3942, Adidasi Reebok, 24/01/06, D200298. 
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merger would have affected only 50 million. 75 This case is significant to the airline 
industry for several reasons. It was the first time the Commission had assessed two 
of the largest airlines operating out of the same country, Ireland. The proposed 
transaction was the first between two low-cost airlines covering the largest number 
of routes ever assessed by the Commission. 76 In the first prohibition since 2004, the 
Commission prohibited the proposed acquisition of Aer Lingus by Ryanair on the 
basis that the proposed transaction would have created a monopoly situation as 
these two companies are the main two carriers operating out of Dublin. 77 Kroes 
stated that: 
"Our decision to prohibit this merger was essential to safeguard Irish 
consumers, who depend heavily on air transport, and other EU consumers. 
Monopolies are bad for consumers because they reduce choice, lower 
quality and give rise to higher prices. Low-cost carriers like Ryanair are no 
exception to this rule. Unfortunately, the remedies proposed by Ryanair 
were not sufficient to remove the competition concerns." 7 
The Commission conducted an in-depth market investigation consulting 
competitors, customers, etc. The Commission found that competitors would be 
unwilling to enter into direct competition with the merged company due to the 
fearsome reputation of Ryanair taking on any new entrant to the market and as they 
operate out of their existing hubs they already had access to the customers because 
of their famous brands?9 The proposed monopoly would impede competition as the 
new entity would "... account for 80% of intra-European traffic at Dublin 
" Watson, R. Ryanair's takeoverbid for Aer Lingtis flits. Timesonline, 28/06/07. Available from 
htipi/business.thnesonlhie.co.uk/toWbusiness/rnarkets/mergers  and acquisitions/article 1996273 .ece 
[Accessed 29/06/071. RyanAir proposed a takeover of Ac Lingus. The Commission prohibited the 
takeover on the basis that it would create a monopoly over 35 mutes flying out of Ireland. 
76 Rapid Press Release: Commission prohibits Ryanair 's proposed takeover ofAer Lingus. 
Reference: IP/07/893 Date: 27/0612007. Available from: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference='IP/07/893 
 [Accessed 13/07/071. 
"Rapid Press Release: Commission prohibits Ryanair's proposed takeover ofAer Lingus, 
Reference: IP/07/893 Date: 27/0612007. Available from: 
http://europa.eulrapid/pressReleasesAction.do?rekrence=IP/07/893  [Accessed 13/07/01. 
Rapid Press Release: Commission prohibits Ryanair 's proposed takeover ofAer Lingua, 
Reference: IP/07/893 Date: 27/0612007. Available from: 
http://europa.euftapidipressReleasesAction.do ?reference=IP/07/893 [Accessed 13/07107]. 
Rapid Press Release: Commission prohibits Ryanair 's proposed takeover ofAer Lingua. 
Reference: IP/07/893 Date: 27/06/2007. Available from: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=W/07/893 
 [Accessed 13/07/07]. 
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airpf SQ have a monopoly over 35 routes, and thus there was potential for both an 
increase and decrease in fares and an increase in the number of seats when needed, 
if new entrants attempted to enter the market. 8 ' Access to the market was further 
reduced by the presence of congestion at airports and the limited number of slots 
availableY 
Clearly Ryanair had recognised potential problems inherent in the proposed 
transaction, proposing short-term remedies on a proactive rather than a reactive 
basis as part of its proposal. Ryanair proposed that if the transaction was cleared by 
the Commission it would cut prices for customers by 10% and open up air-time 
slots at Heathrow and Dublin to rival carriers for a year in order to preserve 
competition. The Commission, however, rarely accepts short-term remedies as 
there is a potential for a monopoly situation to develop after the remedial action 
period had ended, over which the Commission has no control. 
The continuation of Roller and de La Mano's analysis indicates that there are 
more instances where the Commission is willing to challenge horizontal mergers 
where there are competitive concerns. An examination of more recent case studies 
indicates that the Commission is no longer as concerned with the potential for the 
establishment of dominance when examining horizontal mergers. An examination 
of vertical mergers indicates that the Commission is continuing in the direction 
identified by Roller and de La Mano, slowly expanding its use of equilibrium 
effects theory. 
The second hypothesis involves the analysis of the application of the old test 
by the Commission, and consideration if application of the new test by the 
° Kroes, N. cited in: Ryanair's takeoverbid for Aer Lingus fails. Timeson/ine, 28/06/07. Available 
from: 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/toVbusiness/markets/mergers 
 and acquisitions/article I 996273.ece 
jAccessed 29/06/07]. 
Buck, T. Brussels blocks Ryanair merger. 
	 Ft corn, 28/06/07. 	 Available from: 
http://www.fLeom/cms/s/50909992-2513-Ildc-bf47-Mb5dfl 
 0621 .html [Accessed 14107/07]; 
Watson, R. Ryanair's takeoverbid for Aer Lingus fails. Timesonline, 28/06/07. Available from: 
hilp://business.fimesoththe.co.uWtol/business/marketsfmergers 
 and acquisitions/article 1996273.ece 
29/06/07]. 
Rapid, Press Release: Commission prohibits Ryanair 's proposed takeover ofAer Lingus. 
Reference: IP/07/893 Date: 27/06/2007. Available from: 
http://eumpa.eurapidjprssReleasesAction.do ?relèrence=JP/07/893 [Accessed 13/07/071. 
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Commission would make a difference: "[T]he new test has (unequivocally) shifted 
the emphasis away from structural indicators towards competitive effects. In 
particular dominance is not sufficient". 83 Roller and de Ia Mano noted that within 
their sample they "... find no cases where the Commission considers the possibility 
that the creation or strengthening of dominance might in itself be insufficient to 
raise competition concerns"?' As noted by these authors, and others who analyse 
the principle of dominance relating to both EU and national mergers, market share 
often provided justification for identification of dominance. 85 In Pernod/Ricar4 86 
for instance, the Commission identified dominance because the combined market 
share was above 50%. In more recent cases, there is evidence that high market 
share, on its own, is not interpreted by the Commission as justification to conclude 
that the transaction will impede competition. In Bertelsmann/Springer, the 
Commission cleared the transaction, after an in-depth investigation, without the 
need for remedies, although the combined market share after completion of the 
transaction was above 50%, as there was enough competition to counteract any 
potential dominance by the new jointventure.as In Johnson & Johnson/Guidant, 
the presence of a combined market share post-merger of 70% was offset by a "lack 
of product homogeneity and lack of capacity constraints". 89 
RoIler, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http:/172. 14207.1 O4lsearch?q=cache:39_M60UYXIwJ:europaeu.int/commldgstcompetitiontnew s 
ubstantivejestpdf+SlEC+test&hhen&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd= 10 [Accessed 22/02/061, 14. 
" Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. l4.207.1 
 04/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYIX I wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantivetestpdf+SIEC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=1 0 [Accessed 22/02/06]. 
Kokkoris, I. The Concept of Market Definition and SSN1P Test in the Merger Appraisal. EC.LR . 
26(4), 2005: 209-214; ICN Report on Merger Guidelines - Chapter 2, April 2004: 2. www.intemational 
competitionnetwo&org/seouVamchap2jnktdeth.pdf. 
86 Pernod and Ricard, both French distillers, merged in 1975, was and still is, the third largest 
distiller in the worlcL 
37 Kokkoris, 1. The Concept of Market Definition and SSNW Test in the Merger Appraisal. E.C.LR. 
26(4), 2005: 209-214; ICN Report on Merger Guidelines - Chapter 2, April 2004: 2. www.international 
competitionnetwork.org/seoulfamg_chap2_mktdefkpdf.  
88Ro?ler, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact ofthe New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
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ubmtivetestpdf+SIEC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd= 10 [Accessed 22/02/061. 17. 
Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
Control; Case No COMP/M.3687 Johnson & Johnson/Guidant. 25/0812005. Notified under 
document number C(2005) 3200 FINAL. Johnson & Johnson sought to acquire Guidant. Both 
parties are involved in the research, design, manuftcture and sale of vascular devices. Parties were 
direct competitors with only a small number of participants in the global market The Commission 
identified competition concerns due to the lack of competitors. The transaction was subject to 
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Roller and de Ia Mano found that their evidence supporting their second 
hypothesis was mixed. If dominance was established during an investigation by the 
Commission, this appeared adequate justification to challenge a merger. If the 
merging parties were only distant competitors in a particular market, even if they 
possess high market share, dominance is dismissed. 90 Roller and de La Mano 
consider that "dominance remains a sufficient condition [to challenge a transaction], 
yet more than just high market shares are needed to reach a finding of dominance 
and to challenge a merger". 9 ' 
The T-Mobile Austria/Tele.rinf case, as noted by Weitbrecht, 93 represents 
the first "gap case" in the application of the NMR by the Commission, as it would 
not have fallen under the scope of the original Regulation because this is the first 
case in which the Commission has raised competition concerns on the basis of non-
coordinated, unilateral effects. In this case, T-Mobile, the second largest competitor 
in the market wanted to merge with the fourth, Tele.ring (post-merger Mobilkom 
would remain the strongest player in the market). Although TeIe.ring was not 
Mobilkom's nearest competitor, it was, however, considered by the Commission as 
a maverick. Over 50% of individuals shifting phone providers moved to Tele.ring 
as it offered the lowest prices?4 The Commission felt that the merger would 
remove the maverick player, increase competition between the two main players, as 
pre-merger this competition had been impeded by Tele.ring and thus "... make the 
two leading players more symmetrical in terms of market share". 95 The 
Commission cleared this merger after a Phase I investigation, accepting the 
remedies: J&.J divest its cordis steerable guidewire business (Europe) and Guidant its endovascular 
solutions business. Ultimately, however; this merger collapsed. J&J sued (Iuidant for $76 million 
and Guidant merged with BSX. 
Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
Control, 18. 
9T Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. 104/search?q=cache:39_M60UYXIwJ:europaeu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new
—
s 
ubstantive_testpdf+StEC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&ct.clnk&ed=1 0 [Accessed 22/02/061. 
Case No COMP/M.3916 T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring, Commission Decision, 26/4,2006. The 
Commission cleared the acquisition of Tele.ring by T-Mobile Austria subject to conditions. These 
conditions included the divestment of Tele.ring's UMTS frequency sites and mobile telephony sites 
to competitors with a lower madcet share than Tele.ring. 
Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control - The Year in Review. KC.LP, 28(2), 2007: 125-133. 
94 Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control - The Year in Review. £CLR. 28(2). 2007: 125-133. 
" Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control —The Year in Review. E.C.L.R. 28(2), 2007: 125-133. 
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remedies presented by the notif'ing parties. As Weitbreeht points out, the use of 
unilateral effects enabled the Commission to: "intervene where a maverick is being 
acquired by the number two or number three player in the market without having to 
resort to a co-ordinated effects analysis"? 6 
Mother "noteworthy case of non-coordinated effects" 97 is Linde/BOC. The 
Commission found that competition would be impeded as a consequence of the 
transaction despite the fact that the merged entities would not become market 
leade? (this case was cleared subject to remedies). The Linde/BO(! 9 case 
involved the acquisition of the BOC Group by Linde AG. Both companies were 
involved in the industrial - oxygen, nitrogen and argon - and speciality - helium - 
gas markets.' °° Analysing non-coordinated effects and the helium wholesale 
market, the Commission determined that prior to the merger, competition was 
symmetrical between Air Products, Praxair and BOC, with Air Liquide possessing a 
much smaller market share. Due to the limited access to and sources of helium, the 
market has remained relatively stable because market share is dependent upon 
access to these sources. 101 Linde had also recently gained access to the wholesale 
helium market having acquired access to helium sources via a joint-venture with 
Sonatrach and several long term agreements. The Commission determined that the 
proposed transaction would alter the symmetry of the competition as Linde, now 
part of the triumvirate of the main competitors, would not have the incentive to act 
Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control - The Year in Review. E.C.LIt 28(2), 2007: 125-133. 
Lowe, P. Commission's Enforcement Record 2006. Competition Policy Newsletter, ( I) Spring 
2006:1. Available from: http://ec.europacu/coinrnlcompetition/publications/cpn/cpn2007_1  .pdf 
[Accessed 07/07/071. 
sa Lowe, P. Commission's Enforcement Record 2006. Competition Policy Newsletter, (I) Spring 
2006:1. Available from: http:I/ec.europ&eu/commlcompetition/publications/cpn/cpn2007_l .pdf 
kAccessed 07107107]. 
Kijewski, S. et al. Linde/BOC: Concentration in the industries of industrial gases, specialist gases 
and helium. 	 Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2006:41. 	 Available from: 
httpil.europa,eu/cmm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn20063.pdf [Accessed 07/07/07]. Linde 
acquired SOC. Both these companies are active in helium and industrial gas markets. Initially the 
Commission identified competition concerns as Linde would be removed as a potential competitor 
from the market. The parties offered commitments: divest Linde's gas business contracts in the UK 
and BOC's industrial gases in Poland. The Commission then cleared the transaction. 
'°° Kijewski, S. et al. Linde/BOC: Concentration in the industries of industrial gases, specialist gases 
and helium. Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2006:41. Available from: 
http://ec.europaeu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn20063.pdf  [Accessed 07/07/071. 
'° 'Kijewski, S. et al. Linde/BOC: Concentration in the industries of industrial gases, specialist gases 
and helium. Competition Policy Newsletter, ( 3), Autumn 2006:41. Available from: 
httpJ/ec.eiwopaeu/comm/competitionfp&,lieations/cpnJcpn20063.pdf [Accessed 07/07/07]. 
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aggressively. The removal of an aggressive competitor would encourage non-
coordinated effects and precipitate an increase in prices for consumers! °2 
Roller and de La Mano observe that the Commission is moving to a more 
effects based approach, which reveals the inherent tensions between dominance-led 
and effects-based analysis. They cite the example of Bayer/Roche' 03 where, on the 
one hand, the Commission argues that in the topical antiftingal market, competition 
is Impeded as a consequence of a combination of "... a very high market share, the 
significant competitive overlap and low market share of remaining competitors 
• .")° On the other hand, in the Austrian plain antacids market, the Commission 
identified no such competition concerns, even though Bayer/Roche possessed 55-
601/o of the market share with a 10-15% overlap, because if this entity had 
attempted to raise prices there were enough substitutes to which consumers could 
turn. They also cite the Reuters/Telerate'°5 decision as a reflection of these 
tensions. In this case, the Commission dismissed competition concerns in relation 
to the real-time data market. In the market-data platforms markets, however, the 
Commission raised competition concerns, without making any direct reference to 
dominance, as Reuters possessed 85% market share and Telerate 5%)06 
An important development in relation to the application of the NMR by the 
Commission is that dominance was identified by the Commission on the basis that 
the merging parties' products were too close. In Novartis/Hexal' 07 the Commission 
argued that due to the high combined market share, the merger would foreclose 
102 Kijewski, S. et al. Linde/BOC: Concentration in the industries of industrial gases, specialist gases 
and helium. Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2006:41. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publicationslcpn/cpn2006_3.pdf  [Accessed 07/07/07]. 
Case No. COMP/M.3544 Sayer Healthcarel Roche. Bayer Heathcare AG acquired Roche OTC. 
This case was cleared unconditionally. 
' °4 Kijewski, S. et al. Linde/BOC: Concentration in the industries of industrial gases, specialist gases 
and helium. Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2006:41. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publicationsfcpn/cpn2006_3.pdf  [Accessed 07/07/071.. 
Case No COMP/M3692 Reuters! Telerate. Reuters, a global information network, acquired 
Telerate, a &obal financial information provider. The Commission cleared the transaction without 
the need for commitments. 
' 06 Kijewski, S. et a]. Linde/BOC: Concentration in the industries of industrial gases, specialist gases 
and helium. Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2006:41. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition4,ublications!cpn/cpn20063  .pdf [Accessed 07/07/071. 
'° Case No. COMP/M.3751 Novartis/1-lexal. Novartis wanted to acquire Hexal. The parties offered 
commitments to ensure the market remained competitive. Novartis divested itself of certain assets. 
The Commission did not oppose the transaction. 
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consumer choice as the transaction would not only establish a market leader but as 
the products of the merging parties are very similar, the transaction would link 
together products which consumers would purchase as their first or second choices. 
The Commission also noted that due to the reduced number of competitors, 
combined with the high market share of the merging parties, the potential existed to 
establish single dominance! 08 
There is, of course, the potential for not only non-coordinated (unilateral) but 
coordinated effects! 09 Since the entry into force of the NMR, the Commission has 
identified several cases where there is a danger of coordinated effects, which have 
sometimes required remedial action. In AP Moller/Royal P&O Nediloyd, for 
example, the Commission, subject to certain conditions, cleared the acquisition of 
Royal P&O Nedlloyd by AP Moller - Maersk Group, establishing "the world's 
largest shipping company"!' ° The proposed transaction would establish links 
between Maersk and the other consortia and conferences of which Royal P&O was 
a member. Commission agreement to the transaction was conditional: Royal P&O 
had to leave the consortia hence severing links with competitors. 
Although Amer/Salomon" did not possess a Community dimension it was 
referred to the Commission via the prenotification referral mechanism. In this case, 
Amer (Atomic) acquired Salomon from Adidas-Salomon. The Commission 
identified possible competition concerns as both the companies' products did 
overlap in the ski equipment and accessories market. The Commission's analysis 
focused upon the potential for unilateral and coordinated effects post-merger. In 
' 08 Kijewski, S. et al. Linde/BOC: Concentration in the industries of industrial gases, specialist gases 
and helium. 	 Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2006:17. 	 Available from: 
httpil/ec.eaeu/cmm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn20063.pdf [Accessed 07/07/07].. 
'° Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005 - An Overview. E.CLR. 27(2), 2006: 43-50. 
"° Wcitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005 - An Overview. E.CLR. 27(2), 2006: 43-50. This 
transaction was cleared after a Phase I investigation. This decision permitted the acquisition of 
Royal P&O by A!' Moller - Maersk Group (subject to conditions) which would establish the largest 
shipping company in the world. The Commission analyzed II European shipping Lines to consider 
if the transaction would impede competition. As the proposed concentration would create links 
between Maersk and other consortia of which P&O is a member, remedial action required P&O to 
break these links in order to restore competition. 
.Case No COMP/ M.3765 Amer/Sciomopt 12/10t2005. Notified under document number D(2005) 
205: 502. Amer Sports Corporation (Atomic is its winter goods segment) sought to acquire 
Salomon, a global winter sportswear/equipment manuläcturer. In this case the Commission 
authorized the acquisition. 
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terms of unilateral effects, the Commission concluded that the products were not 
that close: Atomic has a "racing image" whilst Salomon has a lifestyle focus. The 
potential for coordinated effects was, however, much greater in the cross-country 
ski markets in Austria, France and Germany. Although there would not be clear cut 
coordinated effects, the merger would have precipitated a co-operation agreement 
between Salomon and Fischer to be widened to include Atomic - Fischer's main 
competitor in the cross-country ski market. The Commission conditionally cleared 
the acquisition of Amer by Adidas Salomon on condition that Salomon adapted its 
agreements with Fischer!' 2 
3.3.2 Conglomerate Effects 
Analysis of the conglomerate effects of a merger arises if the merging parties 
belong to separate but interrelated markets. As noted by Weirbrecht, conglomerate 
effects are analysed by the Commission in terms of "portfolio effects". In Proctor 
& Gamble/Gillette," 3 the Commission examined the potential for conglomerate 
effects developing as a consequence of their huge portfolio of brands and large 
market share in several different markets which did not overlap. The Commission 
focused upon the possibility of bundled products linked together by discount, 
promotion, etc and the potential for squeezing of competitors' products out of the 
market which could negatively affect the consumer. The Commission decided that 
post-merger, competition would be maintained and the retailer's purchasing 
influence would counteract any potential portfolio effects. 
Procter & Gamble/Gillette represented a significant case in the evolvement of 
the Commission's application of the Merger Control Regulation regime as it was 
the first time that the Commission considered the importance of category 
management and revealed that the restrictive time constraints of the Phase 1 
investigation will not preclude the Commission from conducting an in depth 
112 Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Contro! in 2005 - An Overview. E.CL.R. 27(2), 2006: 43-50. 
" Case No. COMP/M.3732, Proctor & Gamble/Gillette. P&G (a global manuftcturer with a 
portfolio of goods: household care, beauty care etc) acquired Gillette (a multinational producer of 
healthcare/oral care products). The Commission expressed competition concerns, so commitments 
were presented in order to restore competition. P&G divested its spin brush battety operated 
toothbrush business and agreed not to reacquire influence over this business for 10 years. 
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investigation." 4 This case involved the acquisition of Gillette by Proctor & 
Gamble. Both companies operate in a variety of healthcare/beauty related markets: 
Proctor & Gamble produce a variety of beauty, health and household products 
whilst Gillette produce oral health care products, blades, razors and batteries. Post-
merger the new company would operate in 21 markets and have an annual turnover 
of more than $1 billion. Clearly as the merger would combine two market leaders, 
the Commission had to investigate the possibility that they would abuse their 
market position due to their large portfolio post-merger. The Commission, however, 
only identified limited overlap in several markets and only significant competition 
concerns in the battery toothbrush markets)' 5 This case, as noted by Kloc-Evison, 
highlighted the determination of the Commission to stay within the deadlines 
established by the timetable but also to conduct an in-depth investigation including 
new factors within their market investigation)' 6 
An examination of conglomerate effects of the transaction was necessary due 
to the large portfolio of the combined companies. The Commission's analysis of 
non-horizontal effects focused specifically upon the potential of the parties to 
squeeze out competitors through the bundling of products and category 
management. 117 The market investigation focused upon the possibility that parties 
may force retailers to stock their weaker performing brands with their "must have" 
ranges in order to occupy shelf space and squeeze out competitors. Bonuses and 
financial incentives were cited by third parties and competitors as methods of 
ensuring competitors' products were removed from the shelves. 
The Commission's investigation found that direct bundling is only possible if 
the patties' products complement each other. Their combined portfolio was so 
'" KIoc-Evison, K. et al. Procter & Gamble/ Gillette: the role of economic analysis in Phase I 
cases. Competition Policy Newsletter, (3) Autumn 2005: 43. Available from: 
http://ec.europaeu/comm/competition/pubtications/cpn/cpn20053.pdf  [Accessed 16107/071. 
'"Kioc-Evison, K. et al. Procter & Gamble! Gillette: the role of economic analysis in Phase I 
cases. Competition Policy Newsletter, (3) Autumn 2005: 43. Available from: 
hfl://ec.europa.eu/comm/competiüon/publicfions/cpnJcpn20053.pdf  [Accessed 16/07/07]. 
116 KIoc-Evison, K. et al. Procter & Gamble/ Gillette: the role of economic analysis in Phase I 
cases. Competition Policy Newsletter, (3) Autumn 2005: 43. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn20053.pdf  [Accessed 16/07/071. 
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 KIoc-Evison, K. et al. Procter & Gamble! Gillette: the role of economic analysis in Phase I 
cases. 	 Competition Policy Newsletter, (3) Autumn 2005: 43. Available from: 
tittp://ec.europa.eu!comm/competition/publications!cpn/cpn20053.pdf [Accessed 16/07/071. 
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broad that this wasn't the case. When "combined bundling" is introduced it is 
nonnally on a buy one get one free basis. The promotion does not extend through 
the whole portfolio of goods. Strong customer buying power, strong competitors 
and the retailers' threat of changing supplier, all act as a countervailing power, 
preventing the parties abusing their position as a consequence of the transaction. 
In Procter & Gamble/Gillette the Commission examined if category 
management/captainship may help the parties to dominate the market post-
merger. 118 Category captainship is when a supplier provides the retailer with 
information about the product and shoppers and details about where to place the 
products for optimal selling opportunities through plan-o-grams. 119 Third parties 
expressed concern that category management would enable Proctor & Gamble to 
position their own products in the best positions within these plan-o-grams with or 
without retailers consent. This would result in a gradual reduction of competition as 
rivals were squeezed out of the market and in a consequential rise in prices for 
consumers and a reduction in choice. 
The intention and focal point of the Commission's enquiry, therefore, focused 
upon the potential of Gillette and Proctor & Gamble to increase their captain/ 
category management in the oral-care market post-merger because, although prior 
to the merger neither company possessed a 11111 portfolio of oral-care products, after 
the merger, they would be in a stronger position to be captain managers in this 
market. Malysis focused upon the evaluation and comparison of Gillette, Proctor & 
Gamble and their competitors' existing sales, the evolvement of their market share 
and prices of products in markets where they were and were not category 
captainsi 20 
... Kioc-Evison, K. et al. Procter & Gamble! Gillette: the role of economic analysis in Phase I 
cases. Competition Policy Newsletter, (3) Autumn 2005: 43. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition!publications/cpnJcpn20053.pdf  [Accessed 16/07/071. 
119 KIoc-Evison, K. et al. Procter & Gamble! Gillette: the role of economic analysis in Phase I 
cases. Competition Policy Newsletter, (3) Autumn 2005: 43. Available from: 
hflp:I/ec.europaeu!comm/competition/publications!cpnJcpn2OO53.pdf [Accessed 16/07/071. 
*20 KIoc-Evison, K. et al. Procter & Gamble! Gillette: the role of economic analysis in Phase I 
cases. 	 Competition Policy Newsletter, (3) Autumn 2005: 43. Available from: 
http:llec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn20053 .pdf [Accessed 16107/07]. 
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The Commission found that the best selling products were not necessarily 
category captains. Retailers favour their own brands, and due to their own collation 
of information and data, were not dependent upon suppliers for information and so 
were not likely to be susceptible to biased recommendations provided by category 
captains. The Commission also found that retailers were unlikely to focus on their 
own brands and certain branded goods to the detriment of certain other brands. The 
Commission found that only failing brands were removed from the shelves and 
retailers "multi-sourced" their products, often deviating from advice given by the 
category captains. In the case of oral health-care products the Commission's 
investigation found that retailers often stocked a wide range of their own products 
which provided a wider variety of items than the largest suppliers and often stocked 
their own brands along-side branded products. Often products are delisted from 
retailers stock as they are failing to sell. Retailers agreed that in certain instances 
Gillette and Proctor & Gamble products had been removed even though they were 
category captains as they were underperforming. The Commission concluded that 
category captainship was beneficial to both retailers and consumers. Retailers' 
overall sales increased as a consequence of the plan-o-grams, as they could pinpoint 
which products - irrespective of brand - sold the most, whilst economies of scale 
could be achieved as retailers were more likely to stock according to the 
requirements of the plan-o-gram. Consumers have more choice - plans are based 
upon consumer choice/habit surveys, so products are more likely to be what they 
actually want. Category captainship was, therefore, a pro rather than an anti-
competitive mechanism and would lead neither to an abuse of market position by 
the parties nor the elimination or squeezing out of competitors.' 2 ' 
The detailed examination of the non-horizontal and the conglomerate effects 
of the transaction indicate that the Commission is determined to apply the merger 
regulation framework diligently when conducting an examination of conglomerate 
mergers. Aithough this was only a Phase I investigation, the Commission's market 
analysis of category captainship and its consideration of economic evidence 
K. et al. Procter & Gamble/Gillette: the role of economic analysis in Phase I 
cases. Competition Policy Newsletter, (3) Autumn 2005:43. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpnicpn200s3.pdf 
 [Accessed 16/07/071. 
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illustrated that it was willing to consider new factors, such as category captainship, 
and apply econometric models when conducting market investigations. 
The acquisition of Guidant by Johnson & JohnsonW represented a transaction 
where both parties were involved in the research, design, manufacture and sale of 
vascular medical devices. The parties were in direct competition with only a small 
number of competitors active in this market (European and world-wide). Bacchiega 
et al. note that this case raises several interesting and relevant substantive and 
procedural points in relation to the application of the NMR by the Commission. 
Substantively the Commission has shifted its focus of analysis. Market definition 
and the potential for single dominance are no longer the focal point for 
investigation. Instead the Commission focused its attention upon the closeness and 
the possible substitution of products and the effect the transaction would have upon 
the competitive structure of the market. The Commission's investigation examined 
several areas: coronary drug eluting stents (DES) and accessories; endovascular 
stents and accessories used in peripheral arteries and endovascular stents. 
Analysis of bundling strategies focused upon the impact they would have in 
terms of their foreclosure effects: can competitors successfiully compete or risk 
being squeezed out of the market; do consumers have enough purchasing power to 
influence bundling practices. (luidant had a large portfolio of cardiac medical 
devices, as the market leader in steerable guide wires and is one of the main 
competitors in the European bare metal stent (BMS) market. Johnson & Johnson 
was also a competitor in the same markets and held a strong position in the DES 
market. The Commission, therefore, considered if the parties had the incentive and 
ability to enter into anti-competitive bundling practices. 
With regard to the potential ability of the parties to enter into bundling 
agreements the Commission found that bundled products only accounted for about 
30% of sales, and hospitals purchased medical devices from several competitors to 
Bacchiega, A. et al. Johnson & Johnson/Guidant: potential competition and unilateral effects 
markets. Competition Policy Newslette, 3, Autumn 2006:87. Available from: 
htlpi/ec.europaeu/comm/competition4rnblicaJionsJcpnicpn20053 .pdf [Accessed 27/07/071. 
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avoid being reliant upon one supplier. Further more, both Medtronic and BSX were 
capable of entering into competitive bundling strategies. 
The Commission also focused upon how the removal of a competitor would 
affect competition in that particular market. In its analysis of coronary stents in 
interventional cardiology, for example, the Commission had to determine if the 
removal of a competitor, in this instance Guidant, from the DES market would have 
a negative impact upon competition in this market. The Commission's 
investigation found that the time and expense of conducting research and design 
and clinical trials, the existence of patents which already cover these innovations 
and the existence of long-standing, trusting relationships between supplier and 
customer, all hindered new competitors' entry to the market. Due to the differing 
ambitions of competitors, the investigation identified two tiers within the market. 
In the higher tier, which was the market the Commission examined, there were/are 
only a limited number of companies active in the global DES market. 
The Commission's analysis focused upon two issues: the hierarchy of 
competitors prior to the merger and the possibility that new entrants could enter the 
market post-merger. The investigation found that BSX's leadership of the market 
was precarious, and could be challenged either by Johnson & Johnson or by any 
new entrants. The Commission's analysis also focused upon the potential of a new 
entrant to enter and make an impact upon the DES market In the case of Guidant, 
the Commission considered that the transaction would remove a new entrant to the 
market, as Guidant possessed the capacity to be a successfiul competitor in this 
particular market. Two new entrants, Medtmnic and Abbott also had the capacity to 
enter the DES market and gain significant shares of the European market. The 
Commission, therefore, considered that the removal of Guidant would not harm 
competition in the DES market.' 
Procedurally the case also raised some interesting points. The Commission 
and FTC worked closely together in this case as the transaction raised several points 
'Bacchiega, A. et S. Johnson & JohnsonfGuidant: potential competition and unilateral effects 
markets. Competition Policy Newsletter s 3, Autumn 2006:87. Available from: 
hup://ec.eumpaeu/comm/competitionfpublications/cppjcpn20053.pdf [Accessed 27/07/07]., 89. 
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relevant to both investigations and the merger had the potential to increase the 
parties' patent portfolio in the Drug Eluting Stent market in America, which would, 
as a consequence of the transaction, foreclose the market with the negative 
competitive effects spilling over into the European market.' 24 The transaction 
would result in the entity possessing a large portfolio of patents which would affect 
competition in both the US and European markets. The Commission, therefore, 
analysed the possibility that possession of intellectual property rights in the form of 
patents would preclude new entrants to both the DES and BMS markets. The 
Commission's investigation found that the "intellectual property landscape" 
differed between the US and European market The US patent market is more 
litigious, patents are more expansive and last for longer, whilst in Europe there is 
less Court intervention, patents are more defined and are in existence for shorter 
periods of time. 
The most important patents in the US market cover the Rapid Exchange 
delivery system which places the stent inside the patient's coronary artery. This is 
the most popular way of inserting the stent (over 70% of procedures). Only 
Guidant, Johnson & Johnson and BSX can manufacture this system. Thus new 
entrants are hindered from entry in to the US market due to existing patents and 
existing surgeon preferences. The European market, however, does not have Rapid 
Exchange delivery system patents. Competitors were concerned that the merged 
entity would be unwilling to grant licenses for the system to competitors in the US 
market This would prevent new entrants penetrating the market. Lack of 
profitability in this market would spill over into the EU market as companies would 
lack the finances needed to effectively compete here. Evaluating these 
considerations as part of the investigation, the Commission dismissed these 
concerns as unfounded. The Commission felt that although the transaction may 
affect the US market - the outcome of litigation is difficult to predict - this would 
not necessarily spill over into the European markets. As research and design in this 
area is rapid, there is often the chance of injunctions, but these are rarely used in 
either market. More importantly those excluded from the US market were in the 
''Bacchiega, A. et S. Johnson & Johnson/Guidant: potential competition and unilateral effects 
markets. Competition Policy NewsIester, 3, Autumn 2006:87. Available from: 
http://ec.europaeu/comm/competition/publications/cpnJcpn20053.pdf  [Accessed 27/07/071. 
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process of entering the European markets, using the Rapid Exchange delivezy 
system. 
The endovascular stent market has a high degree of product differentiation 
and product substitution. The Commission, as part of its investigation had to assess 
the closeness of substitution between Johnson & Johnson and Guidants' stents. The 
Commission found that the removal of Guidant would remove the manufacturer 
whose products were closest to Johnson & Johnson. No other competitor's 
products were as close in terms of substitution as Guidant and Johnson & Johnson. 
As hospitals are the main customers for the medical stent device market, the 
parties argued that they were in a strong position to exert countervailing buying 
power and to purchase theft products from a variety of suppliers. The Commission 
found, however, that although multiple sourcing is a common practice, there are 
only a limited number of suppliers. The closeness of Guidant and Johnson & 
Johnsons' products meant that consumer choice would be limited as a consequence 
of the transaction and countervailing purchasing power could not counteract the rise 
in prices) 25 
The Commission's analysis decided that the transaction, by removing Cluidant 
as a competitor, would eliminate the strongest rival in this market, which 
consequently would allow Johnson & Johnson to unilaterally raise prices. Doctors 
could not switch products in order to exert theft buying power as they could in other 
markets as this is a niche market with only a limited number of manufacturers. The 
transaction would precipitate non-coordinated effects which would impede 
competition in the endovascular stent market. 
The Johnson & Johnson/Guidant and Procter/Gillette decisions reveal the 
Commission's restrained approach when analysing the possibility that bundling 
'Bacchiega, A. et al. Johnson & JohnsonlGuidant: potential competition and unilateral effects 
markets. Competition Policy Newsletteç 3, Autumn 2006:87. Available from: 
httpilc.europaeulcomm/competitionlpublications/cpnicpn2005_3.pdf [Accessed 27/07/071, 92. 
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policies will squeeze out and foreclose the market to competitors.' 26 The 
Commission analysed both the purchasing power of consumers and the strength of 
competitors in counteracting the possible foreclosure of the market as a 
consequence of bundling strategies. In these cases the Commission determined that 
bundling would not occur despite the large portfolios of the companies involved. 
The Commission is following the Horizontal Guidelines, placing more emphasis 
upon the analysis of the substitution of products and the effect the transaction will 
have upon the competitive structure of the market rather than focusing upon the 
analysis of the potential for single dominance and market dominance.' 27 
3.4 Mergers: A Way of Opening Up Markets? 
The Total/Gaz'28 case is notable as it is the first case where the application of 
the NMR by the Commission is the most evident. 129 In this case the transaction 
involved Total, a French oil and gas producer, acquiring certain gas assets in the 
South-West and Central France from the French public utility, Gaz de France 
(GDF). This acquisition took place within a larger context. A Nationalization Law 
(1946) had established a complex set of contracts linking Total, GDF and their 
affiliates Gaz du Sud Ouest (050) and Compagnie Francaise du Methane. This 
framework was revised as a consequence of the implementation of two European 
Gas Directives which liberalised the gas industiy, opening up the market to new 
competitors. As a consequence of these Directives, Total and GDF decided to 
"unwind ... their cross-shareholdings".' 3° Total acquired GSO, and the gas 
t26121acchiega, A. et al. Johnson & Johnson/Guidant: potential competition and unilateral effects 
markets. Competition Policy Newsletters 3, Autumn 2006:87. Available from: 
http://ec.europaeu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2005_3.pdf 
 [Accessed 27/07/071. 
" Bacehiega, A. et a]. Johnson & Johnson/Guidant: potential competition and tmilateral effects 
markets. Competition Policy Newsletteç 3, Autumn 2006:87. Available from: 
http://ec.europaeu/comm/competition/publications/cpnJcpn20053.pdf  [Accessed 27/07/07]. 
'28 Case No COMP/M. 3410 Total/Gaz Dc France. In this case the Commission cleared the 
acquisition of certain GDF assets by Total. To allay competition concerns that Total would hold a 
monopoly over the supply/storage of gas, it implemented measures which would allow competitors 
access to these thcilities. 
De Riveiy, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - Total/Gaz be France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the (ins Sector. E.CLR. 26(11), 2005: 624-637; See 
rest of the chapter for flurther references to this case. 
"° be Rivezy, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - Total/Gaz be France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the (las Sector. E.CLIt 26(11), 2005: 624-637. 
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pipelines between France and Spain (Lacal) and the natural gas storage facility 
(Izaute). Total also gained control of CFM's gas supply business.' 3 ' 
This is the first decision where the Commission did not make any reference to 
dominance.' 32 In this case the Commission examined each of the segments of the 
French gas sector in turn, allowing it to raise several competition concerns as 
Total's acquisition of the pipeline network and sole control over both Lacal and 
(ISO placed Total in a monopolistic position post-merger in the South West France 
transportation of natural gases market. By obtaining control over Izaute, Total 
would have a monopoly over storage facilities.' 33 As De River)' and Guerard point 
out this case represents a "gap" case because if the new SLEC test had not been 
introduced, the Commission would not have necessarily raised or identified 
competition concerns because Total already held a dominant position.' 
The Commission, therefore, analysed Total's position in the market, the 
possibility that it would legally restrict third parties' access to storage and pipeline 
facilities and thus counteract the objectives of the Second Gas Directive. Despite 
Total's strong position in the market, the Commission found that Total did not have 
either the capability or incentive to restrict GDF's access to the transportation or 
storage facilities. The Commission did find, however, that Total did have the 
capabilities and incentive to restrict new entrants to the market by restricting access 
to facilities. This possible abuse of their position by Total was not premised upon 
large market share but the relatively small markets involved in the natural gas 
market.' 
' 31 See De Riveiy, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMPIM. 34 10 — Total! Gaz De France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. E.CLK 26 (II), 2005: 624-637, for a 
more detailed outline of the transaction. 
' Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ConiroL Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. 104/search?q=cache:39  M60UYXlwj:europaeu.int/conmL/dgs/competition/new
—
s 
ubthntive_test.pdf+SWC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=l0 [Accessed 22/02/06], II. 
" 'De Rivery, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - Total! Gaz De France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. &C.LR. 26(11), 2005: 624-637. 
'' De Rivery, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - Total! Gaz De France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. KCLR. 26(11), 2005: 624-637. 
"De Rivery, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP!M. 3410 - Total! Gaz De France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. EC.LIt 26(11), 2005: 624-637. 
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The main reason the Commission challenged the transaction, therefore, was 
premised upon Total and ODF's shared use of transportation and storage facilities 
and the potential for Total to refuse to allow new entrants access to these facilities 
because of over-subscription. As noted by De Rivery and (luerard, the 
Commission's conclusions are "remarkable" because Total's control over storage 
and transportation is governed by the Second Gas Directive which expressly allows 
lack of capacity as a legitimate reason to refuse access. The remedies proposed by 
the Commission in order for the transaction to be cleared, were behavioural in order 
to ensure that facilities were shared fairly between existing and new competitors. 
This case provides an insight into the way the Commission intends to address 
transactions in de-regulated liberalised industries in the future. It is clear that the 
Commission is keen to encourage transactions which facilitate liberalisation of 
markets which have previously been monopolies, even if there remains one 
competitor with a large market share. 136 The Commission is also willing to go 
further than is required by directives to ensure that competition, as required by the 
NMR, is not impeded. 
The regulation of mergers has favoured the liberalisation of state monopolised 
markets and so can be placed within a wider EU competition policy context: the 
liberalisation of markets! 37 In EDF/ENBW,' 38 K ON/MOL, TolaUGaz, for example, 
the Commission has used these merger investigations and subsequent remedies as a 
way of opening up markets in the telecommunication, gas and energy sectors.' 39 
' 1k Rivery, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - Total/ Gaz De France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. KC.LR . 26(11), 2005: 624-637. 
137 Monti, M. A reformed competition policy: achievements and challenges for the future. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2004:6. Available from: 
htlp://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpnicpn2004_3.pdf  [Accessed 11/071071 . 
°' Case No. COMP/M.1853 EDF/EnBW. Subject to conditions, the Commission cleared the 
acquisition of joint control of EnBW by EDF and OEW. The Commission expressed concern that 
the EDF held a dominant position in the French market EnBW was a potential competitor to enter 
the market To address these concerns EDF agreed to make 6,000 Megawatts of generation capacity 
available to competitors. 
Lowe, P. The Ltheralisazion of EU Energy Mar/rca. The Beesley Lectures, Institute of 
Economic Afläirs, The Royal Society London, 9/11/06. 
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3.5 Three to Two Mergers 
Prior to the entry into force of the NMR, 74% of three to two mergers 
were unconditionally cleared by the Commission,' 4° as the original Regulation did 
not allow the Commission to examine three to two mergers because they did not 
fulfil the criteria for suspected collective dominance. After the entry into force of 
the NMR, Homer speculated that the VNU1WPP1J0 4 ' decision, taken by the 
Commission on the basis of the new Guidelines would render three to two mergers 
illegal) 42 
 Homer commented that the recast Merger Control Regulation may, in 
fact, ensure that the Commission can become interventionist, intervening in cases of 
single-firm dominance, targeting three to two mergers. Ridyard' 43 pointed out that 
the recast Merger Contml Regulation was supposed to close the "alleged gap in the 
old dominance test", the SIEC enables the Commission to widen its scope of 
intervention to examine cases which fail below "... the tradition threshold 
associated by findings of single-firm dominance". 
In KorsnaslAD Cartonboard' 44 the Commission cleared the acquisition of 
Assi Doman Cartonboard by Komas, the second and third companies in the liquid 
packaging board market (LPB) whose product is then sold to convertors, Tetra Pak, 
140 Homer, N. Unilatera] Effects and the EC Merger Regulation - How The Commission Had Its 
Cake And Ate It Too. Hanselaw, Review, 2(1), 2006: 37. 
141 Case No. COMP/M.3152 VNU/WPP/JV, involved the establishment ofajoint venture between 
ACNielson Corporation which controlled VNU N.Y. and AGB Holdings S.p.A. to establish a new 
venture by purchasing shares in a newly established company - AGB Nielson Media Research. This 
transaction was cleared by the Commission. 
142 Homer, N. Unilateral Effects and the EC Merger Regulation - How The Commission Had Its 
Cake And Ate It Too. Hanselaw Review, 2(1), 2006: 37. 
'43 Ridyard, D. The Commission's New Horizontal Merger Guidelines - An Economic Commentary. 
The Global Competition Law Centre Working Papers, GCLC Working Paper 02/05, (Brugge, 
College of Europe) 5, supra note 27, 2, cited by Homer, N. Unilateral Effects and the EC Merger 
Regulation - How The Commission Had Its Cake And Ate It Too. Hanselaw Review, 2(l), 2006: 
37. 
'"Case No COMP/M.4057, Korsns/Assidoman Cartonboard, 12/05/06 (2006/C 209/05); Karlsson, 
J. Clearance of a Near-Duopoly. E.C.LK 27(9), 2006: 514-518. Kornas and Al) Cartonboard are 
two of the EEA leading producers in liquid packaging. As there are only three main producers in the 
EEA: Stora Enso, Kornas and AD Cartonboard, this transaction would merge the second and third 
largest producers. There are three customers: Tetra Pak, Elopac and Combibloc. Although the 
market is small, the merger would not result in the market being impeded as there is countervailing 
buyer power and more competition is expected from Latin America and China. In fhct the 
Commission felt that this transaction would increase efficiencies, allowing the parties to combine 
resources, increase production and manuftcture both types of liquid packaging (Rapid, Press 
Release, Mergers: Commission approves the acquisition ofAD Cartonboard by Korsnas. IP/06/6 10. 
Available from: httjri/europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refbrence'=IP/06/6 10, Accessed 
25/08/08) 
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Combibloc and Elopak who then convert it into packaging to hold liquids. Prior to 
the merger the main supplier was StoraEnso, and the two smaller suppliers Korsnas 
and AD Cartonboard on one side and the largest purchaser, Tetrapak and two 
smaller competitors, Elopak and Combibloc on the other) 45 Post-merger the supply 
side was distorted with only two suppliers, although not creating a market leader. It 
did, however, create and raise unilateral and coordinated effects concerns. As 
Karlsson points out this is a "notable case" whereby this transaction would result 
not in the establishment of a dominant position, but in a "near duopoly" in an 
already "highly concentrated market" 146 as the two largest companies in the LPB 
market post-merger would possess 90% of the market' 47 The proposed transaction 
also distorted the "mirrored structure of supply and demand".' 48 Karlsson 
commented that this case "sheds additional light on the non-coordinated effects test 
in oligopolistic markets". 149 Examining the impact of the non-coordinated effects 
of the transaction, the Commission found that it would actually enhance 
competition as Korsnas and AD Cartonboard would fImction more optimally as a 
competitor as a combined force. Neither the merged entity nor its competitor would 
be able to raise prices due to the presence of a viable competitor, whilst the 
anticipated competition from outside the European Economic Area (EEA), 
especially Brazil and China, was also expected to constrain any anti-competitive 
effects the two main competitors may have on the market via a "ripple effect" in a 
few years) 50 Increased manufacture of liquid packaging board outside the EEA 
area would encourage the newly merged company and StoraEnso to resell within 
the EEA and therefore reduce the prices of theft product as the market became more 
congested. 
This case also raised serious coordinated effects and unilateral concerns. As 
noted by Karlsson, the Korsnas/AD Cartonboard case created a "near duopoly in 
the EEA". 15 ' The Commission was concerned about the change to the "exceptional 
" Karisson, J. Clearance of a Near-Duopoly. E.C.LIL 27(9), 2006: 514-518. 
'46 Karlsson, J. Clearance of a Near-Duopoly. E.CLR. 27(9), 2006: 514-518. 
147 Karlsson, J. Clearance of a Near-Duopoly. E.C.LR. 27(9), 2006: 514-518. 
'4t Karlsson, J. Clearance of a Near-Duopoly. &C.LR. 27(9), 2006:514-518. 
'49 Karlsson, J. Clearance of a Near-Duopoly. E.C.LR. 27(9), 2006: 514-518. 
'5° Karlsson, J. Clearance of a Near-Duopoly. KC.LR. 27(9), 2006: 514-518. 
' Karlsson, J. Clearance of a Near-Duopoly. EC.L.R. 27(9), 2006: 514-518. 
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market structure" established by the StoraEnso merger, which established one large 
producer, StoraEnso, and two smaller producers, Korsnas and AD Cartonboard. As 
the merger would result in only two competitors, post-merger concerns were raised 
about the ability of the existing supplier and the new entity to increase production, 
if the other competitor raised prices and the possibility of coordinated effects. The 
Commission, therefore, during their Phase I investigation, closely scrutinised this 
possibility. The Commission felt that the two suppliers would find cooperation, 
post-merger, difficult: StoraEnso is much larger and produces white/white and 
white/brown LPB whilst the new entity only produces white/brown LPB and the 
countervailing buyer power would ensure that customers could not be shared. The 
longevity of customer agreements would mean that it would be several years before 
any cooperation could be put into operation and would be unlikely to be maintained 
partially due to countervailing power. 152 This decision illustrates that the 
Commission does not necessarily consider that a three to two merger will impede 
competition. Rather the Commission appears to take the view that the reduction of 
competitors may enhance competition, 153 with countervailing buyer power seen as a 
device to maintain and ensure effective competition. 
Although in Korsnas/AD Cartonboard there was no identification of 
dominance, there is a presumption evolving on the part of the Commission that does 
not follow the speculative argument of Homer. Instead of prohibiting three to two 
mergers, the Commission is clearing them on the basis that countervailing buyer 
power can counteract any negative impact of a transaction, whilst the transaction 
itself will not impede but encourage and enhance competition. 
Although the introduction of the New Guidelines was supposed to enhance 
legal certainty, and restrict unpredictable application of the NMR, 154  Homer noted 
that three overriding factors - the HHI index, market definition and market share - 
actually influence the Commission's decisions. Homer also points out that 
although "typically" market share is assumed by the Commission to be between 40 
132 1s&rn, J. Clearance of a Near-Duopoly. E.CLK 27(9), 2006: 514-518. 153 Karlsson, J. Clearance of a Near-Duopoly. E.C.LR. 27(9), 2006: 514-518. 
154 Homer, N. Unilateral Eflcts and the EC Merger Regulation - How The Commission Had Its 
Cake And Ate It Too. Hanselaw Review, 2(I), 2006: 37. 
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and 501/o, in certain cases the threshold is much lower. In Syngenta CF/A dvanta' 55 
for example, the Commission identified competition concerns in cases where the 
post-merger market share would have been much lower than would normally be the 
case for the Commission to register concern. Baxter uses these examples to argue 
that the Commission intends to lower the intervention threshold during the 
application of the N 156 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have widened the Commission's scope of 
investigation by emphasising the need to analyse the non-coordinated and 
coordinated effects of a merger. These Guidelines have moved the Commission's 
analysis away from the consideration of the potential establishment of a dominant 
position, instead the Commission now takes into account the overall effect and 
(possible) negative impact the merger may have upon competition, especially the 
effect the transaction may have for consumers. They do not necessarily prohibit 
three to two mergers. Instead they consider that this will, in fact, improve 
competition and countervailing buyer power will counteract any anti-competitive 
effects of the merger. The NMR also allows more scope for intervention by the 
Commission - thresholds for intervention have been lowered and the Commission 
can legitimately raise concerns on points of transaction which would not have been 
possible under the original regime. The Commission appears to be slowly 
becoming more comfortable with applying the provisions of the NMR, with a 
corresponding change in the normative dimension as focus is placed upon the 
possible effect the transaction will have in terms of significant effect on 
competition, not dominance. 
Homer, N. Unilateral Efiècts and the EC Merger Regulation - How The Commission Had Its 
Cake And Ate It Too. Hanselaw Review, 2(1), 2006: 37. In Syngenta CP/Advanta the Commission 
cleared the acquisition of Advanta by Syngenta, subject to conditions as the Commission identified 
competition concerns in the sugar beet seed market and other seed breeding markets. In the beet seed 
market the combined market share after the transaction would be 30/40%. Case No COMP/M.3465 - 
SyngentaCP/Advanta. Available from: 
http://www.google.co.uk/search?hI=en&q=Syngenta+cp+%2FAdvanta+-4-&btnG=Google+Search&  
meta= [Accessed 11/09/081. Rapid Press Release, Commission clears Syngenta acquisition qfseed 
producerAdvanta subject to sale of European operations. IP/0411036. Available from: 
http://europa.eu/rapidJpressReleasesAction.do?reterence=1P/04/1  036 [Accessed 09/09/08). 
"'Homer, N. Unilateral EfIbcts and the EC Merger Regulation - How The Commission Had Its 
Cake And Ate It Too. Hanselaw Review, 2(1), 2006: 37. 
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3.6 The Gradual Incorporation of Efficiencies 
Another, significant indication that the Commission is shifting away from a 
structural approach to the analysis of transactions is their changing attitude towards, 
and the gradual incorporation of, efficiencies into the Merger Control Regulation 
framework. 157 As Kocmut' 58 points out, the original ECMR did not explicitly 
make reference to or include efficiencies in the evolving system of merger control. 
Although there were several legal bases upon which parties could base their 
efficiency defence, it was the revised Regulation which provided clarity in this area. 
Prior to the entry into force of the NMR, the use of the efficiency defence had not 
been well received by the Commission, who had regarded any benefits of a merger 
as secondary to the impact the merger may have for competitors. 
During the formative period of merger control, despite Article 2(1) ECMR 
making implicit reference to efficiencies, the Commission viewed the potential 
benefit of efficiencies negatively, considering the impact they would have for 
competitors rather than consumers and the possibility that "the merger [would] 
increase societal welfare") 59 Davidson' ° points out that the Commission's use of 
the range effects theory of competitive harm "overly" focused upon the potential 
harm a merger may have upon competitors rather than the potential effect it will 
have on consumer/societal welfare. Whereas in the US, increased efficiency could 
be justified to authorise a merger which would impede competition, efficiencies 
were regarded by the Commission, however, as a "disadvantage to competitors,. 
an efficiency offence, rather than accept that efficiency would stimulate future 
competition on the market, i.e. an efficiency defence".' 6 ' In some cases, such as 
'"Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. I O4fsearch?q=cache:39 M60UYX I wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantivetestpdf+SIEC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=l 0 [Accessed 22102/06]. 
' 51 Kocmut C. Efficiency Considerations and Merger Control - Quo Vadis, Commission. E.C.L.R. 
27(1), 2006: 19-27. 
' Davidson, L. M. EU Merger Control and the Compatibility Test A Review of Recent 
Developments. Liverpool Law Review, 25,2004: 195-220. 
160 Davidson, L. M. EU Merger Control and the Compatibility Test: A Review of Recent 
Developments. Liverpool Law Review, 25, 2004: 195-220, 211. 
"1 qjyjas, G. New Directions in EC Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control. KLJ 12 
(5), 2006: 535-660, 639. 
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Aerospatiale-Alenialde Havilland,' 62 the Commission concluded that the claims that 
efficiencies would result as a consequence of the merger, were unsubstantiated and 
were of little importance when assessing the transaction. 163 In relation to 
conglomerate mergers, the Commission, in certain cases, did accept that efficiencies 
would result as a consequence of the merger, these efficiencies would allow the 
merging parties to reduce prices, and impede competition.' TM Whilst in 1996 the 
Commission stated: "[t]here is no real legal possibility of justifring an efficiency 
defence under the Merger Regulation ... Efficiency issues are ... not [used] to 
justi1' or mitigate that dominance in order to clear a concentration which would 
otherwise be prohibited".' 65 In 1999, however, the Commission stated that "[t]he 
creation of a dominant position in the relevant markets ... means that the 
efficiencies argument put forward by the parties cannot be taken into account in the 
assessment of the present merger".' 
A much cited example of the transatlantic divergent attitude in relation to 
efficiencies is the GE/Honeywell case, whereby the US competition authorities 
considered the proposed transaction would permit merger-specific efficiencies as 
the merged company would be able to offer bundled products and spend more upon 
research, whereas the European Commission felt that the potential for the merged 
entity to bundle products would penalise competitors who could not compete, and 
that the increased financial power of the merged company would permit more risk-
taking in the research field, without this risk-taking threatening the company's 
'Case TV/M 053 Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland [1991] 01 L 334/42. This was the first case to 
be prohibited under the ECMR. This case involved the acquisition of de Havilland by Aerospatiale 
and Alenia. The Commission was concerned that this transaction would impede competition in the 
world market for regional turbo prop aircraft. The Commission prohibited the acquisition. 
Jones, A. & B. Suffrmn, EC Competition Law. OIJP, 2004:953. 
Jones A. & B. Sufihin, EC Competition Law. OUP, 2004:954. 
'Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http:/t72. 14.207. l04/search?q=cache:39 M6OUYX1 wJ:europaeu.int/comm/dgslcompetitionlnew_s 
ubstantive_test.pdf+SIEC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnic&cd= 10 [Accessed 22/02/06]; European 
Commission: Contribution to Efficiency Claims in Mergers and Other Horizontal Agreements, 
O.E.C.DJCID(96)65, 1996. 
'Case No COMP/ M. 1313— Danish Crown'Vesjyske Slagterier, para 198, cited by Roller, L. M. 
& M. de La Mano, The impact oft/ic New Substantive Test in European Merger ControL Available 
from: 
http://72. 14.207 ,1 04/searth?q=cache:39_M6OUYX I wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new_,s 
ubstantivetest.pdf+SIEC+test&hl=en&gl—ulc&ct=clnk&cd= 10 [Accessed 22/02/061. This 
transaction was cleared conditionally by the Commission. 
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competitiveness within its market. The principle of efficiencies, as observed by 
Weitbrecht,' 67 
 does not easily fit into the dominance-orientated model. From the 
early 2000s onwards, the Commission acknowledged the need to take the principle 
of efficiencies into account, publishing several studies examining the principles of 
efficiencies' 68 and the 2002 Green Paper reviewing the ECMR "hinted" at the need 
to take efficiencies into account.' o In the Air France/KLM"0 merger, the 
Commission's press release, announcing clearance of the transaction, highlighted 
the positives and benefits of this merger for passengers, but the decision to clear the 
merger makes no reference to these efficiencies or the influence they may have had 
during the merger investigation) 7 ' 
Recital 29 of the NMR makes it clear that if certain conditions are met, and 
clear identifiable gains can be made for the consumer, these gains can be used to 
offset or "counteract the effects of competition", whilst Form CO invites merging 
parties to present theft efficiency claims. 172 The Guidelines on horizontal mergers 
(seventh section, pam. 85) makes explicit reference to the need for efficiencies to be 
of benefit to the consumer, to enhance consumer welfare, to be merger specific and 
to be verifiable. The DG competition publication: Best Practices on the Conduct of 
EC Merger Control Proceedings also outlined the Commission's approach to, and 
application of, the principle of efficiencies. Certainly, the ambiguity towards 
167 Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004— An Overview. KC.LR . 26(2), 2005: 67-74. 
aRoI1er, L. M. & M. de La Mario, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
Control. Available from: 
http://72. 14.207 .! 04/search?q=cache:39_M6OIJYX I wJ:europa.eu.inticommldgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantive_testpdf+SIEC+test&h!=en&gl'=uk&ct=clnk&cd=lO [Accessed 22/02/06], 13. 
'0 Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mario, The Impact ofthe New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. 1 
 04/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYXI wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubve_test.pdf+SIEC-'-test&hl=en&gl- uk&ct=clnk&cd=lO [Accessed 22/02/061. 
° Case No IV/M.3280, Afr FranceJKLM. Commission Decision of February 11,2004, D2005 49. 
This case allowed Air France to acquire control of KLM. The Commission identified competition 
concerns in several flight routes (Paris-Amsterdam and Europe-US). The parties offered 
commitments: freeing up 94 slots a day to competitors. This would restore competition as flyers 
would be offered more choice and competitors would have the chance to enter the market. The 
Commission then cleared the transaction, establishing it as the third largest airline company in the 
world.(Rapid, Press Release, Commission clears merger between Air France and KLM subject to 
conditions. IP/041194/ Available from: 
http://europaeu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=jp/o4/l 
 94 [Accessed 13/09108]). 
171 Weitbncht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004 - An Overview. E.CLR. 26(2), 2005:67-74, 
rnEJ.,tle; Commission Regulation 802t2004, Implementing Council Regulation I 39t2004 [2004] 
OJ.L 133/1,at20. 
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efficiencies which was evident both in the original Regulation and the application 
of the Merger Control Regulation by the Commission was diminished by the 
publication of these documents. It must be noted, however, that although "... the 
new legislation constitutes a vital step in the direction of awarding efficiencies a 
proper role in the EU merger control ... greatly improves clarity ... and enhances 
legal certainty", the principle of efficiencies remains absent from the legally-
binding segment of the Regulation and package of merger control. 173 As Kocmut 
points out, the lack of efficiencies in the "legislative package" and the lack of a 
legal base to appraise concentrations partly "diminishes the importance of 
efficiency concerns in the appraisal of concentrations ... and ... The weight of 
such claims is adversely affected.Th 
 As the principle of efficiencies is only 
mentioned in the Preamble of the Merger Control Regulation and the Guidelines 
(which are not legally binding) merely "consolidate and explicate the provisional 
directions laid by the Commission's past decisions", the Commission retains a 
certain amount of interpretative flexibility in this area and in the pathway their 
attitude towards the merit and significance of efficiencies may take in fixture 
appraisals. 175 Whilst Roller and de La Mano note that "[E] fficiencies continue to 
play a negligible or hidden role in either Phase 1 or Phase 2 merger 
investigations", 176 they do, however, point to one "notable exception": Proctor & 
Gamble/Gillette. In this investigation the Commission consider that clearing this 
transaction may "... bring efficiencies to retailers and customers, for example, 
[retailers] benefit from having only one partner to negotiate with ...". Nevertheless 
it was buying power not efficiencies that counteracted portfolio effects.' 77 
Kocmut C. Efficiency Considerations and Merger Control - Quo Vadis, Commission. E.C.LK 
27(1), 2006: 19-27. 
"4 Kocmut. C. Efficiency Considerations and Merger Control - Quo Vadis, Commission. E.C.Llt 
27(I), 2006: 19-27; Rickard, S. European Merger Reform, mt. Company and Commercial Law 
Review, 2002: 408. 
'"Koemut. C. Efficiency Considerations and Merger Control - Quo Vadis, Commission. E.C.LR. 
27(l), 2006: 19-27. 
' 76 Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available thm: 
http:/t72. 14.207. 104/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYX I wi:europa.eu.int/comni/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantive_testpdf+SIEC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd= 10 [Accessed 22/02/061, 18. 
'"Roller; L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact oft/ic New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14107.1 04/searcb?rcache:39_M6OUYX I wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantivetestdf+SIEC+test&hl=en&g1=uk&ct='clnk&cd= 10 [Accessed 22/02/06]; Weithrecht, A. 
EU Merger Control in 2005 - An Overview. E.C.L R. 27(2), 2006:43-50. 
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In Korsnas/ADCartonboard and Inco/Falconbridge'78 the Commission 
clarified the position of efficiencies within the merger regulation framework In 
these cases the Commission, in line with the Horizontal Guidelines, assessed the 
extent to which the efficiencies generated by these two transactions would 
counteract negative competitive effects. In Korsnas/ADCartonboar4 both 
countervailing buying power and increased efficiencies were cited as reasons for 
clearance of the acquisition. 179 Although the Commission was not in a position to 
fully assess the efficiency claims in the Phase I investigation, it found, however, 
that efficiencies could be gained. The Commission concluded that the acquisition 
would generate efficiencies by increasing price competition between the market 
leader, StoroEnso and the merged entity. The Commission found that synergies 
would be made as the merged entity would be able to increase production of LPB. 
Taking into consideration a new agreement with one of its customers and a lack of 
opposition from their existing customers, the Commission concluded that 
efficiencies would result as a consequence of the transaction and the effects would 
be passed on to the consumer. The Commission also decided that the substantiated 
efficiencies would ensure that competition would not be impeded as a consequence 
of non-coordinated effects. 180 It appears, therefore, that the efficiencies will be 
considered by the Commission in terms of the potential impact they will have for 
the consumer. 
Inco/Falconbridge'8 ' involved the takeover of Falconbridge Limited by Inco 
Limited. Both are Canadian mining companies with interests in the mining, 
refinement and sale of nickel and other precious metals. This transaction would 
have created the largest mining operation company in the world. Ultimately, 
however, Inco's bid failed and the merger collapsed. 182  This case, however, is the 
' Case No. COMP/M.4000, IncolFakonbridge, Brussels, 04/07t2006. Available from: 
http://ec.eropaeu/cmm/competition/merS&decisions/m40002006070420600en.pdf  
[Accessed 07/07/07]. involved the takeover of two Canadian mining companies: Falconbridge 
Limited by Inco Limited. This transaction would have created the largest mining operation company 
in the world. Ultimately, however, Inco's bid tailed and the merger collapsed 
'Karlsson, J. Clearance of a Near-Duopoly. E.C.L.R. 27(9), 2006: 514-518. 
' 80 Karlsson, J. Clearance ofaNear-Duopoly. E.C.LR. 27(9), 2006: 514-518. 
' 81 Case No. COMP/M.4000, inco/Fakonbridge, Brussels, 04/07t2006. 
Boeshertz, C. et aL lnco/Falconbridge: A nickel mine of application in efficiencies and remedies. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2006:41. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competitionipublicaiion*pnJcpn20063.pdf 
 [Accessed 07/07/071. 
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first time that the Commission has considered the impact of efficiencies in detail 
and so provides an interesting insigtit into the way the Commission intends to deal 
with their application. The parties claimed that the merger would generate 
efficiencies due to the closeness of their mines and processing plants in the Sudbury 
Basin which would enable their resources to be combined, resulting in lower 
production costs. These reductions could be passed on to nickel customers. The 
parties claimed that these efficiencies would offset any anti-competitive effects of 
the tmnsaction.' 
Whilst the Commission acknowledged that the merger would facilitate 
significant operating efficiencies, these efficiencies were not merger specific - the 
same efficiencies could be achieved without the anti-competitive effects that the 
merger would precipitate. The Commission felt that the same savings/efficiencies 
could be achieved if Inco and Falconbridge entered into a joint-venture in the 
mining and processing of nickel, rather than a fill scale merger. This would allow 
the two parties to continue to compete in the nickel refining and marketing markets. 
The Commission also considered that consumers of end-nickel products would not 
benefit from the cost-savings achieved by the merger in the markets identified as 
having competition concerns)M 
 As cost-savings could be made during the up-
stream mining and during the processing stage, the savings would not be directed 
just to the customers of the three markets where competition concerns were 
identified but spread amongst all the nickel and cobalt markets. The transaction 
would also place the new company in a monopolistic position, with very little 
competitive pressure and so it would not have any incentive to distribute any 
benefits gained from the identified efficiencies to customers in these markets. 185 
'Boeshei'tz., C. ci al. Inco/Falconbridge: A nickel mine of application in efficiencies and remedies. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2006: 41. Available from: 
http://ec.europaeulcomScompelition/pubIicationscpn/cpiQoo63.pdf 
 [Accessed 07/07/071. 
84 Boeshertz, C. ci al. lnco/Falconbridge: A nickel mine of application in efficiencies and remedies. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2006: 46. Available from: 
http://ec.europaeu/comm/competitionlpublications/cpn/cpn20063.pdf 
 [Accessed 07/07107]. 
' Boeshertz, C. et al. lnco/Falconbridge: A nickel mine of application in efficiencies and remedies. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autwnn 2006: 41. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competitionipublicatiorsjcpnfcpn200o3.pdf 
 [Accessed 07/07/07]. 
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This is the first case where the parties outline the potential operating 
efficiencies in detail. The Commission examined these claims, and, whilst 
acknowledging that efficiencies would be made as a consequence of the merger, 
decided that these savings were not merger-specific, would not directly benefit the 
consumers in the affected markets and therefore the synergies achieved by the 
acquisition could not be used to offset or justi& the anti-competitive effects of the 
transaction. Clearly the Commission is determined to examine the potential 
efficiencies which parties feel would offset anti-competitive effects of the merger. 
In particular the Commission focuses upon the potential effect the efficiencies 
would have upon the merger (cost-savings etc) and upon customers in affected 
markets. 86 
Prior to the entry into force of the NMR, the impact of the concentration upon 
competitors took precedence over the potential benefit the transaction would have 
for consumers. As a consequence of the adoption of the NMR and the increasing 
use of economic analysis, "[TJhe issue of taking efficiency into consideration in 
Community merger control policy seems to be of primordial importance toda'.' 8' 
The analyses of Roller and de La Mano, and Weitbrecht and Kocmut's merely 
theoretical analysis of the impact of efficiencies, highlights the fact that, although 
the merging parties can use the efficiency defence, there is little incentive to do so - 
hence the lack of empirical analysis. The Commission's identification of 
dominance appears to be sufficient to challenge horizontal mergers where there are 
competition concerns, whilst with vertical mergers, where equilibrium effects are 
taken into account, the impact of the NMR is visible.' 
Boeshectz, C. et al. IncolFalconbridge: A nickel mine of application in efficiencies and remedies. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2006: 41. Available from: 
htlp://ec.eumpa.eu/comnilcompetition/publications/cpWcpn20063.pdf  [Accessed 07/07/07]. 
Va1lindas, U. New Directions in EC Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control. E.LJ, 12 
(5), 2006: 535-660, 655. 
' Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. 1 
 04/search?q=cache:39 M60UYX I wJ:europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubstanfivetestpdf+SIEC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&c&= 10 [ACceSSed 221021061, IS, found one 
case after the sample ended. 
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3.7 Remedies: Structural v. Behavioural 
"In the early days of the EC Merger Control Regulation, the Commission 
adopted a strict rule against behavioural commitments and typically considered that 
structural' 89 remedies should involve divestiture of a business". 190 As 
commented, "... the Commission's guidance as to what types of commitments 
would be likely to remedy the situation is increasingly more stringent and 
demanding". The divestiture procedure was seen as an efficient way of protecting 
or restoring "effective competition".' 92 The Commission laid out the "up front-
buyer procedure" in its "Standard Model for Divestiture Commitments".' 93 In 
several cases the Commission required the parties to find a buyer, in certain cases 
the transaction had to be near completion or completed before the original merger 
could be cleared.' In Masterfoods/Royal Canine' 95 the parties' commitments were 
premised upon the divestiture of several of their pet food brands to an "up-front 
'Although the Regulations and Notices do not define either structural or behavioural remedies, 
the CFJ, in Gencor provides clarification. Structural remedies were defined as "commitment to 
reduce the market share of the entity arising from the concentration by the sale of a subsidiary." The 
2005 Remedies Study identifies the endowment of exclusive licenses and access to privileged 
infbrmation to third parties as alternatives to divestiture. Other structural remedies, established in 
Gencor, "include severing structural links between competitors, terminating an alliance, granting a 
long-term lease of manuthcturing facilities, and terminating long-term supply or exclusive 
distribution agreements". Behavioural commitments are not as clear cut. Went provides examples 
of behavioural remedies: "commitments not to price discriminate, not to use a trade mark for a 
period, to offer to supply products to third parties, not to assert intellectual property rights, not to 
engage in tying practices, not to enter into exclusive or long-term contracts, and to give customers an 
option to terminate long-term supply contracts". Went, U. The Acceptibilities of Remedies under 
the EC Regulatioit Structural versus Behavioural. E.C.LR. 27(8), 2006: 455475. 
'° Went, D. The Acceptibilities of Remedies under the EC Regulation: Structural versus 
Behavioural. E.C.L.P, 27(8), 2006: 455475. 
"'Winckler, A. Some Comments on Procedures and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger Control. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 219-
232, 225. 
Winck]er, A. Some Comments on Procedures and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger Control. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 219-
232; Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 and 
under Commission Regulation (EC) No. 447/98 OJ C 68,02/03/2001: 3, para.l 3. 
Winckler, A. Some Comments on Procedures and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger ControL World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 219-
232, 226. 
Winckler, A. Some Comments on Procedures and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger Control. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 219-
232 
t95 Case No COMP IV/M.2544, Master Foods/Royal Canine, 15/02/02, pans 90 and 100-102. The 
Commission conditionally cleared the acquisition of Royal Canine by Master Foods subject to the 
requirement that certain brands were divested. 
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buyer" prior to the closure of the original tz-ansaction, 196  whilst in 
WorldCom/MC1, 197 although the Conmiission had not demanded an up-front buyer 
to form part of the notifying parties commitments, the parties, as part of theft 
proposed commitments, stated that the divestiture of certain businesses was 
dependent upon the Commission clearing the proposed transaction. 198  Notifying 
parties have also proposed alternative "crown jewel" provisions. In Nestle/Ralston 
Purina'99  the Commission accepted the proposed divestiture of Ralston Purina's 
holdings in a joint-venture, Gallina Blanca Purina JV, as an alternative commitment 
and a fail safe, in case the parties failed to license the Friskies brands in Spain by a 
specific date or by the close of the transaction. 200 
 Over time, however, that position 
has "softened", with the Commission more willing to consider more flexible 
alternatives to divestiture. As noted by Went, the Commission has accepted that 
behavioural remedies can "... have a structural effect on the market". 2o ' Although 
structural remedies are still regarded by the Commission as preferable to 
behavioural remedies, the latter are still preferable to the possibility of prohibition 
of the transaction. Additionally, as observed by Weitbrecht, 202 after the scathing 
criticism of the Commission by the CFL, the Commission has focused upon 
accommodation: "clearing mergers subject to remedies wherever possible". The 
'i" Winckler, A. Some Comments on Procedures and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger Control. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 219-
232,226. 
Case No COMP IV/ M.1069 WorldComJMCJ. 8/07/1998 (1999 03 LI 16/1), pans 136-8. The 
Commission conditionally cleared the transaction, subject to MCI's divestiture of its internet 
business. 
' Winckler, A. Some Comments on Procedures and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger Control. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 219-
232, 226. 
'° Case No COMP IV/M.2337, NesilélRalston Purina. 27/07/2001, Oi C 179. In the 
Nestle/Ralston Purina case, the Commission cleared Nestle SA to acquire Ralston Purina, subject to 
certain conditions in relation to the Spanish, Italian and Greek markets. To allay Commission 
concerns relating to the continued competitiveness of the Spanish pet food market, Nestle offered the 
Commission two possible remedies to prevent distortion of competition - either to grant an exclusive 
licence for "Friskies" branded cat food and divest the Castellbisbal production site, or, to divest 
Ralston Purina's 500/o stake in a joint venture with Agrolimen SA - Gallina Blanca Purina In 
Greece and Italy, the concentration would giant licenses for "Chow", Ralston Purina's branded pet 
food. In both situations, divestiture would include goodwill, marketing and public relations assets. 
Nestle/Ralston Purina would not be permitted to reintroduce or market the licensed brands for five 
ars after the licence period's expiry date. 
Winckler, A. Some Comments on Procedures and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger Control. World Competition, 26(2), 2003:219-
232, 228; Case No COMP IV/M.2337, Nestlé/Ralston Purina, 27/07/2001, OJ C 179. 
20T Went, V. The Acceptibilities of Remedies under the EC Regulation: Structural versus 
Behavioural. E.C,LP, 27(8), 2006: 455-475,455. 
202 Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004 — An Overview. £C.L.R. 26(2), 2005:67-74. 
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application of remedies is a crucial tool in the Commission's merger regulation 
toolkit, because, as Paas speculated, 203 a large number of mergers would have been 
prohibited without them. 
Weitbrecht204 noted the Commission's more accommodating approach was 
underway, prior to the entry in to force of the NMR. In Lagardère1Natexis/VUP1205 
for example, the Commission, despite refusing a request for a partial referral, 
approved Lagardére's acquisition of Vivendi Universal Publishing (VIJP). Vivendi 
is the leader in the French publishing market whilst Lagardere, who also owns 
Hachette, is the second largest company in the market. This merger, according to 
the Commission, would have created an entity which was seven times larger than its 
nearest competitor, controlling access to the "raw material (well-known writers) and 
access to sales outlets". 206 Lagardêre, therefore, was permitted to acquire 40% of 
VUP's assets which related to academic and reference books. 
After the CFJ judgments of 2002, the Commission tried to avoid further 
humiliation and lengthy court cases by employing remedies which are both strict 
yet innovative. 207 The Commission, as observed by Weitbrecht, used remedial 
action as a means to open up regulated markets. The Commission had previously 
expressed concern about structural impediments - the restriction and scarcity of take 
off and landing slots - restricting competition in the air transportation market, due to 
the bi-lateral agreements between Member States and third countries. In Air 
France/KLM therefore, the Commission required Air France and KLM to give up 
some of these slots, which allowed the creation of 31 new flights a thy, and to enter 
into "intermodal agreements" with different types of transportation companies in 
order to encourage individuals to fly one way and to make the return journey by, for 
203 Paas, A. Non-Structural Remedies in EU Merger ControL E.C.LR. 27(5), 2006: 209-216. 
°' Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004—An Overview. &C.LR. 26(2), 2005:67-74. 
Case No COMP IV/M.2978, LagarderelVUP. 7/01l 2004. After the referral back was rejected 
by the Commission, the Commission initiated an in-depth investigation exanfming the proposed 
acquisition of VUP by Lagardere. As these are the two largest publishers of French language text 
books, the Commission expressed dominance concerns. Lagardtre could only puithase 40 9/o of 
VUP's reference and academic portfolio. 
Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004—An Overview. &C.LR. 26(2), 2005:67-74. 
207 Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004— An Overview. EC.L.R. 26(2), 2005:67-74. 
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example, train. The Dutch and French national regulatory authorities will widen 
cabotage rights to other companies wishing to stop over in their airports 
Prior to the entry into force of the NMR, the Commission was already 
utilising behavioural remedies. In Areva/Urenco/ETC, 202 for example, the parties 
wanted to enter into a joint-venture in order to develop and manufacture centrifuges 
for the enrichment of uranium. The Commission expressed concern that this 
transaction would place Areva and Urenco in a joint dominant position in the EU 
uranium enrichment market. The Commission approved the merger, subject to the 
following commitments: the introduction of measures which would prevent the 
exchange of commercially sensitive information between Areva and tirenco; 
increased monitoring by the European Supply Agency and the parties agreement to 
supply the Agency with any additional information needed for it to monitor the 
"provision and pricing of enriched uranium". 
After the entry into force of the NMR, the Commission has continued with 
this flexible approach towards commitments, with remedial action being the tool of 
choice rather than the outright prohibition of a merger. "[A]s a result, [of the entry 
into force of the NMR] merging parties have flexibility in proposing remedies that 
address and are proportional to the competition concern raised by the 
transaction". 209 
The application of the NMR by the Commission illustrates that although 
commitments are preferable to a prohibition of a merger, the tool most used is still 
either divestiture or the termination of contracts to other companies. 21° The two 
related transactions involved in the acquisition of Allied Domecq plc by Pernod 
Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004 - An Overview. &C.LR. 26(2), 2005: 67-74; Rapid 
Press Release, Commission clears uranium enrichment equipment joint venture between ARE VA and 
Urenco. Relirence: IP/04/1 189 Date: 06/10/2004. The Commission approved this venture 
between AREVA and Urenco subject to the condition that the two parties continued to act 
independently after the transaction. 
209 Went, D. The Acceptibilities of Remedies under the EC Regulation: Structural versus 
Behavioural. KC.LR . 27(8), 2006: 455-475. 
210Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005 — An Overview. &CLR. 27(2), 2006:43-50. 
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Ricard SA21 ' and the simultaneous divestiture of certain Allied brands to Fortune 
Brands,212 for example, were approved by the Commission subject to the divestiture 
of certain whisky brands and the cancellation of Moet & Chandon and Dom 
Perignon distribution agreements in Portugal. Behavioural remedies, however, are 
being used. In the PiaggiolAprilia and Total/Gaz de France decisions, for example, 
behavioural remedies were accepted by the Commission. In the Piaggo decision, 
remedies were accepted by the Commission as they felt that purely structural 
remedies were "unrealistic". Instead Piaggio's promise to supply four stroke 
engines to competitors was seen as sufficient to restore competition to the market. 
Whilst Total promised to improve/increase access to its gas storage and 
transmission facilities, these remedies were used to ensure that the transaction did 
not contravene the objectives of the Second Gas Directive?' 3 This case also 
highlights how the Commission cannot operate in a vacuum when applying the 
NMR, but must take into account European legislation in that particular area. The 
Commission imposed remedies which actually went further than required by the EU 
and French legislation governing competitors and new entrants' access to natural 
gas facilities, as it felt these laws failed to provide enough protection for 
competitors in terms of access to facilities. 2t4 Behavioural remedies included Total 
publishing transportation and gas storage capacities on their website, the 
development of a secondary market through the sale of storage and transportation 
capacities and the introduction of a points policy, to ensure that the capacity 
bookings are not merely booked as a means of preventing other competitors using 
the facilities. 2t5 Although "traditional" remedies are used by the Commission in 
order to restore the competitive balance of a market, behavioural remedies are, in 
211 Case No COMP IV/M. 3779 Pernod Rican/IA/lied Domecq, D(2005) 202800, 24/06t2005. 
Subject to conditions and obligations, Pemod was permitted to acquire Allied, as long as certain 
distribution agreements were cancelled and whisky and brandy brands sold off. 
212 l,id Press Release: Commission approves acquisition ofAl/iedDomecq by PernodRicar4 
Subject to Conditionc. Reference: 1P105/792 Date: 24/0612005. Available from: 
httjrJ/europae&rapidlpressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/O5/792 [Accessed 13/01120071. 
2I3 Rivery, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - Total! CIaz Dc France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. KCL1L 26(11), 2005: 624-637, 627. 
114 De Riveiy, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - Total! Gaz Dc France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. E.C.LK 26(11), 2005: 624-637. 
215 De Rivery, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - TotalI Gaz Dc France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. ECLJL 26(11), 2005: 624-637. 
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certain circumstances, becoming an acceptable alternative to potential prohibition, 
ensuring that a transaction can proceed without impeding competition. 
Now, in order to avoid any more scathing criticism at the hands of the 
judiciary, the Commission takes a "risk-averse, middle-of-the-road" 6 approach to 
the appraisal of transactions. As Lowe observed, there was a "great deal of 
continuity" between the old and new system, whilst Roller and de La Mano 
considered that "there is no evidence of a radical change in the way the 
Commission assesses the competitive effects of mergers"?' 7 Monti observed that 
whilst the reform of the substantive test has reinforced the effectiveness of the 
merger regulation framework, there is now little to distinguish between the 
American and EU system as both are premised upon "sound economics", have SLC 
tests and can take efficiencies into account when evaluating the effects of a 
transaction. 218 The NMR, however, still represents a critical juncture, but is a step 
rather than a radical change in the evolution of EU merger regulation policy, in 
terms of normative dimension and formal policy path dependency. In relation to 
the introduction of the new substantive test, it formalised the move towards the 
effects-based approach, placing less emphasis upon structural factors. 219 Whilst 
Monti considered the discussion between the old and new test as "semantic" as 
dominance is retained as the main test for assessing a transaction's compatibility 
with the Common Market, ° the dynamics and focus of the Commission's 
investigation now place less emphasis upon structural issues such as market share. 
': 6 Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004 — An Overview. KC.LR. 26(2), 2005: 67-74. 
2"Roller, L. M. & M. de L.a Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14.207. I 04/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYX lwJ:europa.eu.intfcomm/dgs/competition/new_s 
ubsvetpdf+SIEC+test&hlen&gl=ukAct=clnic&cd=10 [Accessed 22/02/06]; Lowe, P. EC 
Merger Regulation: Is there Really a New Approach? EC Competition Day, Vienna, 2006 EC 
Competition Day. Available from: http://www.competition06.com/NR/rdonJyres/HE2DDlE3-
SFA3-48CE-A333-D 13651 5D1 FE4/25532/PhilipLoweslides l9June2006 Vienna.pdf (Accessed 
14/0 1/08). 
... Monti, M. A refbnned competition policy: achievements and challenges for the future. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2004:6. Available from: 
htlp://ec.europa.eu/comm/competitionlpublications/cpn/cpn20043.pdf 
 [Accessed 11/07/07]. 
219 Lowe, P. EC Merger Regulation: Is (here Really a New Approach? EC Competition Day, 
Vienna, 2006 EC Competition Day. Available from: 
hup://www.competitiono6.com/NR/rdonlyres/BE2DD 
 I E3-5FA3-48CE-A333- 
DI 3651 5D1 FE4t25532/PhilipLoweslides l9June2006Vienna.pdf (Accessed 14/01/08). 
no Monti, M. A refbrmcd competition policy, achievements and challenges for the future. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2004:6. Available from: 
http://ec.eaeu/comm/competition/publications/cpnicpn20043.pdf  [Accessed 11/07/07]. 
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More importance is placed upon analysis of the impact that non-coordinated effects 
of a transaction may have not only for the merging parties but also for their rivals. 
The identification of dominance is sufficient justification for the Commission 
to challenge a horizontal merger whilst the Commission has incorporated 
equilibrium effects analysis into its investigation of vertical mergers. The 
principles of efficiencies has also been clearly formalised within the merger 
regulation framework, although there is a lack of case-law in this area which could 
be used to analyse how the Commission will interpret and apply this device. The 
propensity of the Commission in utilising dominance as justification to challenge a 
merger may dissuade merging parties from presenting efficiency claims/defence, 
because as Roller and de La Mano note, "if efficiencies cannot trump findings of 
dominance, it is best to focus on rebutting such finding"?' The NMR, therefore, 
closes the unanticipated "enforcement gap" which developed as an unanticipated 
consequence of the original Merger Control Regulation. The revised Merger 
Control Regulation allows the Commission to take into account the effect of the 
impact of non-coordinated effects of a transaction in cases where there is no clear 
cut market leader. 
3.8 Procedural Issues 
3.8.1. More Flexible Notification Procedure/Timetable 
Prior to the entry into force of the NMR, concentrations had to be notified to 
the Commission within a week of notification of an agreement. tm The Total/Gaz 
decision "can be regarded as concrete illustration of the 2004 reforms of the 
European merger control framework.m 
 This is the first case of the parties 
noti1'ing the Commission of a proposed rather than a final transaction. Instead of 
presenting the Commission with a final agreement, the parties presented a Protocole 
d'Accord, a framework agreement between Total and Gaz to enter into several 
221 Monti, M. A reformed competition policy: achievements and challenges for the future. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2004:6. Available from: 
hllp://ec.europaeu/conun/competitio&publicatjopcjcppJcpraoo43.pdf (Accessed 11/07/071. 
222 
 EUR-lex, Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings. OJ L 395, 30/12/1989: 0001 - 0012. 
223 De Rivery, M. D. & V. (3uerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - Total/ Gaz De France: Merger 
Control as a Too) to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. E.CL.It 26(11), 2005: 624-637. 627. 
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agreements between the two parties. Although the framework agreement did not 
mention any financial considerations, it did, however, outline the desired outcome 
of the transaction and a variety of key issues? 24 
Again, emphasis is placed upon enhanced flexibility of the merger regulation 
framework. Whilst this provision is not reliant upon its application by the 
Commission rather than by the notiing parties themselves, it does, however, 
reflect the recognition of the need to accommodate the needs of the noti1'ing 
parties. 
3.8.2. Simplified Procedure 
The simplified procedure is applicable to certain types of concentrations, 
which the Commission considers to be unproblematic and thus unlikely to impede 
competition. Examples of transactions being cleared by the Commission on the 
basis of the procedure prior to the entry into force of the NMR, included Shy 
Holdings/NPM Capital and HVB/Commerzbanke/Deutche Bank/Dresdner Bank 725 
The Commission published a new Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for 
treatment of certain concentrations pursuant to Council Regulation No. 139/2004, 
which replaced the original Notice. 116 Several transactions have recently been 
cleared by the Commission using the simplified merger review procedure. These 
include the acquisition of Sitel by Onex and the acquisition of Nordkalk by 
Ahistrom Capital and Rettig CapitaL 117 
3.8.3. Stop-the-Clock 
Regulation 4064/89 established very tight timetables and a two phase 
procedure for the application of the merger regulation framework, which as 
224 1k Rivety, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - Total/ Gaz Dc France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. E.C.LR. 26(11), 2005: 624-637. 
Case COMP/M.2146 - SIlL' Holdings/NPM Capital; Case COMP/M.2039 
IIVB/Commerz/,an.kgJDeujche Ban/cjDpesdnerBwit 
Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005 - An Overview. E.CLR. 27(2), 2006: 43-50. 
W,id Press Release, Midday Eapress of2006-12-22., Reference: MEXJO611222 Date: 22/1212006. 
Available from: 
222&fonnat=HTML&age4=O&Ianguage= 
EN&guiLanguageen [Accessed 19/04/071. 
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Andreangeli 8 
 pointed out, "turned out to be too much of a good thing", and turned 
into a "straightjacket" for all concerned in the investigation. As Winckler? 29 
highlighted in a minority of complex cases, the Commission's application of the 
merger rules was constrained by the strict timetable, as the MiT acted as negotiator, 
economic analyst, applying the DI, and "adopt[ed] realistic and enforceable 
complex remedies packages within the pre-established deadlines". In Tetra Laval v 
the Commission the CFI was extremely critical of the Commission's procedures in 
relation to the appraisal of commitments, highlighting flaws in the way proposed 
mergers were appraised by the Commission and its application of econometric 
models? 0 
 Due to the time constraints involved, remedies or commitments could 
have placed parties in a weak position, as "objective market testing of the modified 
proposals became 'extremely difficult and unpredictable"? In 
Schneider/LegrantP2 the notifying parties presented commitments which they 
presumed would counterbalance the competition concerns presented in the 
Statement of Objections (SO). The Commission, however, identified competition 
concerns which had not previously been identified in the original SO and so the 
notifying parties had not included commitments to address these concerns. Even so 
the Commission did not extend the timetable to allow the parties to discuss revised 
commitments.233 The Commission's decision was later overturned by the CFI. The 
time constraints came under increasing scrutiny and there was a general consensus 
that the strict deadlines placed the parties to the transaction, in a weak bargaining 
Andreangeli, A. Fairness and Timing in Merger Control Proceedings: Will the Stop-The-Clock 
Clause Work? E.C.LR. 26(7), 2005: 403-409. 
229 Winekler, A. Some Comments on Procedures and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger Control. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 219-
232, 220. 
Th0 Andreangeli, A. Fairness and Timing in Merger Control Proceedings: Will the Stop-The-Clock 
Clause Work? E.C.LR. 26(7), 2005: 403409. 
231 
 Andreangeli, A. Fairness and Timing in Merger Control Proceedings: Will the Stop-The-Clock 
Clause Work? E.C.L R. 26(7), 2005: 403-409, quoting Winckler, A. Some Comments on Procedures 
and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger 
Control. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 219-232. 
232 Case No COMPIM.2283, Schneider/Legrand 30 January 2002, quoted by Winckler, A. Some 
Comments on Procedures and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: Something Rotten in the 
Kingdom of the EC Merger Control. World Competition; 26(2), 2003: 219-232. 
233Winckler, A. Some Comments on Procedures and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger Control. World Conspetlilon, 26(2), 2003: 219-
232. 
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position, encouraging them to accept the remedies proposed by the Commission, 
due to the longevity of any possible appeal to the CFL 
The introduction of the "stop-the-clock" provision in Art. 10(3), 2nd. 
subparagraph of the New Merger Control Regulation, allows both the parties and 
the Commission to request extensioni 5 (although the Commission must have the 
permission of the parties). As noted by Winckler, the original Merger Control 
Regulation permitted the Commission to extend the timetable in "exceptional 
circumstances". In TellalTelenor, the Commission granted a one-week extension 6 
and in Oracle/PeopleSofi,'37 the Commission suspended the investigation twice and 
the review period was extended by about 6 months? 8 The insertion of Article 
10(3) in the recast Regulation, as Winck1er 9 anticipated and Andreangeli 
observed,'° adds an element of flexibility to the new merger policy regime, 
reflecting a desire to accommodate the notit,'ing parties and to ensure that there is 
time for negotiation for the Commission to consider the transaction and any 
proposed commitments, hence avoiding rather (lengthy) standoffs in the courts. 
234Andreangel4 A. Fairness and Timing in Merger Control Proceedings: Will the Stop-The-Clock 
Clause Work? E. CL.R. 26(7), 2005: 403409, pain. 32: 199-200. 
235"The periods set by the first subparagraph shall likewise be extended if the nolitjiing parties make 
a request to that effect not later than 15 working days after the initiation of proceedings pursuant to 
Article 6(1 Xc). The notil'ing parties may make only one such request. Likewise, at any time 
fiAlowing the initiation of proceedings, the periods set by the first subparagraph may be extended by 
the Commission with the agreement of the notil'ing parties. The total duration of any extension or 
extensions effected pursuant to this subparagraph shall not exceed 20 working days". 
Winclder, A. Some Comments on Procedures and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger Control. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 219-
232. 225. 
Wse COMP/M.32 16 OraclelPeopleSofi. Oracle, the second largest software company sought to 
acquire PeopleSoft. Due to the complexities of the case and the associated difficulties finding the 
information required by the Commission and the fist turnover of staff at Oracle, the Commission 
allowed a 6 month suspension period. 
235 Botteman, Y. Mergers, Standard of Proof and Expert Economic Evidence. 2. J .Competition L. & 
Econ. 71, 2006: FN 28. Article II allowed the Commission to suspend proceedings until the correct 
documentation had been presented by the parties. 
239 Winckler, A. Some Comments on Procedures and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger Control. World Competition, 26(2), 2003: 219-
232. 
'° Andreangeli, A. Fairness and Timing in Merger Control Proceedings: Will the Stop-The-Clock 
Clause Work? &CLR. 26(7), 2005:403-409. 
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In the E.ON/MOL investigation, for example, the notifying parties requested 
an extension to the timetable, and the Commission was in agreement. 24' As the 
E.ON/MOL case illustrates, Article 10 acts as a "potential safety valve", 242 as both 
sides will enter into discussion, triangular or state of play meetings as the 
investigative timetable is now more flexible. The insertion of Article 10 (3) allows 
the Commission to consider proposed transactions and correctly apply complex 
econometric models without such pressure of time constraints etc, because as the 
American Chamber of Commerce to the EU observed, each submission would 
probably weigh over 180kg, and is the equivalent of a length of 8 metres. A typical 
year's worth of submissions, therefore, would equate to 53 tons and 2.5 km.243 
Article 10, as noted by Mdreangeli, 2" must be "read in conjunction" with the 
new Best Practice Guidelines which encourage the use of "state-of-play" and 
"triangular" meetings, which establish points of contact and information for the 
parties and keeps the Commission in the loop of discussion, encouraging debate, 
negotiation and greater transparency. The introduction of Article 10 has added an 
element of flexibility into the merger regulation framework. The introduction of 
these provisions is past of a multifarious set of measures designed to enhance the 
"fairness and transparency of the enforcement regime". 245 The introduction of this 
clause, as noted by Andreangeli,246 is likely to quell the concerns of both industry 
and the House of Commons Select Committee on the European Union, who have 
expressed their concerns about the tiinescale pressures the notifying parties are 
placed under during the appraisal of commitments. 
W Hearing Officer, Final Report of the Hearing Officer in Case Comp/M3696. OJ C223/12 
Available from: http://66. 102.9.1 04/search?q=cache:8Kv-8qqOWBMJ:eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do%3Furi%3D0J:C:2006:223:o0 12:001 3:EN:PDF+article+1 
0+merger+eu+parties+suspend+mcrger&hI=en&ct=clnk&cd=9&gi=ujc [Accessed 21/04/07]. 
'1 'Hearing Officer, Final Report of the Hearing Officer in Case CompiM. 3696. OJ C223112. 
Available from: httpJ/66. 102.9.1 04/search?q=cache:8Kv8qqOWBMJ:eur 
Iex.europa.euxUriSev/IexUriSey.do%3FurioA3l)OJ:C:2006:223:00 12:0013 :ENPDF+aiticle-f I 
O+mergel*eu+parties+suspend+merger&hI=en&ct=clnk&cd=9&gl=uk [Accessed 21/04/071. 
AmCham EU, Position Paper on the Merger Implementing Regvlation , March II, 2004. 
Available from: httpJ/www.amchameu-be/PopsCO04archive/mergeffegO3tl2OO4.pdf [Accessed 
21/04/07]. 
AndreangeIi, A. Fairness and Timing in Merger Control Proceedings: Will the Stop-The-Clock 
Clause Work? E.C.LR. 26(7), 2005: 403-409. 
Andreangeli, A. Fairness and Tuning in Merger Control Proceedings: Will the Stop-The-Clock 
Clause Work? E.C.LR. 26(7), 2005: 403409. 
246 Andreangeli, A. Fairness and Timing in Merger Control Proceedings: Will the Stop-The-Clock 
Clause Work? E.CL.R. 26(7), 2005: 403409. 
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The introduction of this procedure represents a fairly radical change designed 
to remove the timescale pressures which have emerged for both sides as an 
unanticipated consequence of the application of the original Regulation. The 
introduction of the stop-the-clock procedure enables the notif'ing parties to have 
time to present considered commitments and evidence. The Commission now has 
time to consider these commitments when conducting an investigation. The 
application of the NMR by the Commission will not be under the same timescale 
pressures when appraising commitments and so it should be able to avoid a repeat 
of the stinging criticism dealt by the CFI in 2002. 
3.8.4. Ancifiary Restrictions 
The evolvement of EU merger policy in relation to the assessment of ancillary 
restrictions has been shaped by the Commission attempting to put the onus of this 
assessment upon national authorities in order to free up resources to deal with the 
"main competition law issues raised by a notifiable concentration". 24' The 
Preamble to the original Merger Control Regulation stated that: "Regulation should 
still apply where the undertakings concerned accept restrictions directly related and 
necessary to the implementation of the concentration", whilst Article 8 (2) required 
that "[t]he decision declaring the concentration compatible with the Common 
Market shall also cover the restrictions directly related and necessary to the 
implementation of the concentration". A further clause was inserted in 1997 
relating to Phase I decisions. These clauses which related to the appraisal of 
ancillary restrictions were introduced in order to avoid the instigation of parallel 
proceedings by the Commission under the Merger Control Regulation and Articles 
81 and 82 EC Treaty? 
Between 1990 and 2001 the Commission diligently followed its guidelines set 
out in the Notices on restrictions directly related and necessary to concentrations, 
"... usually reserv[ing] a few paragraphs under the heading of "Ancillary 
147 
	 G. & H. Armengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillazy Restrictions: 
Evotution of the European Commission's Policy. E.C.L.R. 26(9), 2005: 500-506. 
248 Metaxas, G. & H. Armengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillary Restrictions: 
Evolution of the European Commission's Policy. &C.L.R. 26(9), 2005: 500-506. 
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Restrictions" for the analysis of ancillary restrictions". 249 The restrictions which 
were outlined in the appraisal were included in the Commission's decision and 
those which did not fall under the scope of ancillary restrictions were considered 
separately under Articles 81 and 82 EC?50 
The 2001 (second) Notice, however, indicated a change in trajectory of policy 
concerned with the appraisal of ancillary restrictions. This Notice stated that the 
Commission was no longer going to appraise and consider ancillary restrictions on 
a formal basis as Articles 6(1) (b) and 8(2) already covered all restrictions which 
fell under the scope of the Merger Control Regulation and "were already cleared by 
operation of law, whether or not explicitly addressed in the Commission's 
decision".25 ' The 2001 Notice pushed for national courts to play an active role in 
adjudicating ancillary restraint disputes: 
"[d}isputes between the parties to a concentration as to whether restrictions 
are directly related and necessary to its implementation and thus 
automatically covered by the Commission's clearance decision fall under 
the jurisdiction of national courts."252 
In the Lagardere and Canal-i- case, 253 the CFI ruled that as the Commission 
alone was responsible for the appraisal of transactions, it was therefore also 
required to assess whether or not restrictions presented by the notifring parties to 
49 Metaxas, G. & H. Armengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillary Restrictions: 
Evolution of the European Commission's Policy. £ C.LR. 26(9), 2005: 500-506. 
° Metaxas, G. & FL Armengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillary Restrictions: 
Evolution of the European Commission's Policy. £C.LR. 26(9), 2005: 500-506. 
251 Metaxas, G. & H. Armengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillary Restrictions: 
Evolution of the European Commission's Policy. £C.LR. 26(9), 2005: 500-506. 
252 Metaxas, G. & H. Armengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillary Restrictions: 
Evolution of the European Commission's Policy. £C.LR. 26(9), 2005: 500-506. 
Case T-251/00 Lagardere SCA and Canal+ £4 v. Commission. The Commission had approved 
the joint venture between Lagardere Canal and Liberty Media. In its first decision the Commission 
approved the concentration, accepting certain non-compete clauses were necessary. In the second 
corrective decision, issued two weeks later, the Commission concluded that two of the clauses were 
not, in fact, ancillary and the main non-compete clause could only be considered ancillary for a 
limited period. Lagardere and Canal+ appealed to the CFL During the appeal the Commission (in 
an attempt to justify its position retroactively) issued a new Notice - " 2001 Ancillary Restraints 
Notice" stating that any assessment of ancillary restraints should by seen as declaratory rather than 
legally binding. The Commission argued that the appeal should be dismissed as ancillary restraints 
analysis/decisions were not contained within the operative part of the decision. The CFI, dismissing 
the Commission's argument, annulled the second decision stating that appeal by the parties was 
admissible because ancillary restrictions art legally binding in nature, as the Merger Regulation, by 
its very nature, was supposed to increase legal certainty. 
129 
An Appraisal of the Ewoptan Commission's Application of the New Maser Regulation 
the transaction were justifiable, necessary and actually needed as part of the 
transaction: 
"... when the parties to a concentration noti& the Commission of 
clauses as restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation 
of a concentration, they must be deemed to form an integral part of the 
transaction ... . [flaIling within the competence of the Commission, .. [it] 
must provide an adequate reply." 254  
The CFI ruled that national courts may share jurisdiction with the Commission in 
decisions that related to Article 81. 
The NMR clarifies the situation concerning the review of ancillary 
restrictions. 255 Although, as noted by Metaxas and Armengod,256 the provisions 
relating to ancillary restrictions differed only "slightly" from the old, they are still 
"legally significant". In Article 6(1) "shall cover" has been replaced by "shall be 
deemed to cover". The 21 Recital of the NMR states: 
"Commission decisions declaring concentrations compatible with the 
Common Market in application of this regulation should automatically 
cover such restrictions, without the Commission having to assess such 
restrictions ... . At the request of the undertakings concerned, however, the 
Commission should, in cases presenting novel or unresolved questions 
giving rise to genuine uncertainty, expressly assess whether or not any 
restriction is directly related to, and necessary for, the implementation of the 
concentration." 
In contrast to the Commission's approach to ancillary restrictions prior to the 
operationalisation of the NMR, the new Notice on the consideration of ancillary 
restrictions257 emphasises that restriction: must be "directly related"; must be 
economically linked to the transaction and must facilitate the shift to the new 
company post-merger. Whilst the non-competition clauses in relation to 
Metaxas, G. & H. Armengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillary Restrictions: 
Evohition of the European Commission's Policy. &C.L.R. 26(9), 2005: 500-506. 
5 Maudhuit, S. & T. Soames, Changes in EU Merger Control: Part 3. E.CL.R. 26(3), 2005: 144-
150. 
"6Metaxas, G. & H. Armengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillary Restrictions: 
Evolution of the European Commission's Policy. LC.LR . 26(9), 2005: 500-506, 504. 
°' DG Comp, Commission Notice on Restrictions Directly Related and Necessary to 
Concentrations. OJ C56, 5t312005: 24. 
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acquisitions remain unchanged from the previous Notice, nevertheless the non-
competition clauses in relation to joint-ventures, which prevent the parent company 
entering into competition with the joint-venture, were extended to encompass the 
time the joint-venture is in existence (rather than just the three years as specified by 
the previous Notice). The new Notice directly refers to the 21' Recital, reiterating 
the principle that "[d]isputes as to whether restrictions are directly related and 
necessary and thus automatically covered by the Commission's clearance 
decision may be resolved before national courts". The new ancillary restrictions 
policy is a "product of compromise". 253 The Commission's proposal for the NMR 
did not include provision for the Commission to consider even "novel and 
unresolved" issues relating to ancillary restrictions, indicating that they did not wish 
to be involved with the assessment of ancillary restrictions at all. 259 As the 
Commission is painfully aware of both the legal and political pitfalls inherent in the 
merger regulation/clearance system, the strict time constraints and deadlines 260 and 
increasing case load, mean that they are not keen to take on more work, assessing 
ancillary restrictions for every case. The principle of self assessment of ancillary 
restrictions by notifying parties is consistent with the ethos of the 2004 revision of 
the competition policy regime. 26 ' This places more emphasis and reliance upon the 
parties to the transaction to interact and cooperate proactively with regulatory 
authorities, hence the reliance upon self assessment of ancillary restrictions, more 
flexibility when notifying a proposed transaction and use of efficiencies to offset 
and justifj, anti-competitive mergers. 
In Airbus/SJTA, 262 the Commission, as noted by Metaxas and Armengod, 
discussed ancillary restrictions briefly and inconclusively? 
	 During the 
253 Metaxas, G. & H. Antiengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillary Restrictions: 
Evolution of the European Commission's Policy. E.C.LR. 26(9), 2005: 500-506, 205. 
" Metaxas, G. & H. Armengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillary Restrictions: 
Evolution of the European Commission's Policy. E.C.L.R. 26(9), 2005: 500-506. 
260 Metaxas, G. & H. Armengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillary Restrictions: 
Evolution of the European Commission's Policy. E.CLK 26(9), 2005: 500-506. 
Metaxas, G. & H. Arniengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillary Restrictions: 
Evolution of the European Commission's Policy. E.C.LR. 26(91 2005: 500-506. 
Case No. COMP/M.3657 Airbus/Sita/JV. The Commission cleared the joint venture between 
Airbus, an airplane manuthcturer, and SITA, a communications company, to establish a new 
venture: OnAir, which would enable the use of mobile phones and wifi etc onboard, concluding that 
the joint venture would not impede competition. 
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investigation, competitors argued that the creation of this joint venture would 
impede competition and limit consumer choice. The Commission approved the 
joint venture, making reference to the 3 year non-compete agreement between 
Airbus and SITA, stating that the agreement was compatible with the 2005 Notice. 
Metaxas and Armengod stated that the Commission's conclusions were distorted as 
the "references to the non-compete clause were heavily truncated in the public 
version ... . Therefore legal relevance ... of the Commission's brief comment is 
unclear". 2" 
The direction the Commission is taking in the application of the NMR and 
ancillary restrictions becomes more apparent in Tota!/Gaz De France. In this case 
Total sought the acquisition of certain assets of Gaz de France, which, prior to the 
transaction, were controlled jointly with Gaz de France, 265 namely natural gas assets 
in South West and Central France. The supply, transportation and storage contracts 
between Total and (iaz required to make the transaction viable, could, as noted by 
De Rivery and Guerard, be regarded as ancillary restrictions as "... they were 
intimately linked to the concentration and rais[ed] novel issues". 266  Instead of 
explicitly acknowledging and examining these contracts under the ancillary 
restrictions toolkit, however, the Commission only implicitly acknowledged theft 
importance, including the appraisal of the need for these contracts by their inclusion 
in the market enquiry/analysis. 267 
Clearly the 2004 revisions to the European merger policy regime marked a 
radical, although not unexpected, change in ancillary restrictions policy. The 
Commission had been pressing for a less hands on approach in relation to the 
assessment of ancillary restrictions. The onus (unless there are novel and 
Metaxas, U. & H. Armengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillary Restrictions: 
Evolution of the European Commission's Policy. &C.L.R. 26(9), 2005: 500-506. 
"Metaxas, U. & H. Annengod, EC Merger Regulation and the Status of Ancillary Resthctions 
Evolution of the European Commission's Policy. &C.L.R. 26(9), 2005: 500-506. 
26 See De Riveiy, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - Tota]/ (iaz 1k France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. &C.LR 26(11), 2005: 624-637 for 
background to this case. 
1k Riveiy, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - Total! Gaz Dc France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. KC.LIL 26(11), 2005: 624-637. 
Dc Rivery, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - Total! Gaz Dc France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. EL CL 1?. 26(11), 2005:624-637. 
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exceptional circumstances) is now placed upon self assessment. Analysis in this 
area, therefore, must now examine how the Commission interprets these new 
Guidelines and applies them. Although empirical evidence in this area remains 
scarce, at the moment it appears that the Commission is taking a flexible case-by-
case approach towards the analysis of ancillary restrictions. 
3,9. Commission as Facilitator 
The Commission plays a unique role in relation to merger policy, setting the 
systemic agenda, facilitating the exchange of ideas and establishing alternative 
institutional venues as forums for discussion. The Commission sets the systemic 
agenda by raising issues for discussion: for example, the Commission launched a 
public consultation initiative on a draft Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice which 
combines four existing Notices which were adopted in 1998 under the old Merger 
Control Regulation. 2M In accordance with the EU's adherence to the open method 
of coordination and increased transparency, the Conunission is the pivotal actor in 
the establishment of arenas where the discussion takes place. It facilitates the 
exchange of ideas by acting, as Wendon 269  conceptualises, as an "image 
entrepreneur". The Commission also establishes "alternative institutional venues". 
In this case interested parties could submit their views on the draft Notice by the 1g 
December 2006. The DG Comp will then publish contributions on their website. 
The Commission states that "the comments will be valuable input for the 
finalisation of the consolidated Jurisdictional Notice which is planned to be adopted 
by the Commission at the beginning of 2007 .270 
As per all other policy arenas, the Commission is responsible for the drafting 
of all documentation and has prime responsibility for the application of the NMR 
and associated Notices. The NMR gave the Commission more "power[s] of 
Rapid Press Release: Commission launches public consultation on consolidated guidance 
concerningjurisdiction in metget control. IP/06/1273, 28/09)2006. 
Wendon, B. The Commission as image venue entrepreneur in EU social policy. Journal ofEuropean 
Pubic Policy, 5 (2), 1998: 339-358: 343. 
270 DG Comp, Draft Commission Jurisdictional Notice. Available from: 
hlip://ec.europaeu/commJcompetitionJmetgeiJ1egjslatJon)jn.htmI (Accessed 11/10106). 
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inspection".27 ' If the Commission is concerned about the compatibility of a 
concentration it can "by a simple request or decision": enter premises, land or 
means of transportation and examine/photocopy business related evidence, seal the 
property and any documentation which is deemed relevant to the investigation and 
ask any representative of the company for clarification or explanation of any 
business related matters. Individuals appointed by the Commission to undertake 
investigations can ask Member State officials, such as the police, for assistance. 
The investigators must act in compliance with national law. 
Mirroring the network of European competition Authorities established by 
Regulation 1/2003, the NMR, (Recital 14) requires the Commission and national 
authorities to establish a network which ensures that each case is dealt with by the 
most appropriate authority. This mechanism will also ensure that the Commission 
has many points of contact and sources of information, remaining a central stnicture 
in the EU merger regulation framework. 
The original first three phases of merger regulation, pre-notification, Phase I 
and Phase II investigations had little scope for negotiation or discussion about 
possible remedies. 272 The New Best Practices Notice 273 introduced "state of play" 
and "triangular meetings". These meetings allow the Commission insight into the 
transaction and market under appraisal. In the Toial/Gaz case, for example, as this 
was the first time there was to be an acquisition in the French gas sector, after the 
entry into force of the European (las Directives which not only "opened up this 
market"274 but also represented a move away from the traditionally dirigiste 
national political economy towards a liberalised model, noti1'ing parties consulted 
27' ELJR-lex, Council Regulation 139t2004 of 20 ianuaiy 2004 on the control of concentration 
between undertakings,Articlel3. L.24/I. 
272 Winckler, A. Some Comments on Procedures and Remedies under EC Merger Control Rules: 
Something Rotten in the Kingdom of the EC Merger Control. World Competition; 26(2), 2003: 219-
232, 220. 
273 See Chapter I of thesis. 
De Riveiy, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M.3410 - Total! (iaz Dc France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. E.CLR. 26(11), 2005: 624-637. 
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both French and European authorities prior to and during the negotiations for the 
Protocole d'Accord. 275 
The Commission's activities are not just confined to the application of the 
NMR, and as noted by Davidson,276 "EU merger control does not exist in a 
vacuum". Economic globalisation has triggered the evolvement of supranational, 
cross-national and national merger policy/regulation regimes. Transnational 
corporations are drawn under the scrutiny of a multitude of competition agencies in 
relation to the same proposed merger - Jones and Sufflin remarked on the "long arm 
of the ECMR," the provisions of which are triggered by the threshold requirement, 
even if the notif'ing parties were non-EU and the majority of their business 
conducted outside the EU. 277 The Commission's role in the international merger 
policy regime, therefore, cannot be underestimated. It is an important 
player/regulator, able to block transatlantic mergers (GE/Honeywell) and influence 
the trajectory of international merger (and wider competition) regulation policy. 
The Commission, as Davidson observed "... has played a leading role in pushing 
forward the new multilateral competition architecture ... the International 
competition network, the Global Competition Forum and the demand for an 
enhanced competition role for the WTO". 278 The Commission is a founder member 
of the International Competition Network (ICN). The ICN is an "informal forum", 
where competition authorities can interact informally, discussing a wide range of 
issues, including the future pathway of merger regulation policy. 279 In relation to 
influencing the trajectory of merger regulation, the ICN has a Merger Working 
Group, which is split into merger and notification procedures and merger 
investigation and analysis?80 Although their decisions are non-binding, they have 
influenced the trajectory of policy, as they aim for a convergence of ideals, tools 
" De Rivety, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M.3410 - Total/ (In De France: Melter 
Control as a Tool to Greater Libenlisation in the Gas Sector. E.C.L1t 26(11), 2005: 624-637. 
'tavidson, L. M. EU Merger Control and the Compatibility Test: A Review of Recent 
Developments. Liverpool Law Review, 25, 2004: 195-220, 197. 
Jones, A. & B. Suifrin, FE Competition Law. OUP, 2004:991. 
' Davidson, L. M. EU Merger Control and the Compatibility Test: A Review of Recent 
Developments. Liverpool Law Review, 25, 2004: 195-220, 197. 
mDG Comp, international Competition Network (1CN). Available from: 
httpil/ec.ewopa.eu/comm/ompetition/international/multilateral/icn.btml  (Accessed 12110/06). 
ICN, Merger Working Group. Available from: 
hup://w.intemationalcompetitionnetworlcorg/mergers/index.html (Accessed 12/10/06). 
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and frameworks. A consequence of the increasing influence of this multilateral 
architecture, "... allied to the emerging goal of greater international convergence in 
competition matters has directly led the EU to rethink the wording and 
operationalisation" of the DT? 8 ' Elements of the Guiding Principles for Merger 
Notification and Review Procedures, for example, can be identified in the NMIt 
The Commission has become intrinsically interlinked with the international merger 
policy community, not only shaping the trajectory of international policy but also 
abiding by and absorbing the principles established by the ICN when drafting 
merger policy documentation. 
Broberg282 pointed out that the [original] Merger Control Regulation gave the 
Commission the competence to investigate mergers which possessed a Community 
dimension. The Commission took an expansive interpretation of this competence, 
"... taking the view that it has the jurisdiction to examine transactions, such as the 
one in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case where this transaction fulfils the 
turnover thresholds and where it will produce direct and appreciable effects within 
the Conmiunity territory". The CFI upheld the Commission's approach to the 
application of the Regulation. In Gencor v. Commisso, 283 the CFI stated that the 
Commission's actions are "... justified under public international law when it is 
foreseeable that a proposed concentration will have an immediate and substantial 
effect in the Community". The Commission's jurisdiction, therefore, according to 
the CFI was dependent upon the fulfilment of both the threshold requirement and 
' Davidson, L. M. EU Merger Control and the Compatibility Test A Review of Recent 
Developments. Liverpool Law Review, 25, 2004: 195-220, 197. 
2 Broberg, A. The European Commission's Extratenitorial Powers in Merger Control. The Court of 
the First Instance's Judgment in Gencor v. Commission International and Comparative Law 
wrterly, 49,2000,172-182: 172. 
Case No 1V1M877, O.J. 1997, L336116 cited Broberg, A. The European Commission's 
Extratenitorial Powers in Merger Control. The Court of the First Instance's Judgment in Gencor v. 
Commission International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 49, 2000, 172-182; Judgment of the 
Court of First Instance in Case T-102196. Gencor v Commission Two mining and metal resources 
companies: Gencor Ltd (South African licensed) and Lomho (licensed in the UK) wanted to enter 
into a joint venture - Imp lats which would then be given control of Westplats. Although the South 
African authorities had no objections, the Commission felt the joint venture would impede 
competition within the European market, establishing collective dominance, as the transaction would 
reduce suppliers from three to two. The parties appealed to the CFI on the basis that the Commission 
did not have the jurisdiction to rule on mergers that affected a non-member state and that the 
principle of territoriality was applicable to the Community. The CU upheld the Commission's 
decision, stating that if a transaction affects the Communit)ç the Merger Regulation is applicable. 
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the effects principle. In several cases,2M 
 albeit prior to the entry into force of the 
NMR, the Commission prohibited several transactions on the basis that they would 
increase or create a position of single dominance within the world market, tm5 and so 
impede competition within the BC market. 
Although there are cases where divergence in attitudes has become apparent, 
the European Commission has entered into close cooperation and several bilateral 
agreements with the DOJ and FTC. As Schaub 286 pointed out in 2001, there has 
been increased interaction between UK and US competition authorities in the light 
of an increase in global mergers. Inco/Fakonbridge represents an example of 
transatlantic cooperation. As Boeshertz et al. noted, the DOJ pinpointed similar 
anti-competitive concerns, as did the Commission. The Consent Decree filed on the 
23 June 2006 by the DOJ approved the same remedy package proposed by the 
Commission?7 The EU has also entered into bilateral agreements with, for 
example, Japan, Canada and Australia. 
Certainly by establishing points of access with interested parties, national and 
international competition authorities, encouraging dialogue between interested 
parties both in civil society and Member States' national competition authorities 
and by establishing venues or forums for discussion, the Commission ensures it has 
many points of information. It remains finnly in the centre of the merger regulation 
framework policy arena, aware of the frameworks and changes in merger regulation 
at all tiers of governance. 
The Commission increasingly has to deal with a multitude of actors and 
interests when conducting in-depth market investigations. In 
2* E.g. Boeing! McDonnell Douglas; WorldCom/MCI; WorldConzlSprint. 
"Schaub, A. Director General for Competition, Assessing International Mergers: The 
Commissiofl Approach. EC Merger Control 10th  Anniversa'y Confrrence, Brussels, 10-14 October 
2000. Available from: http://ec.europa.eulcommJcompetitionlspeechesltext/sp2000_0  I S_en.html 
(accessed 12110/06). 
2*6 Schaub, A. Director General for Comgetition. Assessing International Mergers: The 
Commission'sjfpproach. EC Merger Control 10 Anniversanj Conference, Brussels, 30-14 October 
2000. Available from: hftrJ/ec.europaeuJcommJcompetition/speeches/text/sp2000O I 5_eahtmi 
(accessed 12110106). 
2*7Boeshertz, C. etal. lnco/Falconbridge: A nickel mine of application in efficiencies and remedies. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2006: 41. Available from: 
httpJ/ec.europaeu/comm/compelitionlpublications/cpnJcpnlOO63.pdf [Accessed 07/07/07. 
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,Johnson&.JohnsoWGuidant, for example, the Commission had to deal with the 
analysis of hundreds of markets which would be affected as a consequence of the 
transaction due to the different national vascular device markets in terms of 
purchasing processes, reimbursement schemes and pricing structures? The 
Commission had to gain the opinions of competitors and customers from all these 
markets, basing its analysis upon several rounds of investigations. Later rounds 
concentrated on the larger markets most affected by the transaction, The 
Commission also consulted several financial experts on the impact of the merger on 
the coronary and stent market and the possibility that competitors could fill the gap 
left by the removal of a competitor .289 When analysing if (luidant had the capacity 
to enter the DES market, the Commission sought advice from prominent doctors in 
this field, fmancial analysts and competitors. 29° 
As noted by Roller and de La Mano, the Commission, and other parties 
involved in the merger investigation process, are embarking on a "learning 
curve".29t 
 Investigative techniques need to be and are currently being expanded in 
order for the Commission not only to be able to examine market share, market 
dominance and the potential for dominance which would impede or distort 
competition, but also to be able to examine competitive effects, the reasons for the 
merger and the possible post-merger activity by parties involved in the transaction, 
hence the need for a more industrial economics based toolkit. 
Although the legal and economic aspects of the merger regulation (and EU 
competition) regime are examined in detail by both academics and practitioners, the 
mBhea C. et al. Inco/Falconbridge: A nickel mine of application in efficiencies and remedies. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2006: 41. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/compethioiilpublicationscpn/cpn2OO63 
 .pdf [Accessed 07/07/071. 
Boeshertz, C. etal. Inco/Falconbiidge: A nickel mine of application in efficiencies and remedies. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2006: 41. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competitionlpublicationsicpn/cpn2006_3.pdf 
 [Accessed 07/07/07]; Case 
No COMP//M.3637 - Johnson & JohnsoWGuidani. 25/08/2005. C(2005)3230 FINAL. 
° Bacchiega, A. et al. Johnson & Johnson/Guidant: potential competition and unilateral effects 
markets. Competition Policy Newsletter1 3, Autumn 2006:87. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.etiicommicompetition/publicationsfcpn/cpn20053 
 .pdf [Accessed 21107/071 88. 
'Roller, L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact ofthe New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http://72. 14.207 .! 04/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYx I wJ:europa.eu.intIcomm/dgsfcompetition/new_s 
ubstantive_test.pdf+SIECi -test&hl=en&gI=uic&ctrcink&cd=1 0 [Accessed 22102/061, 13. 
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politics of competition policy has also played a large part in the evolvement and 
consequential trajectory of merger policy. 292 In this area of economic regulation, 
the merger regime is "commit[edl to enforce[ment] of the law, the role of discretion 
and issues such as transparency and democracy"? 93 The Commission has evolved 
as a "genuinely federal actor" shaping the trajectory of merger regulation policy 
both externally and inside the borders of the EU. As Cmi pointed out the 
distinctiveness of the EU model is premised upon three factors (which can be 
analysed by the historical institutional model). The original political compromise 
upon which merger regulation policy is premised, the "rationale which underpins 
policy" and the roles played by the actors within the governance regime have 
shaped the evolvement of merger policy, whilst the Commission's application of 
the NMR (and original ECMR) has played a key role in interpreting and 
determining the shape and direction of policy. 
The Commission is a multi-tasker within the merger policy governance 
regime: systemic agenda setter; facilitator; drafter of all documentation; holder of 
competence for the application of the NMR and is a global player in the 
international merger regulation framework. The tasks it performs when applying 
the Merger Control Regulation must not be viewed in isolation from its 
performance as an actor in the international merger regulation policy arena. The 
actions of the Commission within this policy arena are multifunctional. Its 
activities do not only affect European concentrations but have wider implications 
for the trajectory of global merger regulation. Looking internally, at the European 
dimension, the Commission is not only responsible for the interpretation and 
application of the merger regulation regime, but is also instrumental in setting the 
parameters for discussion and the systemic agenda. Externally the Commission has 
been and is instrumental in establishing a path dependent merger regulation policy 
at international level and mapping the trajectory of future policy pathways. 
McGowan, L. & M. Cliii, Discretion and Politicisation in EU Competition Policy: The Case of 
Merger Control Governance 12(2), 1999: 175-200. 
McGowan, L. & M. Cliii, Discretion and Politicisation in EU Competition Policy: The Case of 
Merger ControL Governance 12(2), 1999: 175-200. 
294 McGowan, L. & M. Cliii, Discretion and Politicisation in EU Competition Policy: The Case of 
Merger Control Governance 12(2), 1999: 175-200. 
Cliii, M, Accounting fbr the Distinctiveness of the EU Model. Policy Studies Journal 30(2), 
2002: 240-241. 
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3.10. The Counter Effect of Protectionist Member States 
The application of the NMR by the Commission is not necessarily assisted by 
Member States who interfere in mergers which possess a European dimension in 
order to protect national interests and "national champions". Internal Market 
Commissioner, Charlie McCreevy, stated that: 
"[N]ot a day goes by lately without European governments commenting 
on, interfering in or trying to bluntly block the free flow of capital 
Everywhere you see the same outdated mstm.... governments 
promoting national champions, of shutting out competition". 2 
Kroes, Competition Commissioner, addressing Members of the European 
Parliament, stated that: 
"As guardian of the EC Treaty, and as the institution responsible for 
merger control on competition grounds at the European level, the 
Commission is determined to guarantee that companies can effectively 
benefit from the advantages of the EU's internal market. That is why 
enforcement of these provisions is, and will remain, one of the 
Commission's central priorities."297 
Clearly the Commission is detennined to protect cross-national mergers and 
prevent a distortion of the market and will take Member States to task if they 
attempt to do so. The Commission has two legal instruments at its disposal which 
can be used to reassert its authority as the principal actor in the merger policy 
regime: Article 21 of the NMR, which allocates the Commission exclusive 
competence to assess mergers with a Community dimension, and secondly the 
single market rules ouflined in the EC Treaty. The Commission has already started 
proceedings against Poland, writing a letter to the Polish government, informing it 
that it is in breech of Council Regulation 139/2004, Article 21, by requiring 
LJnicredit, an Italian bank, to sell its shares in the Polish bank BPH S.A., after 
Unicredit acquired Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG (HVB) which held 
&i Rapid Press Release, C. McCreevy, The Development of the European Capita! Market. 
Available from: eumpa.eu/..J05/702&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLanguageen - 
23k [Accessed 03/06/08]. 
Rapid Press Release, N. Kroes Introductory remarks on 'Mergers in the Internal Market' 
European Parliament plenary session SPEECW06/172 Date: 15/03t2006. Available from: 
bttp://europa.euintlrapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/l 72&fonnt'HThIL&age 
d0&IeEN&guiLanguage=en [Accessed 05/08/061. 
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indirect control of BPH. 298 	 The Commission had already cleared the 
Unicredit/HVB merger, concluding that the merger did not present a significant 
threat to Polish markets. On the 20th 
 December 2005, however, the Polish 
government demanded a divestiture on the basis that when Unicredit acquired the 
Polish bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A. in 1999 from the Polish State Treasury, after 
the fall of Communism, a "non-compete clause" in the Polska agreement prevented 
Unicredit, for 10 years, from opening subsidiaries/acquiring banks which "were 
active there" or investing in the Polish banking industry. On the l February 2006, 
the Polish Treasury again requested Unicredit to comply with the non-compete 
clause: the divestiuire of BPFI within 3 months or the 1999 privatisation agreement 
would be revoked, 
Although Article 21 gives the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over 
mergers with a Community dimension, Article 21(4), however, permits Member 
States to take "appropriate action" and instigate national measures to protect 
"legitimate interests". Such measures have to be presented to the Commission (and 
justified by Member States) prior to implementation of the measure. In this case the 
Commission decided that the invocation of the "non-compete clause" by the Polish 
government represented a threat to the Unicredit transaction and the clause itself 
was incompatible with the EC Treaty. The Commission opened two proceedings 
against the Polish government?9 It sent a letter to the national authorities 300 
requiring them to justi& their actions, and to respond within 15 days for the 
violation of Article 21 NMR. The Commission also opened an infringement 
procedure based upon Article 226, as it was concerned about the incompatibility 
Unicredit acquired BPH as part of the acquisition of HVB. The Polish government required 
Unicredit to divest its shares in BPH (as per agreement when they invested in Polska Kasa Opieki 
SA in 1999). The Commission had cleared the transaction but the Polish govemmeid opposed it. 
EU Focus, Commission Proceeds Against National Intervention In Merger Procedure. EU Focus 
2006,185, 5-6; European Commission, Internal Market - Free Movement of Capital - Surveillance 
andAnalysis ofCapital, Poland: Unicredit1HBV Merger. Available from: 
http://ec.europaeurmternal_market/capital /analysis/index enhtm [Accessed 07/08/06]. 
300 Rapid Press Release: Commission Launches Proceàre Against Polandfor Preventing 
Unicredit/HVB Merger. IP/06/277, 08/03/2006; Larsen, P. Unicredit plans sales to satisfy Warsaw. 
FT.Com 27/05106. Available from: 
httpil/sethitcom/search?queyTex=Unicredjt+plans+saJes+to-lsasly+Warsaw&x=2 I &y"2&aje 
lrue&dse=&ijsz= [Accessed 06105/081. 
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between the "non-compete clause" and Articles 43 and 56 EC. 30 ' 	 11 the 
Commission was not satisfied by the arguments provided by the Polish authorities, 
the Commission could adopt a decision under Article 21 of the NMR preventing the 
Polish government from invoking the "non-compete" clause of the Polska 
agreement. This decision would be directly applicable and could be invoked at 
national level. 302 The Polish authorities filed a complaint with the CR (only the 
second time a Member State has challenged a Commission's merger ruling), 
arguing that the Commission had misinterpreted the effect the merger would have 
upon Polish markets 303 The first set of proceedings brought by the Commission 
were difThsed by the fact that the Polish Government and Unicredit came to a 
compromise, with Unicredit agreeing to sell off 200 BPH's branches and not cut 
jobs for 2 years. 304 Kroes, however, has stated that this agreement does "not 
necessarily put an end to our case" concerning the infringement proceedings. 305 
In France and Spain, the creation of energy national champions, has come 
under investigation by the Commission. France engineered a take-over between 
3°' Rapid Press Release Free Movement of Capital: Commission Opens Infringement Procedure 
against Poland in context of Unicredir/HBV merger. IP/06/276, 08/03/2006; Buck, T. & J. Cienski, 
EU steps up pressure on Poland over bank deal. Fr.Com, 22/02/06. Available from: 
httpil/search.fl.com/ftArticle?queryTexEU+steps+up+pressure+on+Poland+over+bank+deal.-s-s-l-
&f8&aje=true&x=l 
 8&id=060222001 095&ct"O [Accessed 06/05/081. 
Buck, T. & J. Cienski, EU steps up pressure on Poland over bank deal. FT.Com, 22/02/06. 
Available from: 
hup://search.ft.com/ftArticle?querylext=EU+steps+up+pressure+on+Poland+over+bank+deak-H-t- 
8&ajetrue&r'1 8&id=060222001 095&ct0 [Accessed 06/05/08]. 
Wagstyl, S. & T. Buck, Brussels flhces merger challenge as Poland goes to cotfl PT.Com, 
07/02/06. Available from: 
httpil/search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=bnissels+fäces+a+merger+challenge+as+Poland+goes+to+  
court&y=0&e=true&x=0&id=060207001 I 18&ct=0&nclick check1 [Accessed 051051081; Court 
of First Instance, C T- 41/06 Republic of Poland v Conunission of the European Communities, 01 C 
96,22/04/2006:17. 
Cienski, J. & et al, Unicredit strikes a deal over 8PM. Financial Times, 05/04/06. Available from: 
http://search.ft.com/ftArficle?queryText=unicredit+strikes+a+deat+ovei*bph&y=0&aje=true&,eO&  
id=060405008629&ct=0 [Accessed 05/05/08]. 
Cienski, J. & et al, Warsaw and UniCredit seal deal over bank takeover fight fl'.Com. 06/04/06. 
Available from: 
http://schitconi/ftArticle?queiyText=Warsaw+and+LJniCredit4seai+deal+overfbank+takeover+  
fight&y=I 0&aje=true&x= 14&id060406000859&cV0 [Accessed 05/05/08]; Cienski, J. Pekao, 
BPH tie-up is cleared. flCom 08/04/06. Available from: 
http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=BPH+tie- 
up+is+cleared.+&y=8&aje=tme&x=l 6&id=0604200005 1 3&ct=0 [Accessed 06/05/081. 
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Gaz de France and Suez to prevent a takeover of Suez by the Italian firm Ene1 306 
whilst the Spanish government passed emergency legislation to prevent a takeover 
of Endesa (a Spanish energy company) by E.ON (a German energy firm). 3°' In the 
Spanish case E.ON attempted to acquire Endesa (at the same time a Spanish firm, 
Gas Natural, launched a competing bid)? °8 
Clearly in the application of the NMR, the Commission is not going to allow 
its central position within the merger governance regime to be challenged. As 
noted by both the internal market and Competition Commissioners, the Commission 
aims to fulfil its position as "guardian of the treaty" and ensure the single market is 
not undermined by Member States aiming to protect national interests. 
3.11. Factors outside the Commission's control 
Factors, which are not necessarily under the control of the Commission, can 
shape the application of the merger framework and the future pathway of policy. 
Increasingly the press has become absorbed into the merger regulation policy 
governance regime. Judicial review by the CFI has re-evaluated, re-shaped and 
revised the application of the NMR by the Commission, whilst the press has shaped 
the agenda within which decisions are made. There have been several high profile 
cases where Member States have sought to intervene in transactions in order to 
protect national interests. 
3.11.1. The Impact of Judicial Review on the Application of the NMR 
Whilst the European Commission holds the central role in relation to the 
application of the provisions of the merger regulation framework, nevertheless the 
European Courts, especially the CFI, as observed by Weitbrecht, "... continued to 
3°' Mortished, C. EU Inquiry threatens French Utility Deal, The Tiniesonline, 20/06/06. Available 
from: http://buss.tmesonline.co.ukltol/business/'mdustrysectors/utilities/artic1e676573.ece  
[Accessed 06/05/081. 3°' EurActiv, Kroes: nationalism has no place in cross-border mergers. 16/0312006. Available from: 
http://www.euractiv.comlenlfinancial-services6/lcroes-nationalism-place-cross-border-
mergers/article-I 
 53438. [20/06/061. 
Rapid Press Release, Commission ni/es against Spanish Energy Regulator's measures 
concernin&K ON's bidfor Endesz Reference: IP/06/1 265,26/09/2006 Available from: 
http://europaeu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refrrence=IP/06/1265&format=HTMJAaged=O&lan  
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en [Accessed 30/03/071. 
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play a decisive role in reviewing and shaping Commission practice". 3°9 The 
Courts' decisions have and continue to have influence upon the evolvement of the 
EU merger regulation policy regime. Article 2 1(2) states that: "[S]ubject to review 
by the Court of Justice, the Commission shall have sole jurisdiction to take 
decisions provided for in this Regulation". Analysis of the Commission's 
application of the NMR would not be complete without an examination of the 
influence the Courts have upon the Commission's application of the merger 
regulation framework. 
According to Article 230, (pam. 4): 
"[a]y natural or legal person may 	 institute proceedings against a 
decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although 
in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is 
of direct and individual concern to the former". 
The European courts, therefore, are increasingly used by third parties to 
challenge the Commission decisions. 31° Lenaerts noted in the Babyliss judgment 
that: "[I]t has consistently been held that persons other than the addressees of 
decisions can claim to be individually concerned only if that decision affects them 
by reason of certain attributes peculiar to them, or by reason of a factual situation 
,,311 In the Babyliss judgment,312 the CFI considered if the acquisition of certain 
assets of the bankrupt Moulinex by SEE could be challenged by Babyliss. The CFI 
decided that Babyliss did have the standing to challenge the transaction, even 
though its products were only present in one of the thirteen product markets 
affected by the merger. The CFT noted its future potential as a competitor in the 
other markets affected by the merger. 3t3 The AR!) v Commission judgment further 
clarified the right for third parties to challenge Commission decisions. Although, 
unlike Babyliss, ARD was not affected by the merger as it was not, at that time, 
° Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004—An Overview. KCL R. 26(2), 2005: 67-74. 
3T0 Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004—An Overview. &C.LR. 26(2), 2005: 67-74. 
" Case T-1 14/02, Baby!iss £4 v. Commission oft/ic European Communities. Judgment of the Court 
of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 3 April 2003, pars 91. In this case Babyliss (a third party) was 
successful in challenging the Commission decision to permit SE)) to acquire Moulinex. The 
remedies were found by the CFI to be insufficient to allay competition concerns. 
"' Case T-1 14/02, Baby!Lu £4 v. Commission of the European Communities. Judgment of the Court 
of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 3 April 2003, para9l. 
3t3CØ T-1 14/02, Babyliss £4 v. Commission oft/re European Communities. Judgment of the Court 
of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 3 April2003, part 106. 
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present in the pay for TV markets, the CFI held that ARD did pass the "direct and 
individual concern test" because: 
"in the same way as potential competitors of the parties to the 
concentration may have standing to apply for annulment of an approval 
decision in the case of oligopolistic markets ( ... ) where, as in the present 
case, an undertaking holding a monopoly sees its position strengthened by 
a concentration, an action for annulment brought by an operator present 
only on neighbouring upstream or downstream markets may, in certain 
circumstances, also be admissible." 314 
The right of third parties to challenge Commission's referral decisions was 
confirmed by the CFI in Philips Electronics v Commission, where Philips opposed a 
partial referral to the French authorities. The CFI found that a third party can be 
"directly and individually concerned" with a referral as, if a transaction is referred 
back to national competition authorities for appraisal, it is removed from the 
procedural and judicial jurisdiction of the EU and thus third parties cannot question 
the decisions before the CFI. In Cableuropa and others v Commission315 the CFI 
reiterated and reinforced these principles in relation to total referrals back to 
national authorities. The CFI have extended Article 230 EC to this area, meaning 
that when the Commission is appraising transactions, it must consider that not only 
will parties involved in the transaction challenge Commission decisions, 3t6 but so 
also will third parties. Both referrals and the possibility that the Commission has 
committed "manifest errors" during investigation of a transaction, may be 
challenged in the Courts by these parties. 317 
EUR-lex, Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 30 September 2003, 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Offentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstal:en der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(ARD) v Commission of the European Communities. E.C.IL 2003, 11-03825, Pam. 78. In this case 
ARD contested the Commission's decision to clear the proposed concentration between BSkyB and 
KirchPay TV. Although ARD was, not at the present time, nor intended to be in the near future, a 
competitior, the CFI felt that ARE) could still be considered "individually concerned" and the 
remedies proposed by the parties were insufficient to counter anti-competitive concerns. 
... EUR-lex, Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 30 September 2003, 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der offenslich-rechzliclien Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutsci,Jand 
(ARD) v Commission of the European Communities. E.C.R. 2003.11-03825, Pam. 78. 
' 6 Eg. Tetra! Lava!; AirTours. 
" E.g. Case T-177104 EasyJet Airline Company Ltd i' Commission, OJ C 201117; Case T-48-04 
Qualcomm Wireless Business Solutions Europe i' Commission. 01 C94/1 39. 
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Throughout the evolvement of the merger regulation regime the CFJ have 
been instnimental in setting the conditions and checklists to which the Commission 
must adhere when applying the provisions of the NMR. 318 In 2005, the Courts 
ruled on three merger control cases, two of which have implications for merger 
regulation policy and the "standard of judicial review" and standard of proof, 
whilst the third confirms the difficulties the Commission may encounter when 
analyzing the anti-competitive impact conglomerate effects may have upon a 
market as a consequence of clearance of a merger. The Commission decided to 
appeal the Tetra Laval case partially on the grounds that the CR had demanded a 
higher standard of proof than the standard established in Kali & Salz (where the CFI 
concluded that the Commission must present a "cogent and consistent body of 
evidence"). The CFI had not allowed the Commission enough margin for 
discretion, which it normally uses when making decisions which are economically 
complex.32° The Cowl of Justice stated that: 
"A prospective analysis of the kind necessary in merger control must be 
carried out with great care since it does not entail the examination of past 
events or current events, but rather a prediction ... Such an analysis 
makes it necessary to envisage various chains of cause and effect". 
In this judgment, the Cowl provides guidelines relating to standard of proof, 
which the Commission must meet when reviewing merger cases. This case is 
especially relevant to cases where there are conglomerate effects which have to be 
considered by the Commission. As noted by Howarth, several questions were raised 
as a consequence of the appeal, for example: "what is the standard of proof the 
Commission must meet in opposing a merger, particularly where conglomerate 
effects are involved?" and "can the CFI overrule the Commission's assessment on 
discretionary matters?"32 ' In the appeal to the ECJ, the Commission had argued 
that it was impossible to produce "convincing" evidence to substantiate its decisions 
to prohibit mergers where there were conglomerate anti-competitive effects which 
318 E.g. Airtours; Kali & Salz. 
319 Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Contml in 2005 - An Overview. &C.LR. 27(2), 2006: 43-50. The 
third was the GEl Honeywell Appeal - the CFI upheld the Commission's decision but identified 
where the Commission had eired in its analysis. 
320 Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005 - An Overview. KCLR. 27(2), 2006: 43-50. 
321 Howarth, D. Tetra Laval/Sidel: Mieroeconomics or Microlaw, &C.L.R., 26(7), 2005: 369-372. 
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would impede competition. The Commission, therefore, partially based its appeal 
on the premise that the CFI had misinterpreted the evidence relating to market 
defmition and the effect of a transaction on competition and dominance. The ECJ 
partially dismissed these accusations as "partly unfounded" and "partly 
inadmissible". Although the Commission argued that the CFI had disregarded the 
Commission's margin of discretion when assessing merger transactions, the ED 
stated that: 
"[W]hilst the Court recognises that the Commission has a margin of 
discretion with regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the 
Community Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission's 
interpretation of information of an economic nature". 
Clearly, as noted by Howarth, 311 this case "removes any doubt that the ECJ's 
role in merger cases is purely as a court of appeal on matters of law", whilst Bay et 
al. note that Tetra Lava! II illustrates "... how sweeping the Community Courts' 
powers of judicial review in the merger control area are"? Although the CFI 
must "... continue to exercise judicial restraint ..." when assessing Commission 
decisions, the Commission no longer enjoys the same margin of discretion 324 when 
applying and interpreting economic models. 325 The ECJ lays down clear 
parameters for judicial review of merger decisions: 
"[N]ot only must Community Courts, inter alia, establish whether the 
evidence relied upon is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also 
whether the evidence contains all the information which must be taken into 
account in order to assess complex situations and whether it is capable of 
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it." 326 
This case also contributed to the ongoing debate relating to standard of proof, 
especially in relation to the assessment of conglomerate mergers, where the effects 
Howarth, D. Tetra Laval/Sidel: Microeconomics or Microlaw, &C.LI{, 26(7), 2005: 369-372. 
323 EIowarth, D. Tetra Laval/Sidel: Microeconomics or Microlaw, E.C.LRJ, 26(7), 2005: 369-372. 
In Tesral Lava! 1, the CFI acknowledged that "Article 2 confers on the Commission a certain 
dLicretion 2' whilst the Commission, drawing upon the existing case law argued that it had "wide 
discretion", in this area. (Bay, M. F. & J. It Caizado, TWa Laval II: the Corning of Age of the 
Judicial Review of Merger decisions. World Competition, 28(4), 2005: 433453, 436). 
325 Bay, M. F. & I. R. Calmdo, TWa Laval H: the Coming of Age of the Judicial Review of Merger 
decisions. World Competition, 28(4), 2005: 433-453, 436,457. 
' Bay, M. F. & J. R. Caizado, Tetra Laval II: the Coming of Age of the Judicial Review of Merger 
decisions. World Competition, 28(4), 2005: 433-453, 438. 
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of a transaction are hard to pin point. The Court stated that specifically in these 
cases where: 
"... chains of cause and effect are dimly discernible, uncertain and difficult 
to establish ... A prospective analysis of the kind necessary in merger 
control must be carried out with great care since it does not entail the 
examination of past events - for which often many items of evidence are 
available which make it possible to understand the causes - or of current 
events, but rather a prediction of events which are more or less likely to 
occur in future if a decision prohibiting theplanned concentration or laying 
down the conditions for it is not adopted." 32 
Clearly judicial intervention can, and does, shape the Commission's 
application of the merger regulation framework. The above statement by the ECJ 
requires the Connnission to take extra care when assessing conglomerate mergers, 
as anti-competitive effects are not clearly identifiable as they are in a horizontal 
merger. 
In its decision of December 9l 
 2004, the CFI upheld the Commission's first 
prohibition decision since 2001, relating to the merger between Energias de 
Portugal and Gas de Portugal. 328 In contrast to the ECJ statement in the Teira/Laval 
judgment, the CFI stated that the Commission possesses a "wide" degree of 
discretion. The CFI went on to uphold the Commission's original decision to 
prohibit the transaction, on the grounds that the applicant had failed to illustrate that 
the Commission had committed "manifest errors". 329 
The long awaited judgment in GE/Honeywell was delivered on December 14 th  
2005 by the CFI.33° Although the CFI dismissed the two appeals and upheld the 
327 Howarth, P. Tetra LavalJSidel: Microeconomics or Microlaw, KC.LIt, 26(7), 2005: 369-372. 
Weitbrecht A. EU Merger Control in 2005 - An Overview. E.C.L.R. 27(2), 2006:43-50. In this 
case the Commission had prohibited the takeover of GDP by EDP & EN1 on the basis that the 
transaction would impede competition through the removal of potential competitors. The CFI 
upheld the Commission's decision on the basis that the Commission had achieved the requisite legal 
standard of proof when conducting its investigation. 
Weithrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005 - An Overview. E.C.LR. 27(2), 2006: 43-50. The 
CFI upheld the Commission's decision that a merger between the two avionic giants would impede 
dominance but the CFI also held that the Commission had failed to sufficiently prove that 
conglomerate effects of the merger would impede competition and illustrate that GE Capital and GE 
Capital Avionics Services would take advantage of this dominant position. 
° Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005 — An Overview. EC.L R. 27(2), 2006:43-50. 
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Commission's decision to prohibit the merger between the two parties, the CFI held 
that the decision was "vitiated by illegalities" on the part of the Commission. 33 ' 
The CR upheld the Commission's assertion that the merger would have: created a 
world-wide monopoly in the jet engines market; impeded competition insomuch 
that price competition would be reduced. The CFI also upheld the rejection of the 
proposed commitments by the Commission. The CFI, however, was critical of 
several aspects of the Commission's economic analysis as "the Commission's 
analysis was ... vitiated by a manifest error of assessment". 332 
The annulment of the Commission's decision to permit the creation of a joint 
venture between Sony and BMG by the CR on July 13 th 2006, is a significant 
judgment, shaping the application of the merger regulation regime by the 
Commission, "... effect[ing] the way the Commission will handle any contentious 
merger case .. "fl" In this case the CFI stated that the Commission: "did not 
demonstrate to the requisite legal standard either the non-existence of a collective 
dominant position before the concentration or the absence of a risk that such a 
position would be created as a result of the concentration". 335 This case provided 
clarification concerning similar cases, confirming the "... test under the merger 
regulation is symmetric - the burden is just as high on the Commission to clear a 
331 Euractiv.com, ECJ: GE/Honeywell merger ban stands but the Commission made eltors. Available 
from: http:llwww.com/enfcompetition/ecj-gehoneywell-merger-ban-stands-commission.hunl 
Accessed 02/01/07]. 
32 CVRJA, Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Cases 1209/01 and 210/01, Honeywell v 
Commission and General Electric v Commission. fless Release No 109105, 14 December 2005, 
CVRIA Luxembourg. 
Case T-464/04 involved Impala, the international association which represents 2.500 music 
companies, bringing the appeal, with Sony and BMG as the interveners (Volcker, S. B. & C. 
O'Daly, The Court of First Instance's Impala judgment A Judicial Counter-Reformation in EU 
Merger Control. &C.L.R. 2006,27(11). 589-596). The Sony/BMG merger represented a 5-4 merger. 
The Commission, dining its investigation examined if there was parallel wholesaling pricing. The 
Commission found there was not enough evidence to establish collective dominance. Impala 
appealed to the (TI who stated the Commission not only had to prove there would be, but also that 
there would not be dominance as a result of the transaction. The CFI annulled the Commission 
decision. 
334 Volcker S. B. & C. O'Daly, The Cowl of First Instance's Impala judgment A Judicial Counter-
Reformation in EU Merger Control. E.C.L.R. 2006,27(11): 589-596, 589. 
" Rapid Press Release, Independent Music Publishers and Labetc Association (Impala) v 
Commission of the European Communities. Press Release, 60/06, Reference: CJE/06/60 Date: 
13/0712006. 
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merger as prohibit it". 336 The CFT's judgment, as noted by Volcker and O'Daly, 337 
considers "an expansive interpretation of co-ordinated effects ... and saddles an 
already complex and time pressured review process with additional complications", 
whilst this judgment may trigger more ex-post intervention against closed cases. 
The CFI criticised the Commission's economic analysis as "extremely 
succinct", "superficial, indeed purely formal", especially as this transaction "raises 
serious problems". 338 The CFI was also critical of the Commission's use of 
backward looking analysis to examine if retaliation had occurred when there had 
been prior mergers, which was not a suitable analysis - prospective analysis was 
needed to identify if collective dominance would be established as a consequence of 
the merger. Consequentially the Commission had to reassess the transaction. 
As observed by Volcker and O'Daly, if a Commission's decision is annulled 
by the Court, and has to be re-assessed, as with Sony/BMG, the Commission looks 
more favourably upon parties who have to re-notify transactions. For example in 
KalE & Sail, the CFI annulled conditional clearance whilst the Commission, after 
reassessment, granted unconditional clearance. In TetraLaval/Sidel, the CR 
annulled the Commission's prohibition decision. Consequently the Commission 
reassessed the transaction, granting conditional clearance. 339 The Courts, especially 
the CFI, have been drawn into the governance regime and can overturn and 
influence Commission decisions, as judgments can affect Commission 
reassessments. 
336Lowe P. Commission's Enforcement Record 2006. Competition Policy Newsletter, (1) Spring 
2006:1. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publicationslcpn/cpn2007_l  .pdf 
Accessed 07/07/07]. 
'Lowe, P. Commission's Enforcement Record 2006. Competition Policy Newsletter, (I) Spring 
2006:1. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competitionlpublicationslcpn/cpn2007j  .pdf 
1Accessed 07/07/07]. 
Lowe, P. Commission's Enforcement Record 2006. Competition Policy Newsletter, (I) Spring 
2006:1. Available from: http://ec.europa.eufcomm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn200l_1  .pdf 
1Accessed 07107/07]. 
" Lowe, P. Commission's Enforcement Record 2006. Competition Policy Newsletter, (1) Spring 
2006:1. Available from: htqx//ec.emvpaeuJcomnJcmpetitionhubIications/cpn/cpn2007I .pdf 
[Accessed 07/071071. 
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Criticism of the competence of the Commission to correctly apply the 
provisions of the ECMR by the CFI, 340  whilst not precipitating a revision of the 
merger framework, did, however, shape the direction of the review and subsequent 
pathway of policy. Judicial intervention has enhanced the Courts' position within 
this governance regime, establishing check lists and standards to which the 
Commission must adhere when conducting a merger investigation. Recent case-law 
indicates that the CFI and ECJ are continuing to mould the evolvement of the EU 
merger regulation framework. This intervention, in turn, influences how the 
Commission applies the NMR. The European Courts have also continued to add 
more cases to the ongoing discussion surrounding the standard of judicial review. 
The effect judicial review has upon the application of the NMR by the Commission 
is clear. The scathing criticism of the application and interpretation of economic 
analysis by the CFI, which has been sanctioned by the ECJ to reassess analysis, 
coupled with more parties being allowed to challenge Commission decisions, even 
ex-post intervention, has made the whole review process more complex and time 
consuming for the Commission. Increasingly, as parties challenge Commission 
decisions in the Courts, the application of the NMR is adversarial rather than 
investigative in nature. In cases when interested parties challenge Commission 
decisions, both sides present their arguments in Court and it is the judiciary who 
make the final decision. The merger regulation control process is therefore 
converging with the US system, where the Federal Trade Commission and Parties 
present their evidence and it is the court that decides if a transaction should be 
approved or prohibited. 
Although the Council establishes the signposts of policy, negotiating the 
content of the Merger Regulations, the trajectory of policy has been shaped by both 
the application of the Merger Control Regulation by the European Commission and, 
to a certain extent, by judicial review. The new competition architecture 
established in 1990 by the entry into force of the ECMR, as noted by Davidson, TM ' 
340 Eg. Case T-5/02 Tetra Lava! !JV v Commission of the European Communities, (The EQ 
dismissed the Commission's appeal against the CFI's decision to annul its prohibition of the 
merger). 
Davidson, L. M. EU Merger Connl and the Compatibility Test A Review of Recent 
Developments. tivei'pool Law Review, 25,2004: 195-220, 196. 
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was shaped by and also shaped the trajectory of, merger regulation policy. The 
revision of the ECMR has proved to be a formal critical juncture in the evolvement 
of EU merger regulation, formalising the pathway and direction policy was taking 
as a consequence of the application of the merger regulation regime by the 
Commission. As the entry into force of the NMR closed many of the gaps which 
evolved as an unanticipated consequence of the application of the ECMR, the new, 
revised framework offers more opportunities for the Commission to continue to 
shape the evolvement and direction of the new merger policy. The Commission, 
however, does not exist within a vacuum. Increasingly the Commission must share 
its role with the CFI and ECJ and is drawn into an adversarial, instead of an 
investigative, discourse justifj,'ing its decisions before the European Courts. 
3.11.2. The Position of the Omnipresent Press within the New Merger 
Regime'2 
Prior to the entry into force of the NMR the press were already becoming part 
of the merger regulation process. At the Tenth Anniversary of the European ECMR 
Conference, Alec Burnside reviewed the key actors who control the merger process. 
He concluded that the European press corps was now a de facto part of the process 
of merger review.343 
 As the evaluation process by the Commission is one of the 
few areas that can evoke the [shareholding] public's interest in activities at EU 
level, there is, according to Heim, 344 a small but hardcore press corps who target 
European national officials and parties to the transaction willing to speak off the 
record and "leak" certain papers, allowing the press to shape the environment 
within which decisions are made. The Commission officially reprimanded the 
Royal Caribbean for "leaks" in the CarnivalJF&O 45 case (it was assumed that if the 
Commission prevented a merger, it would benefit Royal Caribbean). During the 
(JEIHoneywell merger, Monti publicly criticised "attempts to misinform the public 
342 1 touched upon this discussion in an LLM assignment (2004) The Development of a European-
wide framework of merger control. 
° Helm, M. The Impact of the Media on EU Merger decisions, E.C.L1Q 24(2), 2003:49-53. 
3"Heim, M. The Impact of the Media on EU Merger decisions, E.CLK 24(2), 2003:49-53. 
3t Helm, M. The Impact of the Media on EU Merger decisions, E.C.LR. 24(2), 2003: 49-53. The 
Commission cleared the merger between Carnival and P&O Princess. This enabled the parties to 
establish a dual-listed company. Reference: IP/03t2 12 Date: 10/0212003, (Rapid Press Release: 
Commission clears dual listed company combining the cruise activities of Carnival and P&O 
Princess. Available from: hupi/europa.euhapid/pressReleasesAction.do ?reference=IP/03/2 12 
[Accessed 24/08/081. 
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and to trigger political intervention" which is "entirely out of place in an antitrust 
case".346 Heim argued that media coverage can "condition the environment" as a 
tool used by all parties involved to sensitise the "stakeholders to the possible 
outcomes"?47 By reporting the possibility that the Commission may not sanction a 
merger, the thought of possible remedies is made more palatable to all the 
stakeholdersMS involved. 
After the revision of the Merger Control Regulation, the press's position 
appears to be further entrenched within the EU merger regime, a tool used by all 
parties in order to not only to sweeten shareholders to the possibility that remedial 
action might be more palatable than concentrations being judged as incompatible 
with the Common Market but also to outline the future of the proposed 
concentrations as though the concentrations had already been approved, in order to 
present the Commission as the bad guy if the concentration is rejected. 
Announcements of the intention of parties to enter into a transaction, be it an 
acquisition, merger or joint-venture via a press release or press conference at the 
same time as notification, presents the transaction as fait accompli. Manipulation of 
the press by the parties draws attention away from the impact the transaction will 
have upon competition within a particular market, to the affect the transaction will 
have for consumers. Two examples of this are Total/Gaz de France349  and the 
Mittal takeover of Arcelor. 350 In TotaI/Gaz, press releases were presented at the 
same time as the Protocole d'Accord, declaring their intentions, "making it clear 
315 Rapid, Commissioner Monsi dismisses criticism of GEJHoneywelI merger review and rejects 
q liticisation ofthe case, EUROPA Rapid Press Release, lPIO 11855. 
'Helm, M. The Impact of the Media on EU Merger decisions, E.C.LR. 24(2), 2003: 49-53, 52. 
'tiHeim. M. The Impact of the Media on EU Merger decisions, KCLK 24(2), 2003: 49-53, 53. 
De Rivery, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMPIM. 3410 - Total! Gaz De France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. E.C.LR. 26(11), 2005: 624-637. 
"° Smyth, C. & P. Hollinger, LabThai Mitral warns on mistake ofprotectionism. At the same time 
as notification Mittal released a statement saying that he "was confident the Luxembourg 
government would not take any decision which would frustrate this transaction". He warned: "This 
kind of activity would really disturb the financial community [in Luxembourg]." FT.Com , 
1810312006. Available from: 
hUJ/sch.ftcom(search?quyText=Lakshzni+Mival+warns+on+mistakflof+protectionism%2C+ 
&x=1 l&r2&etrue&dse=&dsz= [Accessed 06/05/08]. The Commission approved the 
acquisition of Acelor by Mittal, subject to certain conditions, establishing the largest steel producer 
in the world. Rapid Press Release, Commission approves acquisition ofAcelor by Mitta!, subject to 
conditioi'u. Reference: IP106/725 Date: 02/06/2006. Available from: 
httpil/europa.eu/rapid./pressReleasesAction.do9refèrencelP/06t725 [29/08/08]. 
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that the contemplated concentration would be ultimately implemented". 35 ' In the 
Mittal case, the press were used by Mittal to pre-empt possible protectionism by the 
French and Luxembourg governments, by illustrating how the economies of EU 
countries opposed to the hostile takeovei? 52 may be affected if the merger was 
sabotaged by protectionist measures. The press was also used by those opposed to 
the merger to urge national governments and the EU to oppose the merger and 
protect national economies. 353 Certainly manipulation and opportunistic use of the 
press allows politicisation of merger decisions, creating a difficult environment 
within which the Commission has to apply the NMR. 
Use of the media has become an integral, de facto, part of the merger review 
process prior to the implementation of the NMR. The media acts as another layer 
of scrutiny. 354 
 Use of the press has been expanded upon to manipulate and shape 
the merger review process, in order to create an environment which is more 
amenable to the creation of a new concentration as the consequences could 
otherwise be detrimental to the economy. The press remain a non-judicial factor 
which must be considered when debating and considering the structures and 
institutions which not only shape and have input into the merger regulation 
framework but also influence and condition the environment within which the NMR 
is applied. 
3.12. Change in Emphasis and Dynamics of the Policy Community 
Environment 
Vallindas,355 
 notes that prior to the modernisation of EU competition law in 
2004, "... everything seemed to indicate that the implementation of Community 
competition rules had lost its economic character, and as such, simply expressed the 
legalistic logic of the Common Market". Decisions made by both the Commission 
351 De Rivery, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMP/M. 3410 - Total/ Gaz De France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. E.CLR. 26(11), 2005:624-637. 
352 De Rivenj, M. D. & V. Guerard, Case No COMPIM. 3410 - Total/ Gaz De France: Merger 
Control as a Tool to Greater Liberalisation in the Gas Sector. KC.LR  26(11), 2005:624-637. 
"' Parker, G. Mittal bid shows need for "strong EU role". FT Corn, 02/02/06. Available from: 
http ://search. ft comiftArtic le?queiyText=Mittal+bid+shows+need+for+%2 7strong+EU+role%2 7&y 
0&ajetrue&x= I 8&id=060206000849&ct=0 [Accessed 06/05/08]. 
Helm, M. The Impact of the Media on EU Merger decisions, E.C.LR. 24(2), 2003: 49-53, 53. 
355 Vailindas, G. New Directions in EC Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control. LU, 12 
(5), 2006: 535-660, 639. 
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and the European Courts were influenced by the ordoliberalist doctrine, a theory 
which attempts to 'tre-establish competition, by ensuring that market power is 
widely distributed".356 Application of economic principles by the Commission and 
ECJ was "ad hoc and imprecise . . '" The annulment of three Commission 
decisions by the CFI in 2002 on the basis of inadequate economic analysis, 
however, "accelerated" 359 the modemisation process and shaped the trajectory of 
policy change. "... scathing criticism originated from recent decisions of the 
Court of First Instance has cast a shadow on the overall fairness and objectivity of 
the assessments of concentrations on the part of the Commission's Merger control 
task force". 36° The renewal (and improvement) of the Commission's economic 
analysis was instigated not only by the revision of competition law in 2004, but also 
by the reorganisation of the Directorate. Late 2003, the then Competition 
Commissioner Monti announced that the MiT was to be reorganised. This 
reorganisation established the position of Senior Economist,36' the first to be 
appointed being Professor Roller, and an accompanying office of 10 PhD level 
economists, within the Competition Directorate. The MTF was split into sector-
specific directorates. 
As Posner observed: "there is remarkable isomorphism between legal and 
economic theory .... [t]he law adopts an explicitly economic criterion of 
legality".362 As noted throughout the thesis, the application of the NMR, coupled 
with increased judicial review has precipitated both systemic change and a slight 
shift in both the normative dimension of the governance structure of merger policy 
and the combination of lawyers and economists, employed by all parties. The 
356Vallindas, G. New Directions in EC Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control. E.LJ, 12 
(5), 2006: 535-660, 641. 
" Vallindas, G. New Directions in EC Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control. E.L.J, 12 
(5), 2006: 535-660. 642. 
"Vallindas, G. New Directions in EC Competition Policy". The Case of Merger Control. ELf, 12 
(5), 2006: 535-660, 645; see Chapter I for more details of the case law. 
"9 Vallindas, G. New Directions in EC Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control. E.L.J, 12 
(5), 2006: 535-660, 646; Soames, T. & S. Maudhuit, Changes in EU Merger Control: Parts 1-3, 
E.C.L.R. 26, (1-3), 2005. 
'° Andreangeli, A. Fairness and Timing in Merger Control Proceedings: Will the Stop-The-Clock 
Clause Work? EC.LR. 26(7), 2005: 403-409. 
36t Andreangeli, A. Fairness and Timing in Merger Control Proceedings: Will the Stop-The-Clock 
Clause Work? E.C.LR. 26(7), 2005: 403409, 646. 
362 Posner, R. The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness. Journoi of Economic 
Perspective, 13(2), 1999: 91-99. 
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increased importance placed upon economic frameworks and models during merger 
investigations has consequences for the structures of governance within the merger 
regulation policy regime and for the teams who advise parties who wish to enter 
into a transaction. Economic theory and counsel is now, in more complex cases, 
placed on a par with legal advice. 
The Commission's assessment of transactions has become increasingly 
complex and whilst the "quality" of decisions has improved with the Commission 
making no more "extreme aberrations such as the prohibition decisions taken in 
2001 ,,,363 
 the parties to the transaction now have to present huge amounts of 
infonnation and data sets to the Commission, which the Commission's own 
economists and Chief Economist's office will then examine. The Proctor & 
Gamble/Gillette decision was one of the first cases to be seen by the Chief 
Economist and his team, as they conducted in-depth economic analysis of the non-
horizontal effects of the merger. 3" As the NMR has dropped the requirement to 
notify 7 days after an agreement between the parties has been signed, the 
proceedings have, as a consequence, become more drawn out as the parties 
themselves can decide when to notifS' after the agreement has been signed. 365 This 
flexible time scale permits extensive prenotification meetings with the Commission. 
Weitbrecht draws attention to several "major cases" which involve several markets: 
Proczer& Gamble/Gillette and Pernod Ricard/Allied Domecq. These cases involved 
a significant amount of prenotification meetings and consultation between the 
parties and Commission. The Commission was also involved in "market testing" 
prior to notification. These cases were cleared by the Commission (with significant 
commitments) after Phase I investigations. 3 In Kornas/AD Carton/ward as noted 
by Karlsson,367 the Commission "bravely" cleared the complex transaction after a 
Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005— An Overview. KC.LR. 27(2), 2006:43-50,46. 
" KIoc-Evison, K. etal. Procter & Gamble/Gillette: the role of economic analysis in Phase I 
cases. Competition Policy Newsletter, (3) Autumn 2005: 43. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comnilcompetition/publications/cpn/cpn20053.pdf  [Accessed 16/07107], 48. 
3" KIoc-Evison, K. et al. Procter & Gamble/ Gillette: the role of economic analysis in Phase I 
cases. Competition Policy Newsletter, (3) Autumn 2005: 43. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.euiconunlcompetitionipublicatiotnfcpnicpn200s_3.pdf [Accessed 16107/071. 
3" KIoc-Evison, K. et al. Procter & Gamble/ Gillette: the role of economic analysis in Phase I 
cases. Competition Policy Newsletter, (3) Autumn 2005: 43. Available from: 
http://ec.eaeu/comni/competition/publications/cpnIcpn20053.pdf 
 [Accessed 16107/071. 
Karlsson, J. Clearance of a Near-Duopoly. E.CL.R. 27(9), 2006: 514-518. 
[Mi 
An Appmisal of the Eumpean Commission's Application oldie New Main Regulation 
Phase I investigation as "considerable time and effort" was taken by the notifring 
parties to enter into interaction with the Commissioa The increasing complexity 
and time consuming nature of Commission investigations also means, however, that 
investigations are referred to Phase II investigations because the Phase I 
investigation runs out of time. Some of these mergers, for example Bertelsmann 
Springer/fl' and Blackstone/A telex, were then cleared without the presentation of a 
publication of objections. 3 
The Commission are employing more economists and utilising an 
increasingly economic approach to the merger investigations and the application of 
the merger regulation framework. In BIackstone/Acetez 3 the proposed 
concentration was only finally cleared after extensive market testing and an 
investigation by the CET.37° Use of industrial economists by the Commission, 
however, was not a new innovation. Prior to the creation of the role of Chief 
Economist and the reorganisation of the MTF, academic economists were consulted 
by the Commission. Economics Professor Ivaldi, for example, was consulted in the 
Volvo/Scania transaction. 37 ' 
Complex cases are now increasingly referred to this team of economists, as 
analysis is premised upon both legal and economic scrutiny. As Weitbrechr 
pointed out, questionnaires constructed by the merger units "... increasingly require 
consideration of economic elements based on Article 11 of the Merger Control 
368 Karlsson, J. Clearance ofaNear-Duopoly. E.C.LR. 27(9), 2006: 514-518. 
COMP/M.3625, LllackstonelAcetex ( unreported, July 13, 2005). 	 AvailabLe from: 
http://ec.eumpaeu  omm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3625 200507 I3_20682en.pdf 
[Accessed 04/03/08]. Blacicstone Crystal Holdings Capital Partiiers (a private merchant holdings 
company) acquired Acetex Corporation (chemicals company) subject to certain undertakings - to 
maintain Acetex's Pardies plant in France. The Commission cleared the transaction after an in depth 
investigation. 
' 70 Weidirecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2004 - An Overview. &CLR. 26(2), 2005:67-74. 
371 Posner, R. The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness. Journal of Economic 
Pcspective 13(2), 1999: 91-99; CaseN000MP/M.l672Volva'Scanials/0312000 ; e.g. Case T-
36191 Soda/Ash & Joined cases C-89195, C-104/85, C-I 14/85, C-I 16/85, C-I 17/85, C-125/85 to C-
129-85 Woodpulp, all make reference to academic advice. In this case the Commission prohibited 
Volvo's acquisition of Scania as the proposed commitments were insufficient to remedy competition 
concerns. (Rapid Press Release, The Commission prohibits Volvo 'c acquisition of its main 
competitor Scania Reference: IP/001257 Date: 14/0312000. Available from: 
httpil/europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/00t257&fonnat=HTML&aged=l &lang 
uage=EN&guiL.anguage=en [Accessed 29/08108]). 
7 Weitbrecht, A. EU Merger Control in 2005 — An Overview. &C.LR. 27(2), 2006:43-50. 
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Regulation". 373 Pflanz374 noted that the team of economists apply "empirical 
quantitative analysis methods to the effects of mergers". "Facts-based" evidence, as 
noted by Vallindas, 375 permits the relevant authorities to "resolve the problems 
raised by the use of economic science in competition law". As economists are 
flexible when constructing theoretical models, often providing alternatives, 
decisions can then be swayed by empirical evidence. 376 
Parties to transactions, like the Commission, are employing not only lawyers 
but also economists. 377 Since the entry into force of the ECMR, expenditure to 
economic consultancy firms such as Lexecon, LECG and RRB has risen as cases 
have increased in complexity and there have been more appeals by parties to the 
CFI. Expenditure on specialised economic consultancies which specialise in EU 
competition issues now equals that in the United States where 15% of aggregate 
fees from antitrust cases are paid to economic consultancy firms?' 8 In the Airtours 
case, expenditure on economists totalled 21% of expenditwe.3 Considering the 
percentage of Commission decisions which made "explicit reference to economic 
advice" between 1991-2005, Neven assessed the impact/influence economists have 
on competition policy. 380 He found that reliance upon economic advice fluctuated 
from year to year, in conjunction with important, complex cases. The number of 
Commission in-house economic specialists in comparison with legal specialists has 
increased from 1:7 in the early 1990s   to 1:2 in 2005. The Chief Economist and his 
team remain a small force in comparison with both the evolving economic 
373 Va1lin 	 G. New Directions in EC Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control. EL..!, 12 
(5), 2006: 535-660, 646. 
374 Pflanz, P. Oracle/Peoplesoft: The Economics of the EC Review. E.C.L.R. 26, (3), 2005, 123-7. 
75 Vallindas, G. New Directions in EC Competition Policy: The Case of Merger Control. ELf, 12 
5 , 2006: 535-660, 647. 
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p2006: 535-660. 
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COMP/M. 3216 OracklPeopleSofi, Commission Decision of 28 October 2004. 
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158 
An Appraisal of the European Commission's Application of the New Merger Regulation 
consultancy industry and the economists employed at the US antitrust agencies who 
employ over 120 specialists. 38 ' 
The increasing number of economists employed by both sides does not 
necessarily reveal the impact economics has had upon case-law and the application 
of the NMR. Certainly the case-law, decisions and developments in the legal 
framework of the EU merger regulation framewo& 82 indicate that the EU has 
taken on a more economic outlook and analytical toolkit. As outlined by Neven, 3 
economic analysis (quantitative methods, merger simulation techniques and the 
theory of collusion in repeated games) have been operationalised by the 
Commission and affirmed by the Courts. Botteman384 
 identifies an "increasing use 
of complex econometric modelling in EC merger control proceedings", as it is now 
standard procedure that economic experts from the Commission, notifring parties 
and third parties, should be actively involved in the investigative process, "... 
shaping the way mergers should be assessed". 385 Use of economics has become 
more influential in the analysis of non-coordinated effects.3M 
 There appears to be a 
shift towards economic, as well as legal, analyses, as a self-fulfilling continuum 
evolves. A combination of both the parties to transactions who increasingly 
employed industrial economic consultancies and economic academics from the 
mid-1990s onwards, especially during the more complex cases, coupled with the 
criticism from the CFI of the Commission's inconect application of economic 
models during certain investigations, has encouraged the Commission to adopt a 
more complex economic toolkit, and to reorganise the MTF in response to the 
parties' and Courts' actions. This, in turn, has facilitated the expansion of industrial 
economist consultancy firms who utilise more complex economic models to advise 
parties during investigations by the Commission, and during judicial review. The 
3$! Neven, D. J. competition, economics and antitrust in Europe. Economic Policy, I, 2006: 741-
791. 
Neven, D. J. competition, economics and antitrust in Europe. Economic Policy, 1, 2006: 741-
791.; see earlier sections of the thesis analysing jurisdictional and substantive issues. 
Neven, D. J. competition, economics and antitrust in Europe. Economic Policy, 1, 2006 741 
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Econ. 71, 2006. 
" Botteman, Y. Mergers, Standard of Proof and Expert Economic Evidence. 2. J .Competition L. & 
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application of the NMR, by the Commission, is evolving and utilising not only legal 
but also economic discourse. 
Criticism (and opinion about the possible pathway merger regulation policy is 
taking) does not only emanate from protectionist Member States and the Judgments 
and Opinions of the European Courts. A new subdivision of academic interest 
examining the economics of EU merger regulation has evolved within the economic 
sphere with the accompanying literature, workshops, conferences and forums, 
which do not just catch the interest of academia but of specialists working within 
this area of economics. Academic roundtables, forums and conference themes 
focus upon a diverse range of issues relating to the future of the EU merger 
regulation regime, its potential, limitations, drawing comparisons with other Merger 
Control Regulations, notably the US, analysing the content of the NMR and 
examining both the impact judicial review has upon the application of the NMR by 
the Commission and the increasing emphasis placed upon the use of quantitative 
economic tools during merger investigations. Academic debate, interconnected 
research arenas and academic literature all add weight and (secondary) input into 
the merger regulation policy community. 
Monti stated that the purpose of competition policy is to facilitate economic 
growth and strengthen European markets. This can only be achieved if there is a 
uniform, economic approach during the application of competition policy. The 
legislative (the revised substantive test) and policy changes (merger guidelines) 
which revised merger regulation, and the appointment of a Chief Economist and 
team of industrial economists, ensured that competition policy is now grounded in 
micro-economics. 387 The legal landscape of merger control regulation policy, 
therefore, has changed as a consequence of the application of the NMR. The 
Commission, due to scathing criticism from the CFI relating to the incorrect 
application of economic models, and as a consequence of the entry into force of the 
NMR, has incorporated more complex analysis, which is more relevant and 
applicable, into its analytical toolkit. There are now more economists employed in 
Monti, M. A reformed competition policy: achievements and challenges for the future. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2004:6. Available from: 
hup://e.eumpa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2004_3.pdf  [Accessed 11/07/07]. 
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the competition directorate whose expertise is employed during more complex 
investigations. On the flip side of the coin, parties also employ economists as well 
as lawyers as part of their teams, as required analysis and arguments are not only 
premised upon legal but economic models. Economics has become intrinsically 
linked with legal analysis as the EU merger regulation framework evolves. 
3.13. Change of Direction in the Trajectory of Policy? 
Lowe, in his speech at the EC competition Day 20063U 
 considered if the 
revision of the EC merger regulation framework had changed the trajectory of path 
dependency in merger policy. Noting that the objectives of the revision were to 
enhance the effectiveness of the system with the introduction of a new substantive 
test, and to improve jurisdictional allocation with the introduction of a new referral 
system, he pointed out that "there has been a high degree of continuity" between the 
old and the new system of merger regulation. The success of the NMR, however, is 
dependent upon the application of its provisions by the Commission. Although the 
NMR does represent a critical juncture in the evolvement of the European merger 
regulation framework, formalising and claril'ing the changes which were evolving 
prior to the entry into force of the NMR, the Commission appears cautious, taking a 
step-change approach to its application of the NMR. 
The use of the SIEC by the Commission, coupled with organisational reform, 
has formalised the changes which were evolving in the normative dimension of the 
merger regulation regime prior to the entry into force of the NMR. The NMR has 
filled the unanticipated gaps left by the original Merger Control Regulation which 
emerged as a consequence of the application of the Regulation by the Commission. 
Whilst the move to a more economic and econometric toolkit, by the Commission, 
by parties to the transaction and third parties, does not represent a paradigmatic 
change per se, but a step-change, there is a shift in emphasis. Both academic 
economists' and economic consultancies' expertise, together with the advice of 
lawyers, are drawn upon by all concerned, especially in more complex cases. 
Lowe, P. EC Merger Regulation: Is there Really a New Approach? EC Competition Day, 
Vienna, 2006 EC Competition Day. Available from: 
hilp://www.competitionO6.corn/NF.Jrdonlyres/BF2DD 1E3-5FA3-48CE-A333- 
013651 5D1 FE4/25532/PhilipLoweslidesl 9iune2006Vienna.pdf (Accessed 14/01/08). 
161 
An Appraisal of the European Commission's Application of the New Mager Regulation 
Although these actors had been drawn into the merger control regulation regime 
prior to the entry into force of the NMR, the application of the revised Regulation 
solidified, enhanced and secured their position within the framework. 
The balance of power in the merger regulation governance regime has shifted. 
Scathing criticism and judicial review of merger decisions was not new. There are 
several well cited examples from mid 2000 onwards which highlighted the 
Commission's struggle to cope with the influx of notifications and the failure to 
correctly apply and interpret the economic models. This criticism shaped the 
direction of the pathway of change and indicated that the Courts were going to play 
an active role in this arena. Increasingly the Commission has been forced to justify 
decisions before the Courts, whilst the Courts have made it clear that they will not 
only consider the legality of the decision but also review the Commission's 
economic analysis. 
The Commission has finally managed to take a step away from the assessment 
of ancillary restrictions, as parties can now self—assess unless the circumstances are 
novel and exceptional. Case referrals now permit the best placed authority to assess 
the merger and the whole process has been made more flexible to assist parties who 
may need to notify multiple authorities as they operate in the global market. 
Although the consequences of the entry into force of the NIMR and changes to 
the governance regime have yet to crystallise, as the NMR is still in its infhncy and 
the way the Commission intends to apply the provisions is unclear, one can still 
conjecture from the evolving case-law that the Commission is being extremely 
cautious in its approach to merger regulation and the appraisal of transactions. New 
economic norms and values are evolving and the balance of power is shifting. The 
transition between the original and revised Merger Control Regulation has, as 
i.oWe389 points out, been smooth, unlike some critical junctures, such as the 1986 
Single European Act, which represented a significant change. The NMR has built 
Lowe, P. EC Merger Regulation: Is there Really a New Approach? EC Competition Day, 
Vienna, 2006 EC Competition Day. Available from: 
hflp://www.competitionO6.comJNRkdonlyres/BE2DDI E3-5FA3-4SCE-A333- 
013651 SDI FE4125532/PhilipLoweslides I 9June2006Vienna.pdf (Accessed 14101108). 
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upon the existing framework, filling the gaps and making improvements where 
needed. Only the application of the new framework by the Commission will give 
insight into how the actual provisions are to be applied and where more 
improvement is needed. 
3.14. Conclusion 
According to Dactylidis and Goolden: 
"Until a few years ago, intervention by the European Commission to 
control mergers and acquisitions within Europe on competition policy 
grounds was infrequent. Control was usuaily exercised under art 86 
applicable only when the acquiring party held a pre-existing dominant 
position". 390 
The fundamental changes which occurred in the regulation of mergers as a 
consequence of the ECMR entering into force on the 21st 
 September 1990 gave the 
European Commission "... the exclusive right (subject to certain exceptions) to 
control mergers which are 'concentrations with a Community dimension". 39 ' 
Elland,392 examining the evolvement of the merger policy regime and the first draft 
of the original Merger Control Regulation, highlighted the "Commission's 
increasingly active role"393 and "active involvement in major EC ,.394  As 
early as 1990, Soames et a1 395 noted that the entry into force of the Merger Control 
Regulation "... provide[d] the Commission with a stiff challenge and it remains to 
be seen how the already over-streched DGIV will cope". 396 
 Although initially the 
Commission coped with the challenges of applying the ECMR, the criticisms dealt 
out by the CFI are indicative that the Commission was not operating to an optimal 
standard, as the CFI highlighted and criticised the Commission's failure to 
objectively and effectively assess transactions in several high profile cases. 
390 Dactylidis, R. & J. Goolden, The EEC merger regulation - M&A control moves to Brussels. New 
Law Journal, 1990, 140(6460). 
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Law Society Gazette s 4 July 1990. 
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This chapter, the main substantive chapter of the thesis, considered if the 
direction of merger policy had changed as a consequence of the application of the 
revised Merger Regulation by the Commission. The application of the NMR and 
accompanying framework cannot have an instantaneous effect upon the 
"Commission's decisional practiceS ,,. 397 The evolvement of the merger regulation 
framework is evolving incrementally on a case by case basis, based on a step 
change rather than radical readjustment to the direction of policy. 
Vickers398 remarked that the 2004 revisions to the merger regulation regime - 
"recent winds of change" - "have dispersed much fog from merger policy...". 
Clearly the revisions instigated by the NMR have clarified and filled the 
unanticipated gaps which have evolved as the original Regulation was implemented 
by the Commission. In terms of jurisdictional allocation, the reforms have 
streamlined and increased the flexibility of the allocation of mergers, inline with the 
EU's emphasis upon subsidiarity, ensuring that the most suitably placed 
competition authority can assess the transaction. Increased flexibility appears to be 
key to the Merger Regulation reforms. Notification has become more flexible and 
the introduction of the stop-the-clock procedure allows more time for the 
Commission to enter into discussion with parties to the transaction and interested 
third parties, ensuring that any potential problems can be ironed out, reducing the 
possibility of the Courts being drawn into the proceedings. 
Originally the Commission's decisional practice when assessing the viability 
of transactions was premised upon assessment of market share and abuse of 
dominance criterion. The Commission could only challenge transactions which 
would strengthen or establish dominance of a concentration post merger, which 
resulted in transactions falling under the threshold or the Commission's decision 
being overturned by the Courts. As Monti pointed out, 3 the revisions represent a 
"Roller; L. M. & M. de La Mano, The Impact ofthe New Substantive Test in European Merger 
ControL Available from: 
http:/172. 14.207. 104/search?q=cache:39_M6OUYXIwJ:europaeu.int/comznfdgs/competition/new_s 
ubstantivetestpdf+SIEC+test&hl=en&gl=uk&cp'clnk&cd=lO [Accessed 22/02/061, 3. 
Vickers, J. Merger Policy in Europe: Retrospect and Prospect E.C.LK, 25(7), 2004: 455463. 
3 Monti, M. A reformed competition policy: achievements and challenges for the future. 
Competition Policy Newsletter, (3), Autumn 2004:6. Available from: 
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"consolidation of a world-wide leading merger system". Now the Commission's 
toolkit has been widened to consider: closeness of substitution; symmetry of the 
market prior to and after the transaction; will the transaction open up, liberalise, the 
market and finally assess the effect the removal of a potential future competitor may 
have upon the competitiveness of the market. Market share, by itself, is no longer 
necessarily justification for the prohibition of a merger. The most notable 
readjustment to the merger regulation framework was the revision of the DI. Now 
a concentration only needs to significantly impede competition to be prohibited by 
the Commission. 
The transition from the DT to the SIEC has not resulted in the instantaneous 
abandonment of the DT as the tool by which concentrations are assessed. The 
potential for a concentrations' dominance to impede competition is still an 
important tool used by the Commission in Phase I cases, but less so in Phase II 
cases. In Phase II cases, other factors, such as equilibrium effects, are taken into 
account. If dominance is identified by the Commission, this is regarded as sufficient 
justification to challenge a merger. If dominance is not identified or not seen as 
sufficient evidence to challenge a transaction, other factors such as closeness of 
substitution are also brought into the analysis. 
The revised Regulation allows factors such as increased efficiencies and 
countervailing buyer power to counteract dominance, whilst the focus of the 
Commission's investigation has shifted from the effect the transaction will have 
upon competitors to the effect the transaction will have upon consumers in terms, 
for example, of price rises. 
The Commission possesses a unique role within the merger regulation policy 
making regime. It not only compiles the draft Regulation but also applies the 
provisions of Regulation during the investigation and can either prohibit or clear a 
transaction. The EU's emphasis upon the open method of coordination has 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpnIcpn20043.pdf 
 [Accessed 11/07/07] & 
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enhanced the Commission's position within the policy regime. Points of access 
have been widened as the Commission meets with both parties to the transaction 
and interested parties. The Commission is also one of the main players within the 
international competition/merger regulation policy regime, influencing not only the 
direction of policy but also able to block mergers which may negatively affect 
competition within the borders of the EU. The Commission is also prepared to take 
to task Member States who attempt to protect national champions. 
Despite the Commission being a multi-tasker and significant player within 
the policy regime, the CFI and ECJ can and do overrule Commission decisions, 
establishing new checks and balances to which the Commission must adhere to 
when conducting investigations. The press, whilst not being part of the formal 
policy regime, does, however, attempt to influence policy outcome. 
Certainly there has been a step rather than a radical change in the direction of 
policy, the roots of which can be traced back prior to the entry into force of the 
NMR. The NMR, whilst not representing a radical shift in policy, does however 
improve the effectiveness of the framework, enhancing both the efficacy of 
jurisdictional allocation and also of legal certainty. As part of the change in 
emphasis and incremental shift in the direction of policy, economics and 
econometric models are becoming more influential, on a par with legal analysis. 
The merger regulation policy is incrementally evolving, the changes instigated by 
the entry into force and application of its provisions becoming more apparent as the 
Commission incorporates the formal changes into the substantive framework. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
This thesis was premised upon the hypothesis that the application of the NMR 
by the Commission represented a step-change rather than a radical readjustment to 
the existing merger regulation framework. 
The evolvement of EU merger policy is punctuated by two critical junctures. 
The first juncture was precipitated in 1990 with the entry into force of the original 
Merger Control Regulation, the second with the entry into force of the NMR in 
2004. The path dependent policy, established at these junctures, evolved and 
developed as a consequence of both the application of the merger regulation 
framework by the European Commission and as a consequence of judicial review. 
The application of the original merger regulation framework revealed its successes, 
gaps, limitations and unanticipated consequences. The entry into force of the New 
Merger Control Regulation sought to bridge these gaps and address perceived 
limitations and unanticipated consequences, whilst maintaining the positive aspects 
and provisions of the original ECMR. The NMR represents a critical juncture in the 
evolvement of EU merger regulation policy. The entry into force of the NIMR 
resolved the anomalies, shortcomings and unanticipated consequences which had 
evolved as a consequence of the application of the original Merger Control 
Regulation. Although the effects of the application of the NMR by the European 
Commission have yet to crystallise, it is nevertheless clear that the concrete 
illustrations of the application of the NMR indicate the Commission's flexibility 
when it is interpreting its provisions. The NMR's impact will be gradual, as the 
Commission and other actors not only adapt theft normative dimension and tools 
associated with merger regulation but also, through application of the NMR, 
discover the anomalies and shortcomings of the existing framework, hence the need 
for an amending or revised Regulation, as the merger regulation framework 
continues to evolve. 
The entry into force of the NMR and its subsequent application by the 
Commission illustrates how the recast Regulation represents both a case of 
continuity and change. The question of whether or not the NMR will live up (or 
down) to the expectations of the theoretical literature analysing the content of the 
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recast Regulation, is reliant upon the Commission's interpretation and application 
of the provisions of the NMR. 
The trajectoiy of policy has not necessarily altered from the course established 
by the original ECMR. Instead, as a consequence of the application of the NMR, it 
is clear that in most areas, the direction the merger regulation framework is taking, 
had already been established by the Commission prior to the entry into force of the 
revised Regulation. Whilst legal certainty has been enhanced by the introduction of 
the SIEC, the Commission, however, has been cautious when applying the 
provisions of the NMR. Dominance continues to play an important role in Phase I 
cases whilst effects based analysis is utilised more in Phase II cases. If dominance 
can be established, it is deemed justification, by itself; to challenge a merger. 
Whilst the NMR has had little impact upon horizontal merger cases, there is 
evidence that the Commission has applied more effects-based analysis to vertical 
mergers. The Commission, however, can no longer depend upon dominance alone 
as justification to prohibit or clear a merger. Now assessment of a transaction can 
include: closeness of substitution; symmetry of the market, prior to and after the 
transaction; countervailing buyer power; the possibility that it will remove a 
potential [future] competitor from the market and consider if the transaction will 
liberalise the market. 
Flexibility has been introduced into the regime. The notification procedure is 
more accommodating, with more points of access for the parties to the transaction 
and interested parties to enter into discussion with the Commission and iron out 
potential problems. This interaction ensures that the actual investigation is 
expedient and clearance/prohibition less likely to be challenged in the Courts. 
Extrapolation and analysis of examples of the Commission's application of 
the NMR, plus the consideration of how the merger regulation framework has 
changed as a consequence of the entry into force of the NMR, clearly illustrate the 
Commission's innovative yet cautious approach to the application of the new and 
revised provisions. The novel and fresh methodology, incorporated into the 
Commission's toolkit, indicates that there has been a change in emphasis in the 
normative dimension of the Commission in relation to the analysis of transactions. 
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Systemic change precipitated by the entry into force of the NMR, has not resulted in 
a vast shift in the trajectory of policy. Emphasis within the governance regime has 
shifted as a consequence of the whole procedure becoming more adversarial as the 
EU Courts are drawn within the regime. 
New actors and institutions have been absorbed into the governance regime, 
which requires the Commission to: become more defensive if it has to justifi 
decisions before the CFI and ECJ; reprimand Member States who try to protect 
national champions and thus undermine the ethos and content of the merger 
regulation policy and also castigate the media for trying to manipulate the 
environment within which decisions are taken. The Commission is also a global 
player, an active participant in the global merger regulation policy community, 
shaping the trajectory of policy. The Commission, therefore, is a multi-tasker in the 
merger regulation policy regime, but its main task within this regime remains the 
same as in the original Regulation: to ensure that competition is not impeded as a 
consequence of transactions taking place. 
The merger regulation governance regime and its accompanying norms of 
governance have become more complex as a consequence of the application of the 
NMR and the revised merger regulation framework. New institutions and actors 
have been drawn into the merger regulation process. As investigations become 
increasingly complex, parties employ teams of specialist lawyers, economists and 
public relation specialists. Criticism levied by the European Courts has further 
sensitised the Commission to the need to conduct in-depth investigations to 
enable/ensure the Commission can be held to a high standard of proof and does not 
have to face ex-post criticism from the European Courts. The Commission's unique 
position as sole applicator/implementer of the merger regulation framework has 
been substantially weakened as the European Courts have been drawn into the 
governance regime, with judicial review shaping the application and path 
dependency of policy. 
The Commission's application of the NMR must be assessed case-by-case. 
Each decision is unique and gives an insight into how the Commission intends to 
apply the provisions of the revised Regulation. At the present time the Commission 
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is taking a cautious approach when applying the NMR. The transition from the old 
to the new Regulation is seamless, yet still represents a critical juncture in the 
evolvement and subsequent application of the Merger Control Regulation, filling 
the gaps, increasing legal certainty and establishing a new set of norms and values 
within the Commission as the assessment of transactions requires not only a legal 
but also an economic toolkit. The entry into force and application of the revised 
Merger Regulation represents a step change rather than a radical readjustment to the 
merger regulation framework. The roots, or foundations, of the changes that 
occurred as a consequence of the revision represent a natural continuation to the 
evolving framework, filling in the unanticipated gaps and flaws that have emerged 
as a consequence of the Commission's application of the original framework. The 
changes do not signify a change in direct to existing policy, but characterize part of 
a naturai progression as the framework evolves and increases in complexity. The 
merger regulation framework, whilst intensif,ing in complexity, has, as in line with 
EU Competition law as a whole, sought to become mores simplistic and flexible for 
the user - parties to the transaction. The framework has kept the elements which 
proved to be effective whilst at the same increasing legal certainty and flexibility. 
The efficacy of these revision (and unanticipated consequences and flaws) will 
become apparent as the Commission applies the new framework of merger control. 
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GLOSSARY' 
Abuse of dominant position - any anti-competitive practices (price-fixing etc) used 
by a dominant firm to maintain or increase its power in the market. 
Ancillary restraints - agreements which impose restrictions upon parties to the 
concentration. The restraints/restrictions are not the main object of the Commission's 
investigation, but they are "related to and necessary for the proper functioning" of the 
concentration. (European Commission, GLOSSARY of terms used in EU competition 
policy). 
Antitrust 
- area of EU competition law concerned with Articles 81 & 82 EC Treaty - 
the rules regulating anti-competitive agreements and practices. 
Buyer power - the ability of the buyer to exert its purchasing power and negotiate 
favourable deals of sale. 
Collective Dominance - two or more firms may possess joint, collective or 
oligopolistic dominance. 
Collusion - coordination of firms' competitive behaviour. 
Commission Notice - a non-legally binding document (which accompanies a legally-
binding document, i.e. Regulation) adopted by the Commission to enable the 
Regulation to be applied successfully. These notices are sometimes called Guidelines 
and can be used by parties needing guidance when submitting, for example, merger 
notifications. 
Commitments - proposals presented by parties to the transaction, or requirements 
presented by the Commission, aimed at addressing/solving the competition concerns 
identified by the Commission during the merger investigation. 
Competition - a market condition where firms compete for buyers/ market share. 
Concentration - a concentration arises when two or more parties merge, an 
undertaking acquires another undertaking or two or more parties enter into a full 
function joint venture. 
Conglomerate merger - a merger between firms in related markets. 
Cooperative joint venture - "embodiment of a special, institutionally fixed form of 
cooperation between undertakings. They are versatile instruments at the disposal of 
the parents, with the help of which different goals can be attained". (Notice on 
cooperative joint ventures, the European Commission [1993] OJ C43/2, pan l). 
'To ensure relevance to EU competition policy I have used Commission of the European 
Communities, Glossary of tenns used in EU competition policy, Directorate-General for 
Competition, Brussels, 2002 as my man source of reference and the Competition Commission's 
online Glossary of terms used in competition matters. Available from: 
httpJ/ec.europaeu/comm/competitionlgenerai_infb/glossary_en.html#aU [Accessed 21/08/08]. 
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Divestiture - often offered as part of a divestiture package, a divestiture requires an 
undertaking to sell off, for example, part of its existing portfolio of firms. 
Dominant position - a firm possesses a dominant position if it has the capacity to 
control the market, i.e. set prices. The dominant firm holds enough market power that 
it can act independently of competitors, customers and consumers. It is not illegal to 
possess a dominant position; it is, however, illegal under EU law to abuse this 
position. 
Downstream market - the next stage in the chain of production/distribution. 
Duopoly - a market where there are two sellers or two main sellers who dominate the 
market. 
Economies of scale - this is achieved when firms save money (for example) by 
increasing production. 
Entry barriers - factors which hinder or prevent a company from entering a market. 
Extra-territorality - one state applying jurisdiction over another. 
Foreclosure - strategic action by one firm, to prevent another firm gaining access to 
either the upstream or downstream market 
Full function joint venture - encompasses a wide range of operations ranging from 
research and design to distribution. The essential element is that the parent companies 
must both put resources into the venture and the venture must be jointly controlled. 
(Notice on the concept of a full function joint venture, the European Commission, 
[1998] OJ C66/1, pam 3). 
Hearing officer - an independent official who organises hearings and ensures they 
are properly conducted. S/he reports to the Competition Commissioner and his/her 
report is published in the official journal. 
Horizontal agreement - arrangements between two or more competitors who operate 
in the same market. 
Horizontal merger - a merger between two companies at the same level in the same 
market. 
Implementing regulation - legislative (secondary) act which implements parts of the 
primary, enabling legislation. 
Infringement proceedings - an action taken by the Commission against a Member 
State which fails to fliffil obligations set out in either the BC Treaty or secondary 
legally-binding legislation. This can result in a judgment being issued by the ECJ. If 
the Member State ignores the judgment then the Commission can open a new 
proceedings and the ECJ can issue a fine upon the Member State. 
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Joint control - whereby two, or more, entities possess the means to control another 
undertaking. 
Joint venture - An arrangement entered into between two (or more) parent 
companies to achieve a specific economic goal. 
Market share - a measure for an undertaking's size in a market. In terms of 
correlation, the larger the market share, the stronger the profit margin etc. 
Monopoly - one entity (the supplier) dominates the market. 
Monopsony - one entity (the buyer) dominates the demand side of the market. 
Notification - firms have to provide the Commission with certain information once 
they have entered into an agreement. 
Obligations - the Commission imposes certain requirements on the parties before a 
transaction can be authorized. 
Oligopoly - a situation where a few (big) sellers, realising that they are 
interdependent, anticipate each other's actions in order to jointly dominate the market. 
Potential competition - pressure is placed upon existing firms due to the possibility 
that new firms will enter the market. 
Potential competitor - an entity will be regarded as potential competitor if it 
expresses an interest in entering, or there is evidence that it possesses the capacity to, 
enter the market. 
Remedies - corrective measures presented by the Commission, or suggested by the 
parties to the transaction, which will restore competition to the market. These 
measures must be implemented by the parties before the transaction can be cleared. 
Retailer— end of the supply chain, sells fmal product to the consumer. 
Spill over effects - side effects of a transaction (sometimes unanticipated). 
Substitutability - products that are interchangeable or equivalent in nature. 
Tacit collusion - firms act independently but can interact when necessary. An 
example of tacit collusion is when one firm raises their prices so its competitors 
follow suit. 
Undertaking - any legal venture involved in economic activity. 
Upstream market - the first stage of the production distribution chain. 
Vertical agreement - an agreement between two or more entities who operate at 
different levels of the production chain. 
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Vertical merger - an undertaking merges with another which operates at a different 
level of the production/supply chain, i.e. producer & distributor. 
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a 	 ti ill IXI P1 
REFERRALS 1 1 09/06 
9091929394959697989900010203040506 Total 
Art 4(4) 
request(Form 2 1410 26 
RS)  
Art 4(4) 
referralto 2 118 21 
Member State 
Art 4(4) 
reflisalof 0 0 0 0 
referral  
Art 4(5) 
request(Form 202830 78 
Art 4(5) 
referral 162432 72 
accepted  
Art 4(5) 
refusalof 200 2 
referral 
Art22 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 4 3 15 
request  
Art 22(3) 
referral (Art 22. 
4 taken in 
conjunctionwith O 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 2 13 
article 6 or S 
under Reg. 
4064\89)  
Art 22(3) 
reflisalof 1 1 2 
referral  
Art9request 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 7 4 9 4 9 8 104 7 5 74 
Art 9.3 partial 
referralto 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 3 2 3 6 7 1 1 3 1 35 
Member State 
 
Art9.3full 00010031 1 3 2 1 4 8 2 3 1 30 
referral  
Art 9.3 
refusalof 01000000010001000 3 
referral 
Available from: European Commission, European Merger Control - Council Regulation 13912004 
Statistics. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/caseslstats.html  (Accessed 
17/10/06). 
APPENDIX 2 
Lars-Ilendrik Roller & Miguel de In Mano's Evaluated Cases 
Phase 1 cases approved with conditions and obligations 
M.3863 - 1151/ CP SHIPS 
M.3829 - MAERSK / PONL 
M.3817 - WEGENER/PCM/JV 
M.3779 - PERNOD RICARD / ALLIED DOMECQ 
M.3770 - LUFTHANSA / SWISS 
M.3765 - AMER / SALOMON 
M.3751 - NOVARTIS / HEXAL 
M.3732 - PROCTER & GAMBLE / GILLEflE 
M.3692 - REUTERS / TELERATE 
M.3686 - HONEYWELL / NOVAR 
M.3680 - ALCATEL / FINMECCANICA I ALCATEL ALENIA SPACE & 
TELESPAZIO 
M.3658 - ORKLA / CHIPS 
M.3593 - APOLLO / BAKELITE 
M.3570 - PIAGGIO / APRILLA. 
M.3558 - CYTEC I UCB - SURFACE SPECIALTIES 
M.3544 - BAYER HEALTHCARE I ROCHE (OTC BUSINESS) 
M.3465 - SYNGENTA CP / ADVANTA 
M.3410 - TOTAL / GAZ DE FRANCE 
Phase 2 cases 
M.3687 - JOHNSON & JOHNSON / GUIDANT 
M.3653 - SIEMENS / VA TECH 
M.3436 - CONTINENTAL I PHOENIX 
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M.3431 - SONOCO/AFILSTROM/JV 
M.3 178- BERTELSMANN / SPRINGER / JV 
M.3696 - E.ONIMOL 
My sample: contested cases between October 13 2005 and October 13 2006 
Phase 1 cases approved with conditions and obligations 
Art 6(1) (1,) with conditions and obligations 
M.4314 - JOHNSON & JOHNSON / PFIZER CONSUMER HEALTHCARE 
MAI51 -ORICA/DYNO 
M.4150 - ABBOfl / GUIDANT 
M.4141 -LINDE/BOC 
M.4137 - MITrAL / ARCELOR 
M.4066 - CVC / SLEC 
M.4055 - TALANIX / GERLING 
M.4035 - TELEFONICA /02 
M.3998 - AXALTO / GEMPLUS 
M.3946 - RENOLIT / SOLVAY 
M.3940 - LUFTHANSA / EUROWINGS 
Phase 2 cases, Art.8(2) with conditions and obligations 
M.41 87- METSO / AKER KVAERNER 
M.4180 - GAZ DE FRANCE / SUEZ 
M.4000 - INCO I FALCONIBRIDGE 
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